282
A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
ecological conservation by catching fi sh beyond the legal guidelines. This would
represent a weaker standing of conservation value in light of the more desirable
conception of secure livelihoods. Likewise, an image of poverty in his/her household may pose more painful/fearful than the image of the barren sea. Such
con fi gurations would affect his/her principles so that one’s action and decisions are
fi rst and foremost guided by the principles involving the ful fi llment of human welfare and economic viability rather than those concerning nature/resource conservation. Acknowledging the diverse ways people’s values, images and principles
interact to produce different behavior and decisions, it may be of bene fi t to examine
them and gain a more deep-seated understanding of why illegal fi shing takes place
and persist despite the various deterrence measures.
Illegal Fishing as a Governability Challenge
We reason that the varying views that exist about the compliance of fi shing rules, as
well as the real social and environmental consequences that may ensue from illegal
fi shing, all lead to governability challenges. Governability here can be rephrased as
the capacity of fi sheries as a whole to self-organize and maintain themselves with
due consideration of the inherent and constructed qualities embedded in nature and
society. Referred to in simpler terms as a propensity for successful governance
(Kooiman 2008 ) , implications for governability have several dimensions in the context of illegal fi shing. First, the depletion of fi sh stocks and deterioration of ecosystem services pose a rather obvious dif fi culty in maintaining the governability of an
overall fi sheries system. This is because it results in the reduction of integrity and
self-generating capacity of the ecosystem. Over fi shing, combined with much suspected illegal fi shing by foreign fl eets in the Grand Banks, has led to the northern
cod collapse in the waters around Newfoundland. The recovery has yet to fully
occur, while the abundance of large cod prey such as snow crab and shrimp has
greatly increased (Bundy and Fanning 2005 ) . This complex trophic shift has made
governing the fi shery in the region a more contentious affair and thus less governable. Looking at the social aspect, illegal fi shing contributes to a loss of social cohesion and sense of cooperation, as well as a stimulation of hyper-competitive spirit,
hostility and even physical confrontation. These factors make governance an
extremely delicate and tense subject, and reduce the ways in which governing can
reach its potential. In the Gulf of California, for instance, poaching by outsiders was
shown to jeopardize otherwise well-observed local cooperation. Leading to a rapid
cascading effect on fi sheries resources and locally-designed rule compliance,
accountability was eroded among fi shers and the fi shery quickly became a free-forall (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009 ) . Thirdly, people’s varying views pose a challenge to the upkeep of governability in and of themselves. Incommensurable values
may act as a limit to how governable a fi shery can be (Jentoft 2007 ) . If governors
and those-being-governed hold highly polarized or otherwise vastly different views
A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
ecological conservation by catching fi sh beyond the legal guidelines. This would
represent a weaker standing of conservation value in light of the more desirable
conception of secure livelihoods. Likewise, an image of poverty in his/her household may pose more painful/fearful than the image of the barren sea. Such
con fi gurations would affect his/her principles so that one’s action and decisions are
fi rst and foremost guided by the principles involving the ful fi llment of human welfare and economic viability rather than those concerning nature/resource conservation. Acknowledging the diverse ways people’s values, images and principles
interact to produce different behavior and decisions, it may be of bene fi t to examine
them and gain a more deep-seated understanding of why illegal fi shing takes place
and persist despite the various deterrence measures.
Illegal Fishing as a Governability Challenge
We reason that the varying views that exist about the compliance of fi shing rules, as
well as the real social and environmental consequences that may ensue from illegal
fi shing, all lead to governability challenges. Governability here can be rephrased as
the capacity of fi sheries as a whole to self-organize and maintain themselves with
due consideration of the inherent and constructed qualities embedded in nature and
society. Referred to in simpler terms as a propensity for successful governance
(Kooiman 2008 ) , implications for governability have several dimensions in the context of illegal fi shing. First, the depletion of fi sh stocks and deterioration of ecosystem services pose a rather obvious dif fi culty in maintaining the governability of an
overall fi sheries system. This is because it results in the reduction of integrity and
self-generating capacity of the ecosystem. Over fi shing, combined with much suspected illegal fi shing by foreign fl eets in the Grand Banks, has led to the northern
cod collapse in the waters around Newfoundland. The recovery has yet to fully
occur, while the abundance of large cod prey such as snow crab and shrimp has
greatly increased (Bundy and Fanning 2005 ) . This complex trophic shift has made
governing the fi shery in the region a more contentious affair and thus less governable. Looking at the social aspect, illegal fi shing contributes to a loss of social cohesion and sense of cooperation, as well as a stimulation of hyper-competitive spirit,
hostility and even physical confrontation. These factors make governance an
extremely delicate and tense subject, and reduce the ways in which governing can
reach its potential. In the Gulf of California, for instance, poaching by outsiders was
shown to jeopardize otherwise well-observed local cooperation. Leading to a rapid
cascading effect on fi sheries resources and locally-designed rule compliance,
accountability was eroded among fi shers and the fi shery quickly became a free-forall (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009 ) . Thirdly, people’s varying views pose a challenge to the upkeep of governability in and of themselves. Incommensurable values
may act as a limit to how governable a fi shery can be (Jentoft 2007 ) . If governors
and those-being-governed hold highly polarized or otherwise vastly different views