295
15 The Damage Schedule Approach
as well as among resource users at the individual level. The economic motive
involving the expansion of one’s fi shing work therefore appears to be an important
factor hindering a more resilient expression of conservation value in the SEA
fi sheries.
The fi ndings indicate that the short-term enhancement of standard-of-living is
one of the resource-dependent group’s main conceptions of ‘what is desirable’, and
that this competes with conservation values. From the perspective of policy-makers
and governors, a compromising solution is likely required when promoting conservation and rule compliance in order to respond to the real demands of resourceusers. We submit that a policy recommendation that does not lead to enhanced
standards-of-living would not be well-received and would therefore bring little positive improvement to the governability of the system. Consequently, initiatives
that supply the resource-dependent group with an economic incentive to engage in
conservation-oriented fi shing practices are strongly recommended.
One possible approach that directly utilizes resource users’ economic-minded
preferences is conservation payments (or conservation performance payments).
Conservation payments compensate people for their role in looking after fi sheries
resources (Simpson and Sedjo 1996 ; Ferraro 2001 ; Ferraro and Simpson 2002 ) .
Conventional development interventions attempt to reduce pressures on ecosystem
by steering the economic development process towards a path that is compatible
with ecosystem protection through initiatives such as eco-tourism and aquaculture.
However, this indirect way of encouraging conservation is often observed to be
ill-suited for the proper alignment of economic incentives and conservation goals.
This is mainly due to the complexity of development interventions vis-à-vis the
temporal and spatial scales at which conservation objectives must be achieved.
This dif fi culty often creates little effect on conservation-related household behavior
(i.e. in fi shing practices) (Ferraro 2001 ) . The premise of the payment scheme is to
offer a far more cost-effective way of ensuring conservation results than conventional development projects by directly linking explicit payments to conservation
progress. Although the direct payment system is not without its own set of shortcomings – ones that necessitate careful program design and implementation – past
and ongoing examples can be found in several developing countries in the tropics,
where they have been employed to protect ecosystems and promote stewardship of
forest resources (Ferraro and Simpson 2002 ) . For instance, Ferraro and Simpson
( 2002 ) report that Guatemala’s example delivers direct payments to forest stewards
through the Forest Incentives Program (World Bank 2000 ) , while, in Costa Rica,
institutional mechanisms were established to allow local, national, and international bene fi ciaries of ecosystem services to compensate those who protect ecosystems (Castro et al. 2000 ) . As with these examples, such programs can be made
feasible through fi nancial support garnered from national and international donors,
NGOs and various interest groups around the world who share a keen interest in
protecting particular ecosystems.
Various forms of conservation subsidies and direct payments schemes should
garner meaningful attention in meeting the economic/development demand of the
15 The Damage Schedule Approach
as well as among resource users at the individual level. The economic motive
involving the expansion of one’s fi shing work therefore appears to be an important
factor hindering a more resilient expression of conservation value in the SEA
fi sheries.
The fi ndings indicate that the short-term enhancement of standard-of-living is
one of the resource-dependent group’s main conceptions of ‘what is desirable’, and
that this competes with conservation values. From the perspective of policy-makers
and governors, a compromising solution is likely required when promoting conservation and rule compliance in order to respond to the real demands of resourceusers. We submit that a policy recommendation that does not lead to enhanced
standards-of-living would not be well-received and would therefore bring little positive improvement to the governability of the system. Consequently, initiatives
that supply the resource-dependent group with an economic incentive to engage in
conservation-oriented fi shing practices are strongly recommended.
One possible approach that directly utilizes resource users’ economic-minded
preferences is conservation payments (or conservation performance payments).
Conservation payments compensate people for their role in looking after fi sheries
resources (Simpson and Sedjo 1996 ; Ferraro 2001 ; Ferraro and Simpson 2002 ) .
Conventional development interventions attempt to reduce pressures on ecosystem
by steering the economic development process towards a path that is compatible
with ecosystem protection through initiatives such as eco-tourism and aquaculture.
However, this indirect way of encouraging conservation is often observed to be
ill-suited for the proper alignment of economic incentives and conservation goals.
This is mainly due to the complexity of development interventions vis-à-vis the
temporal and spatial scales at which conservation objectives must be achieved.
This dif fi culty often creates little effect on conservation-related household behavior
(i.e. in fi shing practices) (Ferraro 2001 ) . The premise of the payment scheme is to
offer a far more cost-effective way of ensuring conservation results than conventional development projects by directly linking explicit payments to conservation
progress. Although the direct payment system is not without its own set of shortcomings – ones that necessitate careful program design and implementation – past
and ongoing examples can be found in several developing countries in the tropics,
where they have been employed to protect ecosystems and promote stewardship of
forest resources (Ferraro and Simpson 2002 ) . For instance, Ferraro and Simpson
( 2002 ) report that Guatemala’s example delivers direct payments to forest stewards
through the Forest Incentives Program (World Bank 2000 ) , while, in Costa Rica,
institutional mechanisms were established to allow local, national, and international bene fi ciaries of ecosystem services to compensate those who protect ecosystems (Castro et al. 2000 ) . As with these examples, such programs can be made
feasible through fi nancial support garnered from national and international donors,
NGOs and various interest groups around the world who share a keen interest in
protecting particular ecosystems.
Various forms of conservation subsidies and direct payments schemes should
garner meaningful attention in meeting the economic/development demand of the