straints in evolutionary time, opening up new vistas in the adaptive landscape. More often than not, however, new physical or physiological constraints will probably exist, even in this new adaptive space, which again will
influence the evolutionary trajectory of a particular species’ communication system. We now turn to the role of cognitive mechanisms and
behavioral flexibility in dishonest signaling and its detection.
3. Perceptual and Cognitive Constraints on Skepticism:
The Behavior of Deception
3.1. Lies of Commission
When President William Clinton was asked about his alleged relationship
with Monica Lewinsky, he claimed that he never had an illicit affair with
her. As the world now knows, he lied. The public perceived Clinton’s statement as a lie because they detected a mismatch between what Clinton said
he did and what he actually did.
Humans are not alone in their ability to create lies of commission—
actions that actively falsify information. In fact, a wide variety of animal
species appear to be comparably endowed. In order for such lies to work,
however, three conditions must hold. First, the species must have a signal
that is tightly correlated with a particular context. Thus, for example, when
an animal gives an alarm call, it must signal the presence of a predator on
a significant proportion of occasions. At present, we cannot say precisely
how tight this correlation must be, but the signal must have relatively high
predictive value with respect to the sequelae of signal and response. Second,
when individuals hear such signals, they must respond in a relatively stereotyped or consistent way and must do so on a statistically significant number
of occasions. Thus, when animals hear an alarm call, they must consistently
flee. Third, individuals must have the flexibility to manipulate the behavior
of other group members by producing a species-typical signal in a novel
context; in this sense, there must be some level of independence between
signal and context. Thus, while competing over food or a mate, one animal
might give an alarm call causing the competitor to dive under the bushes.
Falsifying information should theoretically be a rare event, or at least
have a low cost for the deceived, in order to maintain the effectiveness
of the lie. Thus, individuals might be expected to produce false alarm calls
infrequently in order to avoid generating a completely ineffectual signal—
“the boy who cried wolf.” However, there may be considerable variability
within taxa in how sensitive individuals are to being deceived as well as in
the cost of deception. To flesh out these ideas, we explore a set of observations and experiments on insects, birds, and primates designed to reveal how
lies of commission are enacted and sometimes foiled by skeptical receivers.
In each case, we evaluate the evidence in light of the three conditions
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
107
influence the evolutionary trajectory of a particular species’ communication system. We now turn to the role of cognitive mechanisms and
behavioral flexibility in dishonest signaling and its detection.
3. Perceptual and Cognitive Constraints on Skepticism:
The Behavior of Deception
3.1. Lies of Commission
When President William Clinton was asked about his alleged relationship
with Monica Lewinsky, he claimed that he never had an illicit affair with
her. As the world now knows, he lied. The public perceived Clinton’s statement as a lie because they detected a mismatch between what Clinton said
he did and what he actually did.
Humans are not alone in their ability to create lies of commission—
actions that actively falsify information. In fact, a wide variety of animal
species appear to be comparably endowed. In order for such lies to work,
however, three conditions must hold. First, the species must have a signal
that is tightly correlated with a particular context. Thus, for example, when
an animal gives an alarm call, it must signal the presence of a predator on
a significant proportion of occasions. At present, we cannot say precisely
how tight this correlation must be, but the signal must have relatively high
predictive value with respect to the sequelae of signal and response. Second,
when individuals hear such signals, they must respond in a relatively stereotyped or consistent way and must do so on a statistically significant number
of occasions. Thus, when animals hear an alarm call, they must consistently
flee. Third, individuals must have the flexibility to manipulate the behavior
of other group members by producing a species-typical signal in a novel
context; in this sense, there must be some level of independence between
signal and context. Thus, while competing over food or a mate, one animal
might give an alarm call causing the competitor to dive under the bushes.
Falsifying information should theoretically be a rare event, or at least
have a low cost for the deceived, in order to maintain the effectiveness
of the lie. Thus, individuals might be expected to produce false alarm calls
infrequently in order to avoid generating a completely ineffectual signal—
“the boy who cried wolf.” However, there may be considerable variability
within taxa in how sensitive individuals are to being deceived as well as in
the cost of deception. To flesh out these ideas, we explore a set of observations and experiments on insects, birds, and primates designed to reveal how
lies of commission are enacted and sometimes foiled by skeptical receivers.
In each case, we evaluate the evidence in light of the three conditions
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
107