1.2.2. External and Internal Reference
Because “reference” in humans is typically construed to involve consciousness and intentionality, researchers wishing to remain agnostic about these
issues in animals often adopt the term “functionally referential” when discussing this issue (Marler et al. 1992; Hauser 1996). We will use the word
“refer” here only in a limited sense of causal correlation between an object
or event and a corresponding animal signal. Thus, a bee’s waggle dance
“refers” to flowers in the sense that it enables other bees to locate and feed
from the flowers despite a presumed lack of self-awareness or high-order
intentionality on the part of the dancing bee. Most traditional work in
animal communication has concentrated on signals that indicate the signaler’s species, individual characteristics or motivational state, and we will
consider many such internally referential signals in the first part of this
chapter. Recently, there has been much interest in signals that seem to refer
to the world outside the signaler (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, 1980b; Gyger et al.
1987; Hauser and Marler 1993a, 1993b). The classic example is alarm calling
in vervet monkeys, where different calls produced by signalers viewing
eagle, snake, or leopard predators elicit appropriate escape reactions from
listeners (Struhsaker 1967, see Section 3.2). These calls are externally referential in that, regardless of the state of the caller, listeners respond to
them as if they indicated something about the world outside of the caller
(playback experiments that simulate a predator encounter provide further
evidence that the calls alone are sufficient to elicit appropriate responses
from listeners). We will consider such signals in some detail in the second
half of this chapter.
1.2.3. Lies of Omission and Commission
In their recent textbook on animal communication, Bradbury and
Vehrencamp (1998) define deceit as “the provision of inaccurate information by a sender to a receiver.” However, it is often possible to deceive by
failing to provide information (e.g., failing to give food calls upon discovering food) (Hauser 1992b; Hauser and Marler 1993a). We thus distinguish
between lies of commission (the provision of inaccurate or misleading information) and lies of omission (withholding expected information) (Hauser
1997). There are good empirical data concerning both types of “deceit” in
animal communication (see Section 3). It may be quite difficult to locate
and identify individuals who withhold signals, which may make the evolution of lies of omission easier. The evolution of receiver skepticism is not
as common as might be expected. In particular, receivers who are able to
learn about signalers through repeated interactions should quickly be able
to learn to identify signalers who “cry wolf” because calls typically carry
information about signaler identity along with any external referentiality.
Our review of the literature will suggest that the development of such facultative skepticism is surprisingly uncommon, with clear evidence only in a
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
71
Because “reference” in humans is typically construed to involve consciousness and intentionality, researchers wishing to remain agnostic about these
issues in animals often adopt the term “functionally referential” when discussing this issue (Marler et al. 1992; Hauser 1996). We will use the word
“refer” here only in a limited sense of causal correlation between an object
or event and a corresponding animal signal. Thus, a bee’s waggle dance
“refers” to flowers in the sense that it enables other bees to locate and feed
from the flowers despite a presumed lack of self-awareness or high-order
intentionality on the part of the dancing bee. Most traditional work in
animal communication has concentrated on signals that indicate the signaler’s species, individual characteristics or motivational state, and we will
consider many such internally referential signals in the first part of this
chapter. Recently, there has been much interest in signals that seem to refer
to the world outside the signaler (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, 1980b; Gyger et al.
1987; Hauser and Marler 1993a, 1993b). The classic example is alarm calling
in vervet monkeys, where different calls produced by signalers viewing
eagle, snake, or leopard predators elicit appropriate escape reactions from
listeners (Struhsaker 1967, see Section 3.2). These calls are externally referential in that, regardless of the state of the caller, listeners respond to
them as if they indicated something about the world outside of the caller
(playback experiments that simulate a predator encounter provide further
evidence that the calls alone are sufficient to elicit appropriate responses
from listeners). We will consider such signals in some detail in the second
half of this chapter.
1.2.3. Lies of Omission and Commission
In their recent textbook on animal communication, Bradbury and
Vehrencamp (1998) define deceit as “the provision of inaccurate information by a sender to a receiver.” However, it is often possible to deceive by
failing to provide information (e.g., failing to give food calls upon discovering food) (Hauser 1992b; Hauser and Marler 1993a). We thus distinguish
between lies of commission (the provision of inaccurate or misleading information) and lies of omission (withholding expected information) (Hauser
1997). There are good empirical data concerning both types of “deceit” in
animal communication (see Section 3). It may be quite difficult to locate
and identify individuals who withhold signals, which may make the evolution of lies of omission easier. The evolution of receiver skepticism is not
as common as might be expected. In particular, receivers who are able to
learn about signalers through repeated interactions should quickly be able
to learn to identify signalers who “cry wolf” because calls typically carry
information about signaler identity along with any external referentiality.
Our review of the literature will suggest that the development of such facultative skepticism is surprisingly uncommon, with clear evidence only in a
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
71