102
R.S.V. Pullin
the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and
Latin America, for producing food, fi bre and biofuels. Cotula et al. ( 2009 ) found
that 2,492,684 ha of such lands (excluding deals less than 1,000 ha) had been thus
acquired in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan. Such arrangements are
usually styled as cooperation in “ agribusiness ”. They can include attempted and
established cooperation in coastal and inland aquaculture; for example, PRCPhilippines and PRC-Ghana ( www.ibon.org ; present author’s observations). From
2004, the PRC has been implementing a so-called “Going Out” policy to develop
collaboration in business, including agribusiness, but announced in 2008 that its
new 20-year Food Security Policy explicitly excludes any foreign land acquisition
(Xinhua News Agency 2008 , cited in Cotula et al. 2009 ) . This situation will probably remain highly dynamic and somewhat opaque.
Kurien ( 2004 ) saw food security for all as a guided outcome and found that
trade-enhanced food security inevitably requires cooperation between market, state
and civil society. Kurien also described the so-called chains of custody of internationally traded fi sh products as “long and varied” ( 2004 , 17). He saw the end of such
chains that were closest to fi shers and fi sh workers, as well as “ fi rst sale transactions
and fi rst product transformations,” as most important for the food security of the
poor, with the prospect of “people power” at these chain positions to “match ‘market
power’” (Kurien 2004 , 17).
Food security is therefore highly diverse, complex and dynamic, and is typically de fi ned across a range of scales, from household and local to national and
global. These attributes make the case for an interactive governance approach
(Kooiman 2003 ; Kooiman et al. 2005 ) , but the result would have to be more than
a re-description of well-published scenarios in a new jargon and there would have
to be practical applications. At present, the best way forward seems to be assessing
governability along fi sh chains and seeking critical entry points for improvement.
To explore this, the following three examples of entire aquaculture fi sh chains
were chosen as systems-to-be-governed, from ecosystem, through production
cycles, harvests, post harvest processing, marketing, wholesale, and retail to
consumers: A. pond farming of carps by community groups, in Bangladesh;
B. pond farming of tilapia, in the Philippines; and C. lake-based cage farming of
tilapia, also in the Philippines (ADB 2005 ) . Their governing systems included
actors and institutions that deal with the negotiable (man-made arrangements) and
the non-negotiable (climate and ecosystem function). The governance interactions between these systems-to-be-governed and their governing systems were
seen as the main determinants of governance success.
Governability Assessments for Three Aquaculture Fish Chains
Two methods were used to assess the governability of each link in the three chains,
from prerequisites for farming, through seed procurement and growout, to harvesting
to post harvest operations. With both methods, governabilities were scored as low (L),
R.S.V. Pullin
the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and
Latin America, for producing food, fi bre and biofuels. Cotula et al. ( 2009 ) found
that 2,492,684 ha of such lands (excluding deals less than 1,000 ha) had been thus
acquired in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan. Such arrangements are
usually styled as cooperation in “ agribusiness ”. They can include attempted and
established cooperation in coastal and inland aquaculture; for example, PRCPhilippines and PRC-Ghana ( www.ibon.org ; present author’s observations). From
2004, the PRC has been implementing a so-called “Going Out” policy to develop
collaboration in business, including agribusiness, but announced in 2008 that its
new 20-year Food Security Policy explicitly excludes any foreign land acquisition
(Xinhua News Agency 2008 , cited in Cotula et al. 2009 ) . This situation will probably remain highly dynamic and somewhat opaque.
Kurien ( 2004 ) saw food security for all as a guided outcome and found that
trade-enhanced food security inevitably requires cooperation between market, state
and civil society. Kurien also described the so-called chains of custody of internationally traded fi sh products as “long and varied” ( 2004 , 17). He saw the end of such
chains that were closest to fi shers and fi sh workers, as well as “ fi rst sale transactions
and fi rst product transformations,” as most important for the food security of the
poor, with the prospect of “people power” at these chain positions to “match ‘market
power’” (Kurien 2004 , 17).
Food security is therefore highly diverse, complex and dynamic, and is typically de fi ned across a range of scales, from household and local to national and
global. These attributes make the case for an interactive governance approach
(Kooiman 2003 ; Kooiman et al. 2005 ) , but the result would have to be more than
a re-description of well-published scenarios in a new jargon and there would have
to be practical applications. At present, the best way forward seems to be assessing
governability along fi sh chains and seeking critical entry points for improvement.
To explore this, the following three examples of entire aquaculture fi sh chains
were chosen as systems-to-be-governed, from ecosystem, through production
cycles, harvests, post harvest processing, marketing, wholesale, and retail to
consumers: A. pond farming of carps by community groups, in Bangladesh;
B. pond farming of tilapia, in the Philippines; and C. lake-based cage farming of
tilapia, also in the Philippines (ADB 2005 ) . Their governing systems included
actors and institutions that deal with the negotiable (man-made arrangements) and
the non-negotiable (climate and ecosystem function). The governance interactions between these systems-to-be-governed and their governing systems were
seen as the main determinants of governance success.
Governability Assessments for Three Aquaculture Fish Chains
Two methods were used to assess the governability of each link in the three chains,
from prerequisites for farming, through seed procurement and growout, to harvesting
to post harvest operations. With both methods, governabilities were scored as low (L),