150
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have discussed the ways in which the characteristics of fi sheries
systems may impact upon their governability. We conceptualized the system-tobe-governed as possessing both a natural and human dimension –typi fi ed by varying
extents of diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale effects. Subsequently, the
attention shifted to governors and the nature of the governing system, which
sometimes evolves in reaction to demands posed by the system-to-be-governed, but
may also have other origins. Like systems-to-be-governed, governing systems also
prove to be diverse, complex and dynamic. Finally we considered the manifold
interactions that occur within and especially between a governing system and a
system-to-be-governed, distinguishing between three relationship modes.
The central message of this chapter has been that the connections between the
three parts of a fi sheries system matter for governability and that a better match
may result in higher levels of governability. Conversely, where the fi t between the
system-to-be-governed, governing system and governing interactions is lacking
and mutual responsiveness is low, governability is likely to suffer. In this case, the
fi sheries in question are not appropriately steered and have unwanted societal consequences. These can vary – depending on perspectives of the society in question –
from environmental destruction to economic hardship, social injustice and political
strife. In such cases, remedial action is required. The focus of such action, however, depends on the nature of the situation at hand. Governors must determine
the contours of the societal system and the issues to be addressed. They may then
choose to either focus on adapting the governing system to the needs of the systemto-be-governed, or – the other way around – modeling the system-to-be-governed to
better match governing system’s capacities and values. They may also try to change
the style of governing interactions, thereby in fl uencing the legitimacy of rulings.
Whatever the case may be, the overall governability of the system in question is
affected, for better or for worse.
Acknowledgements This chapter has bene fi tted greatly from the comments provided by Derek
Johnson, to whom thanks are due.
References
Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Doubleday, N. (2007). Adaptive co-management – Collaboration, learning,
and multi-level governance. Vancouver: UB Press.
Bavinck, M. (1996). Fisher regulations along the Coromandel coast: A case of collective control of
common pool resources. Marine Policy, 20(6), 475–482.
Bavinck, M. (1998). ‘A matter of maintaining the peace.’ State accommodation to subordinate
legal systems: the case of fi sheries along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu, India. Journal
of Legal Pluralism, 40, 151–170.
Bavinck, M. (2001). Marine resource management. Con fl ict and regulation in the fi sheries of the
Coromandel Coast. New Delhi: Sage.
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have discussed the ways in which the characteristics of fi sheries
systems may impact upon their governability. We conceptualized the system-tobe-governed as possessing both a natural and human dimension –typi fi ed by varying
extents of diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale effects. Subsequently, the
attention shifted to governors and the nature of the governing system, which
sometimes evolves in reaction to demands posed by the system-to-be-governed, but
may also have other origins. Like systems-to-be-governed, governing systems also
prove to be diverse, complex and dynamic. Finally we considered the manifold
interactions that occur within and especially between a governing system and a
system-to-be-governed, distinguishing between three relationship modes.
The central message of this chapter has been that the connections between the
three parts of a fi sheries system matter for governability and that a better match
may result in higher levels of governability. Conversely, where the fi t between the
system-to-be-governed, governing system and governing interactions is lacking
and mutual responsiveness is low, governability is likely to suffer. In this case, the
fi sheries in question are not appropriately steered and have unwanted societal consequences. These can vary – depending on perspectives of the society in question –
from environmental destruction to economic hardship, social injustice and political
strife. In such cases, remedial action is required. The focus of such action, however, depends on the nature of the situation at hand. Governors must determine
the contours of the societal system and the issues to be addressed. They may then
choose to either focus on adapting the governing system to the needs of the systemto-be-governed, or – the other way around – modeling the system-to-be-governed to
better match governing system’s capacities and values. They may also try to change
the style of governing interactions, thereby in fl uencing the legitimacy of rulings.
Whatever the case may be, the overall governability of the system in question is
affected, for better or for worse.
Acknowledgements This chapter has bene fi tted greatly from the comments provided by Derek
Johnson, to whom thanks are due.
References
Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Doubleday, N. (2007). Adaptive co-management – Collaboration, learning,
and multi-level governance. Vancouver: UB Press.
Bavinck, M. (1996). Fisher regulations along the Coromandel coast: A case of collective control of
common pool resources. Marine Policy, 20(6), 475–482.
Bavinck, M. (1998). ‘A matter of maintaining the peace.’ State accommodation to subordinate
legal systems: the case of fi sheries along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu, India. Journal
of Legal Pluralism, 40, 151–170.
Bavinck, M. (2001). Marine resource management. Con fl ict and regulation in the fi sheries of the
Coromandel Coast. New Delhi: Sage.