172
P. Onyango and S. Jentoft
on the table. They devote all their efforts towards fi nding food for the day. The fi shers
say that unless they are provided with food, they have no alternative but to catch fi sh
in whatever way. To them, there is no logic in obeying regulations on an empty stomach. They therefore argue that they are left with little choice; it is either you obey the
government’s rules and starve or look for a way out and survive. Although fi shery
of fi cials sometimes conduct unannounced patrols with BMUs, the fi shers have been
able to avoid being caught by resorting to fi shing at night, fi shing from areas that are
inaccessible to patrolling agents, burying beach seines in the ground after fi shing to
hide them, and, at times, paying bribes to fi sheries staff and BMU leaders.
Furthermore, locals perceive the BMUs to be an extension of the Fisheries
Administration. This is grounded in the fact that, during BMU establishment, it was
the division staff that conceived the idea and led the formation process. In fact, in
the eyes of the fi shers, the BMUs were formed to stop illegal fi shing practices and
ensure beach cleanliness. Fishers have therefore developed a perception that the
roles of these Units run counter to their daily necessities. Nevertheless, many in the
fi shers’ communities do not consider it a good idea to reject a government proposal,
even if you are opposed to it. Instead, it is better to show approval of it. The primary
explanation for this is that the government is perceived to have all the machinery
and power to undertake whatever it desires to do, regardless of what people in smallscale fi shing communities are thinking. There is also an economic aspect to it. When
such plans involve committees, those who anticipate becoming a member of the
committees always foresee a monetary reward for their membership. Moreover,
elections of BMUs are at times used as springboards by people whose interests are
focused on higher elective positions.
At the formation of BMUs, those who were elected were thoroughly vetted by
the community members. The vetting process revolved around being able to accommodate for the community’s norms, and avoid revealing the practices of the community. Given the use of an assortment of gears, including the banned ones, a BMU
member from the local community carries the moral obligation to protect the local
practice. This, however, runs counter to the expectation of the government, who
established the BMUs as a means of deterring such practices. In both communities,
some members of the BMU and women groups have been removed from of fi ce,
because they were not able to stand by the manner in which the community had
previously agreed.
Many of the local fi shing communities conduct their activities with a great deal
of independence. For example, the Tweyambe Fishing enterprise, located in Kasheno
village, runs their organization through various projects, resisting any outside interference ( Onyango and Jentoft 2010 ) . Similarly, Nyakasenge residents have had a
long practice of only trusting local residents rather than outsiders. In Nyakasenge,
residents can protect one another if visited by fi sheries authorities on patrol by
concealing the names of those who own illegal fi shing gear. If, for example, an
unregistered boat is found at the beach by the patrol team, residents will refuse to
name the owner. Instead, they suddenly claim to be visitors without any knowledge
or awareness of what goes on in the village. In claiming to be visitors, they strategically adopt a stance that allows them to run their own affairs without interference.
P. Onyango and S. Jentoft
on the table. They devote all their efforts towards fi nding food for the day. The fi shers
say that unless they are provided with food, they have no alternative but to catch fi sh
in whatever way. To them, there is no logic in obeying regulations on an empty stomach. They therefore argue that they are left with little choice; it is either you obey the
government’s rules and starve or look for a way out and survive. Although fi shery
of fi cials sometimes conduct unannounced patrols with BMUs, the fi shers have been
able to avoid being caught by resorting to fi shing at night, fi shing from areas that are
inaccessible to patrolling agents, burying beach seines in the ground after fi shing to
hide them, and, at times, paying bribes to fi sheries staff and BMU leaders.
Furthermore, locals perceive the BMUs to be an extension of the Fisheries
Administration. This is grounded in the fact that, during BMU establishment, it was
the division staff that conceived the idea and led the formation process. In fact, in
the eyes of the fi shers, the BMUs were formed to stop illegal fi shing practices and
ensure beach cleanliness. Fishers have therefore developed a perception that the
roles of these Units run counter to their daily necessities. Nevertheless, many in the
fi shers’ communities do not consider it a good idea to reject a government proposal,
even if you are opposed to it. Instead, it is better to show approval of it. The primary
explanation for this is that the government is perceived to have all the machinery
and power to undertake whatever it desires to do, regardless of what people in smallscale fi shing communities are thinking. There is also an economic aspect to it. When
such plans involve committees, those who anticipate becoming a member of the
committees always foresee a monetary reward for their membership. Moreover,
elections of BMUs are at times used as springboards by people whose interests are
focused on higher elective positions.
At the formation of BMUs, those who were elected were thoroughly vetted by
the community members. The vetting process revolved around being able to accommodate for the community’s norms, and avoid revealing the practices of the community. Given the use of an assortment of gears, including the banned ones, a BMU
member from the local community carries the moral obligation to protect the local
practice. This, however, runs counter to the expectation of the government, who
established the BMUs as a means of deterring such practices. In both communities,
some members of the BMU and women groups have been removed from of fi ce,
because they were not able to stand by the manner in which the community had
previously agreed.
Many of the local fi shing communities conduct their activities with a great deal
of independence. For example, the Tweyambe Fishing enterprise, located in Kasheno
village, runs their organization through various projects, resisting any outside interference ( Onyango and Jentoft 2010 ) . Similarly, Nyakasenge residents have had a
long practice of only trusting local residents rather than outsiders. In Nyakasenge,
residents can protect one another if visited by fi sheries authorities on patrol by
concealing the names of those who own illegal fi shing gear. If, for example, an
unregistered boat is found at the beach by the patrol team, residents will refuse to
name the owner. Instead, they suddenly claim to be visitors without any knowledge
or awareness of what goes on in the village. In claiming to be visitors, they strategically adopt a stance that allows them to run their own affairs without interference.