346
R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
challenge persists and must be addressed on a continuous basis – just as a wicked
problem without a clear end point. Notably, the limits of governability can sometimes
be stretched through intervention and innovation. What these limits are and how
they can be manipulated is a governability research issue for which the approach has
been outlined above.
Interactive governance theory argues that fi sheries and aquaculture systems are
diverse, complex and dynamic, and that their system characteristics are rich and
spatially variable. Consequently, they are not fully controllable, their developments
are largely non-linear, and information is never complete. All together, this frequently
makes the system outcomes unintended and unpredictable (Degnbol and McCay
2007 ) . The aforementioned reality requires a governance approach that is fl exible
and adaptive as opposed to one that emphasizes control and stability (Mahon et al.
2008 ) . In governance terms, this is what Scholtens and Bavinck (Chap. 10 , this
volume) refer to as an institutional match. A lack of compatibility is not only likely
to reduce governance capacity and hence effectiveness, but is also prone to con fl ict
that will reduce governing system legitimacy and increase transaction costs. Partly
due to institutional inertia, such con fl icts tend to persist over time and have to be
handled without the prospect of ever being fully resolved. For these reasons, governing goals cannot be assumed to be given ex ante. Instead they must be analyzed
as outcomes of a continuing negotiation among a diverse group of stakeholders with
asymmetric power, differentiated images, incompatible expectations and con fl icting
demands (Jentoft et al. 2011 ) . This also means that governance is not so much about
exercising authority from the top down, as it is about political brokerage from below,
where operating goals are at best imperfect and sub-optimal compromises.
Governability issues arise as governing actors attempt to deal with the wicked
nature of fi sheries and aquaculture problems. More precisely, they appear when
de fi nitions of problems are unclear and must be negotiated, and when solutions are
pre-conceived and imposed on the negotiators. They also appear when stakeholders
have different ideas with respect to when the problem is solved; outcomes do not
necessarily ful fi ll the various demands of stakeholders. Solutions for one group of
stakeholders may cause problems for other stakeholders, thereby ensuring the continuation of the governing process without a clear end in sight. For this and for other
reasons pertaining to fi sheries and aquaculture governance, improving governability
is in itself a wicked problem. As a wicked problem, governability is not a quality or
capacity that can be achieved once and for all. Rather, it is an outcome of dynamic
processes that need to be revisited from time to time. However, governability as a
whole, or any of its components, can be in fl uenced by acts of governance. Governance
is therefore essentially about promoting governability.
As illustrated in Song and Chuenpagdee (Chap. 15 , this volume), stakeholders
may share common values. More often than not, however, their interests vary to
the point that their activities cause competition, con fl icts and resource degradation.
In the simplest form, some fi shing areas may be overlapped, and tension arising from
this may be lessened through proper zoning. Some activities are completely opposed
by others, such as when areas used for mariculture are no longer accessible to smallscale fi shing, or when a development of an exclusive beach resort prohibits others
R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
challenge persists and must be addressed on a continuous basis – just as a wicked
problem without a clear end point. Notably, the limits of governability can sometimes
be stretched through intervention and innovation. What these limits are and how
they can be manipulated is a governability research issue for which the approach has
been outlined above.
Interactive governance theory argues that fi sheries and aquaculture systems are
diverse, complex and dynamic, and that their system characteristics are rich and
spatially variable. Consequently, they are not fully controllable, their developments
are largely non-linear, and information is never complete. All together, this frequently
makes the system outcomes unintended and unpredictable (Degnbol and McCay
2007 ) . The aforementioned reality requires a governance approach that is fl exible
and adaptive as opposed to one that emphasizes control and stability (Mahon et al.
2008 ) . In governance terms, this is what Scholtens and Bavinck (Chap. 10 , this
volume) refer to as an institutional match. A lack of compatibility is not only likely
to reduce governance capacity and hence effectiveness, but is also prone to con fl ict
that will reduce governing system legitimacy and increase transaction costs. Partly
due to institutional inertia, such con fl icts tend to persist over time and have to be
handled without the prospect of ever being fully resolved. For these reasons, governing goals cannot be assumed to be given ex ante. Instead they must be analyzed
as outcomes of a continuing negotiation among a diverse group of stakeholders with
asymmetric power, differentiated images, incompatible expectations and con fl icting
demands (Jentoft et al. 2011 ) . This also means that governance is not so much about
exercising authority from the top down, as it is about political brokerage from below,
where operating goals are at best imperfect and sub-optimal compromises.
Governability issues arise as governing actors attempt to deal with the wicked
nature of fi sheries and aquaculture problems. More precisely, they appear when
de fi nitions of problems are unclear and must be negotiated, and when solutions are
pre-conceived and imposed on the negotiators. They also appear when stakeholders
have different ideas with respect to when the problem is solved; outcomes do not
necessarily ful fi ll the various demands of stakeholders. Solutions for one group of
stakeholders may cause problems for other stakeholders, thereby ensuring the continuation of the governing process without a clear end in sight. For this and for other
reasons pertaining to fi sheries and aquaculture governance, improving governability
is in itself a wicked problem. As a wicked problem, governability is not a quality or
capacity that can be achieved once and for all. Rather, it is an outcome of dynamic
processes that need to be revisited from time to time. However, governability as a
whole, or any of its components, can be in fl uenced by acts of governance. Governance
is therefore essentially about promoting governability.
As illustrated in Song and Chuenpagdee (Chap. 15 , this volume), stakeholders
may share common values. More often than not, however, their interests vary to
the point that their activities cause competition, con fl icts and resource degradation.
In the simplest form, some fi shing areas may be overlapped, and tension arising from
this may be lessened through proper zoning. Some activities are completely opposed
by others, such as when areas used for mariculture are no longer accessible to smallscale fi shing, or when a development of an exclusive beach resort prohibits others