47
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
opposite idea of the importance of tenure, may be defended by referencing two equally
laudable justice principles: that of not being excluded from resource extraction, and
that of securing a viable livelihood free from destructive intrusion for oneself or for
one’s group or community. Let me now discuss this issue in a more orderly fashion.
When there is scarcity of resources, issues of distributional justice typically
arise (Bojer 2006 ) . Does everyone get a fair share? Does everyone get what they
deserve – or think they deserve? Claimants to fi sheries resources may fi nd themselves having to settle for less than what they want or need. In the short run, and
within a given total allowable catch (TAC), fi sheries management is a zero-sum
game; more for one means less for someone else. Therefore, distributional issues,
i.e. when quotas are allocated or fi shing territories are divided among fi sher groups,
often lead to social con fl ict and political strife among resource users. Distributional
justice is closely related to how markets work. Markets do not automatically distribute
resources to those most in need or those who have other legitimate claims to them.
Distributional justice must also be discussed in relation to power differentials
and power dynamics. A recurrent justice issue in social science fi sheries social
research is how the “ fi sh chain” produces winners and losers (Kooiman et al. 2005 ;
Pullin (Chap. 6 ), this volume). For instance, there is now substantial literature on the
role of middlemen in transactions with fi shers (see Jentoft et al. 2010 ) . Asymmetric
relationships tend to occur because fi shers lack alternatives; they have no other
place to go and must therefore accept whatever price the middleman offers. Efforts
to increase distributional justice would therefore need to target power relations that
cause unfair distributional outcomes.
Social justice is also related to resource use and overexploitation. Justice is then
both a contributing factor and an outcome. As Chuenpagdee et al. ( 2005 , 35) argue,
“To make a living when no alternative sources of employment are available and
one’s bargaining power is weak, the only response to falling prices is for fi shers to
increase their fi shing effort.” Those who drive fi shing pressure beyond the point of
sustainability are not necessarily those that have to live with the consequences.
A case in point is the “roving bandits” who have no attachment to place and community
and thus move around the world in search of un- or underexploited resources. When
they are done with them and leave, fi sh stocks are ruined (Berkes et al. 2008 ) . This
certainly has ecological and management implications that, from a governability
perspective, have proven dif fi cult to deal with for national governments. From the
perspective of local populations who suffer the consequences for their livelihoods,
however, the problem is also about distributional justice.
It is important to note that there is more to justice than distributional aspects.
Young ( 1990 ) argues that the “distributive paradigm” focuses too much on material
goods and does not take into account group differences and the fact that some groups
are oppressed and marginalized. According to Miller ( 1999 ) , justice should therefore be conceived as a tripartite concept, emphasizing need, desert
1 and equality.
1 By desert, we mean what we believe a person deserves. For an elaboration of this concept, see
Pojman ( 2001 ).
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
opposite idea of the importance of tenure, may be defended by referencing two equally
laudable justice principles: that of not being excluded from resource extraction, and
that of securing a viable livelihood free from destructive intrusion for oneself or for
one’s group or community. Let me now discuss this issue in a more orderly fashion.
When there is scarcity of resources, issues of distributional justice typically
arise (Bojer 2006 ) . Does everyone get a fair share? Does everyone get what they
deserve – or think they deserve? Claimants to fi sheries resources may fi nd themselves having to settle for less than what they want or need. In the short run, and
within a given total allowable catch (TAC), fi sheries management is a zero-sum
game; more for one means less for someone else. Therefore, distributional issues,
i.e. when quotas are allocated or fi shing territories are divided among fi sher groups,
often lead to social con fl ict and political strife among resource users. Distributional
justice is closely related to how markets work. Markets do not automatically distribute
resources to those most in need or those who have other legitimate claims to them.
Distributional justice must also be discussed in relation to power differentials
and power dynamics. A recurrent justice issue in social science fi sheries social
research is how the “ fi sh chain” produces winners and losers (Kooiman et al. 2005 ;
Pullin (Chap. 6 ), this volume). For instance, there is now substantial literature on the
role of middlemen in transactions with fi shers (see Jentoft et al. 2010 ) . Asymmetric
relationships tend to occur because fi shers lack alternatives; they have no other
place to go and must therefore accept whatever price the middleman offers. Efforts
to increase distributional justice would therefore need to target power relations that
cause unfair distributional outcomes.
Social justice is also related to resource use and overexploitation. Justice is then
both a contributing factor and an outcome. As Chuenpagdee et al. ( 2005 , 35) argue,
“To make a living when no alternative sources of employment are available and
one’s bargaining power is weak, the only response to falling prices is for fi shers to
increase their fi shing effort.” Those who drive fi shing pressure beyond the point of
sustainability are not necessarily those that have to live with the consequences.
A case in point is the “roving bandits” who have no attachment to place and community
and thus move around the world in search of un- or underexploited resources. When
they are done with them and leave, fi sh stocks are ruined (Berkes et al. 2008 ) . This
certainly has ecological and management implications that, from a governability
perspective, have proven dif fi cult to deal with for national governments. From the
perspective of local populations who suffer the consequences for their livelihoods,
however, the problem is also about distributional justice.
It is important to note that there is more to justice than distributional aspects.
Young ( 1990 ) argues that the “distributive paradigm” focuses too much on material
goods and does not take into account group differences and the fact that some groups
are oppressed and marginalized. According to Miller ( 1999 ) , justice should therefore be conceived as a tripartite concept, emphasizing need, desert
1 and equality.
1 By desert, we mean what we believe a person deserves. For an elaboration of this concept, see
Pojman ( 2001 ).