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A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
industrial-scale one in the high seas. Manifested in various ways, such as poaching,
use of destructive fi shing methods and zoning violation, the overall effect of illegal
fi shing and non-compliance behaviors threatens the integrity and health of the ecosystem, as well as the socio-economic basis of those who depend on the resources.
The study of compliance had an initial point of departure in the criminal behavior
of economic individuals. Inspired by the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham,
who reasoned that individuals in pursuit of economic self-interest could yield criminal behavior necessitating deterrence to reduce crime, there followed numerous
studies that linked crime and economic circumstances (Hønneland 1999 ) . In the
1960s, a formal theoretical framework that views criminals as any other individuals
attempting to maximize personal utility was established by Becker’s ( 1968 ) economic analysis. Stemming from this neoclassical thinking that underpins the economic models of regulatory compliance, the prevailing framework has regarded
fi shers as utility maximizing individuals driven by self-interest whose decision to
engage in illegal fi shing is primarily determined by expected payoffs and penalties
(cf. Sutinen and Gauvin 1989 ; Sutinen et al. 1990 ; Furlong 1991 ) . Thus, the overarching policy response to this issue has been the promotion of deterrence by
enhancing enforcement and posing threats of severe sanctions or expensive fi nes
(Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . Such deterrent policies do, however, have severe limitations
given that they are costly and dif fi cult to implement (Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . They are
also coercive in nature, which can engender bitterness or hostility towards government authority (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999 ) .
Contrary to what the neoclassical deterrence model prescribes, in reality, the
probability of getting caught is usually low and the penalties are generally not large
relative to the illegal gains (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998 ) . In addition, considerable
empirical evidence has shown that a large majority of fi shers normally complies
with regulations despite such shortcomings (Sutinen and Gauvin 1989 ; Sutinen
et al. 1990 ) . The examples of high compliance despite relatively low enforcement
and deterrence are also commonly found outside the fi sheries sector, such as the low
rate of tax evasion (Elster 1990 ) . Realizing that the neoclassical perspective alone is
not adequate to explain the compliance behavior, several studies have embarked on
accounting for this ‘irrationality’ by incorporating other factors into the compliance
framework (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998 ; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999 ; Charles et al.
1999 ; Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . These other factors include legitimacy, morality and
socialization, which are emphasized through social norms and the social capital of
small groups, for instance, in common property theory (Ostrom 1990 ) .
Tyler ( 1990 ) introduces the terminology of ‘instrumental perspective’ and ‘normative perspective’ in distinguishing between these two streams of arguments. The
instrumental perspective is synonymous with Becker’s ( 1968 ) framework that
assumes individuals as rational agents driven by self-interest and responding to
incentives and sanctions. The normative perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes
that individuals are in fl uenced by what is just, fair, appropriate and morally right.
These are in a sense ‘priceless’ and thus defy a bene fi t-cost calculation. It involves
human values such as being moderate as well as environmental values such as existence value. This perspective also accounts for people acting as a matter of principle,
A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
industrial-scale one in the high seas. Manifested in various ways, such as poaching,
use of destructive fi shing methods and zoning violation, the overall effect of illegal
fi shing and non-compliance behaviors threatens the integrity and health of the ecosystem, as well as the socio-economic basis of those who depend on the resources.
The study of compliance had an initial point of departure in the criminal behavior
of economic individuals. Inspired by the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham,
who reasoned that individuals in pursuit of economic self-interest could yield criminal behavior necessitating deterrence to reduce crime, there followed numerous
studies that linked crime and economic circumstances (Hønneland 1999 ) . In the
1960s, a formal theoretical framework that views criminals as any other individuals
attempting to maximize personal utility was established by Becker’s ( 1968 ) economic analysis. Stemming from this neoclassical thinking that underpins the economic models of regulatory compliance, the prevailing framework has regarded
fi shers as utility maximizing individuals driven by self-interest whose decision to
engage in illegal fi shing is primarily determined by expected payoffs and penalties
(cf. Sutinen and Gauvin 1989 ; Sutinen et al. 1990 ; Furlong 1991 ) . Thus, the overarching policy response to this issue has been the promotion of deterrence by
enhancing enforcement and posing threats of severe sanctions or expensive fi nes
(Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . Such deterrent policies do, however, have severe limitations
given that they are costly and dif fi cult to implement (Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . They are
also coercive in nature, which can engender bitterness or hostility towards government authority (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999 ) .
Contrary to what the neoclassical deterrence model prescribes, in reality, the
probability of getting caught is usually low and the penalties are generally not large
relative to the illegal gains (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998 ) . In addition, considerable
empirical evidence has shown that a large majority of fi shers normally complies
with regulations despite such shortcomings (Sutinen and Gauvin 1989 ; Sutinen
et al. 1990 ) . The examples of high compliance despite relatively low enforcement
and deterrence are also commonly found outside the fi sheries sector, such as the low
rate of tax evasion (Elster 1990 ) . Realizing that the neoclassical perspective alone is
not adequate to explain the compliance behavior, several studies have embarked on
accounting for this ‘irrationality’ by incorporating other factors into the compliance
framework (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998 ; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999 ; Charles et al.
1999 ; Hatcher et al. 2000 ) . These other factors include legitimacy, morality and
socialization, which are emphasized through social norms and the social capital of
small groups, for instance, in common property theory (Ostrom 1990 ) .
Tyler ( 1990 ) introduces the terminology of ‘instrumental perspective’ and ‘normative perspective’ in distinguishing between these two streams of arguments. The
instrumental perspective is synonymous with Becker’s ( 1968 ) framework that
assumes individuals as rational agents driven by self-interest and responding to
incentives and sanctions. The normative perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes
that individuals are in fl uenced by what is just, fair, appropriate and morally right.
These are in a sense ‘priceless’ and thus defy a bene fi t-cost calculation. It involves
human values such as being moderate as well as environmental values such as existence value. This perspective also accounts for people acting as a matter of principle,