299
15 The Damage Schedule Approach
Ngochera, M.J.R. (2001). Status of small scale fi shery in Malawi. In O.L.F. Weyl & M.V. Weyl
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Lake Malawi fi sheries management symposium, Lilongwe, 4–9 June
2001 (pp. 95–104). Lilongwe: Organizing Committee of the Lake Malawi Fisheries Management
Symposium.
Njaya, F. (2007). Governance challenges for the implementations of fi sheries co-management:
Experiences from Malawi. International Journal of the Commons, 1, 137–153.
Njaya, F. (2008). Participatory Fisheries Management revisited. Samudra, Triannual Report of
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, 49, 29–34.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peterson, G.L., & Brown, T.C. (1998). Economic valuation by the method of paired comparison,
with emphasis on tests of the transitivity axiom. Land Economics, 74, 240–261.
Quah, E., Choa, E., Tan, K.C. (2006). Use of damage schedules in environmental valuation:
The case of urban Singapore. Applied Economics, 38, 1501–1512.
Rolston, H., III. (1994). Conserving natural value. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rudd, M.A. (2001). The non-extractive economic value of spiny lobster, Panulirus argus, in the
Turks and Caicos Islands. Environmental Conservation, 28, 226–234.
Rutherford, M.B., Knetsch, J.L., Brown, T.C. (1998). Assessing environmental losses: Judgments
of importance and damage schedules. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 22, 51–101.
Satter fi eld, T., & Kalof, L. (2005). Environmental values: an introduction – Relativistic and axiomatic traditions in the study of environmental values. In L. Kalof & T. Satter fi eld (Eds.), The
Earthscan reader in environmental values (pp. xxi–xxxiii). London: Earthscan.
Simpson, R.D., & Sedjo, R.A. (1996). Paying for the conservation of endangered ecosystems:
a comparison of direct and indirect approaches. Environment and Development Economics, 1,
241–257.
Smith, L.W. (1998). Use of traditional practices and knowledge in monitoring a Lake Malawi
artisanal fi shery. North American Journal of Fisheries Management, 18, 982–988.
Song, A.M. (2009). Dealing with uncertainty in governance outcomes: Illegal fi shing and conservation in the Southeast Arm fi shery of Lake Malawi (pp. 248). Masters dissertation. St. John’s:
Department of Geography, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
Sumaila, U.R., Alder, J., & Keith, H. (2006). Global scope and economics of illegal fi shing. Marine
Policy, 30, 696–703.
Sutinen, J.G., & Gauvin, J.R. (1989). An economic study of regulatory enforcement and compliance in the commercial inshore lobster fi shery of Massachusetts. In P.A. Neher, R. Arnason, &
N. Mollet (Eds.), Rights based fi shing (pp. 415–428). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Sutinen, J.G., & Kuperan, K. (1999). A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance.
International Journal of Social Economics, 26, 174–193.
Sutinen, J.G., Rieser, A., Gauvin, J.R. (1990). Measuring and explaining non-compliance in
federally managed fi sheries. Ocean Development and International Law, 21, 335–72.
Thurstone, L.L. (1927). The method of paired comparisons for social values. The Journal of
Abnormal & Social Psychology, 21, 384–400.
Tyler, T. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Watling, L., & Norse, E.A. (1998). Disturbance of the seabed by mobile fi shing gear: A comparison
to forest clearcutting. Conservation Biology, 12, 1180–1197.
Wattage, P., & Mardle, S. (2005). Stakeholder preferences towards conservation versus development for a wetland in Sri Lanka. Journal of Environmental Management, 77, 122–132.
World Bank. (2000). Project proposal: Guatemala Western Altiplano natural resources management project. Project ID GTPE64883. Latin America and Caribbean Region.
15 The Damage Schedule Approach
Ngochera, M.J.R. (2001). Status of small scale fi shery in Malawi. In O.L.F. Weyl & M.V. Weyl
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Lake Malawi fi sheries management symposium, Lilongwe, 4–9 June
2001 (pp. 95–104). Lilongwe: Organizing Committee of the Lake Malawi Fisheries Management
Symposium.
Njaya, F. (2007). Governance challenges for the implementations of fi sheries co-management:
Experiences from Malawi. International Journal of the Commons, 1, 137–153.
Njaya, F. (2008). Participatory Fisheries Management revisited. Samudra, Triannual Report of
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, 49, 29–34.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peterson, G.L., & Brown, T.C. (1998). Economic valuation by the method of paired comparison,
with emphasis on tests of the transitivity axiom. Land Economics, 74, 240–261.
Quah, E., Choa, E., Tan, K.C. (2006). Use of damage schedules in environmental valuation:
The case of urban Singapore. Applied Economics, 38, 1501–1512.
Rolston, H., III. (1994). Conserving natural value. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rudd, M.A. (2001). The non-extractive economic value of spiny lobster, Panulirus argus, in the
Turks and Caicos Islands. Environmental Conservation, 28, 226–234.
Rutherford, M.B., Knetsch, J.L., Brown, T.C. (1998). Assessing environmental losses: Judgments
of importance and damage schedules. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 22, 51–101.
Satter fi eld, T., & Kalof, L. (2005). Environmental values: an introduction – Relativistic and axiomatic traditions in the study of environmental values. In L. Kalof & T. Satter fi eld (Eds.), The
Earthscan reader in environmental values (pp. xxi–xxxiii). London: Earthscan.
Simpson, R.D., & Sedjo, R.A. (1996). Paying for the conservation of endangered ecosystems:
a comparison of direct and indirect approaches. Environment and Development Economics, 1,
241–257.
Smith, L.W. (1998). Use of traditional practices and knowledge in monitoring a Lake Malawi
artisanal fi shery. North American Journal of Fisheries Management, 18, 982–988.
Song, A.M. (2009). Dealing with uncertainty in governance outcomes: Illegal fi shing and conservation in the Southeast Arm fi shery of Lake Malawi (pp. 248). Masters dissertation. St. John’s:
Department of Geography, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
Sumaila, U.R., Alder, J., & Keith, H. (2006). Global scope and economics of illegal fi shing. Marine
Policy, 30, 696–703.
Sutinen, J.G., & Gauvin, J.R. (1989). An economic study of regulatory enforcement and compliance in the commercial inshore lobster fi shery of Massachusetts. In P.A. Neher, R. Arnason, &
N. Mollet (Eds.), Rights based fi shing (pp. 415–428). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Sutinen, J.G., & Kuperan, K. (1999). A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance.
International Journal of Social Economics, 26, 174–193.
Sutinen, J.G., Rieser, A., Gauvin, J.R. (1990). Measuring and explaining non-compliance in
federally managed fi sheries. Ocean Development and International Law, 21, 335–72.
Thurstone, L.L. (1927). The method of paired comparisons for social values. The Journal of
Abnormal & Social Psychology, 21, 384–400.
Tyler, T. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Watling, L., & Norse, E.A. (1998). Disturbance of the seabed by mobile fi shing gear: A comparison
to forest clearcutting. Conservation Biology, 12, 1180–1197.
Wattage, P., & Mardle, S. (2005). Stakeholder preferences towards conservation versus development for a wetland in Sri Lanka. Journal of Environmental Management, 77, 122–132.
World Bank. (2000). Project proposal: Guatemala Western Altiplano natural resources management project. Project ID GTPE64883. Latin America and Caribbean Region.