72
3 Economic Framework of Conservation
There are two different ways of targeting the farmers who may benefit from the
in situ conservation system:
On the one hand, a certain amount of share certificates may be distributed
among the farmers, determining the individual areal minimum or the production
level of the endangered variety. This a priori distribution is a more static approach,
incapable of reacting flexibly to external conditions or changes and requiring more
resources for controlling the system. Additionally, resources to develop decision
criteria for the distribution of the share certificates and the implementation thereof
are necessary.
Based on a self-regulating price incentive by defining the actual incentive price
at the time of supply the a posteriori distribution of benefits for maintaining
endangered varieties in situ is more flexible.
Another variation may be to only control the yields of the supplying farmers,
paying them a kind of acceptance incentive, based on the opportunity costs plus
the risk premium, and leaving the yield to the farmers to use it according to their
considerations. This variation would reduce the costs of handling the yield
resulting from the aMSS for the demand side. It would, however, increase the
costs of the demand side due to increased activities for travelling and controlling.
This approach requires a national centralized system of PGRFA conservation
with a strong and central role for the national genebank. It has to be the focal point
for all information on ex situ and in situ conservation activities in the country as
well as for any collaborations on international level. This information system
insures that all relevant information is available even in a country with
decentralized structures of conservation and breeding activities. This is one of the
major prerequisites for an efficient utilization of PGRFA (see Chap. 5.4).
Information concerning the technical development in marginal agrobiodiversityrich areas must be observed in order to assess the danger of losing distinct
varieties 34 • The genebank must be the place for determining what and when
controlled in situ conservation activities have to be put in place. The doubling of
conservation work can be reduced and the cost effectiveness of PGRFA
conservation can be increased only with a centralized information system (see
Chap. 5.4).
In this chapter, the conceptual framework and the theoretical issues have been
outlined. PGRFA conservation cannot be carried out without reflecting the value
of genetic resources. Although an attempt was not made at assessing the value, it
is clear that PGRFA have a certain social value. It remains to be seen whether the
whole social value can be captured by market prices. A significant breeding value
exists as long as the genetically coded information is not substituted by other,
synthetically produced information.
Because of this and the other theoretical values discussed, different optima of
conservation levels exists. These optima can be reached only through the right
incentives, internalization of positive external effects and compensation for
conservation efforts. While a very flexible and self-targeting incentive mechanism
" See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.
3 Economic Framework of Conservation
There are two different ways of targeting the farmers who may benefit from the
in situ conservation system:
On the one hand, a certain amount of share certificates may be distributed
among the farmers, determining the individual areal minimum or the production
level of the endangered variety. This a priori distribution is a more static approach,
incapable of reacting flexibly to external conditions or changes and requiring more
resources for controlling the system. Additionally, resources to develop decision
criteria for the distribution of the share certificates and the implementation thereof
are necessary.
Based on a self-regulating price incentive by defining the actual incentive price
at the time of supply the a posteriori distribution of benefits for maintaining
endangered varieties in situ is more flexible.
Another variation may be to only control the yields of the supplying farmers,
paying them a kind of acceptance incentive, based on the opportunity costs plus
the risk premium, and leaving the yield to the farmers to use it according to their
considerations. This variation would reduce the costs of handling the yield
resulting from the aMSS for the demand side. It would, however, increase the
costs of the demand side due to increased activities for travelling and controlling.
This approach requires a national centralized system of PGRFA conservation
with a strong and central role for the national genebank. It has to be the focal point
for all information on ex situ and in situ conservation activities in the country as
well as for any collaborations on international level. This information system
insures that all relevant information is available even in a country with
decentralized structures of conservation and breeding activities. This is one of the
major prerequisites for an efficient utilization of PGRFA (see Chap. 5.4).
Information concerning the technical development in marginal agrobiodiversityrich areas must be observed in order to assess the danger of losing distinct
varieties 34 • The genebank must be the place for determining what and when
controlled in situ conservation activities have to be put in place. The doubling of
conservation work can be reduced and the cost effectiveness of PGRFA
conservation can be increased only with a centralized information system (see
Chap. 5.4).
In this chapter, the conceptual framework and the theoretical issues have been
outlined. PGRFA conservation cannot be carried out without reflecting the value
of genetic resources. Although an attempt was not made at assessing the value, it
is clear that PGRFA have a certain social value. It remains to be seen whether the
whole social value can be captured by market prices. A significant breeding value
exists as long as the genetically coded information is not substituted by other,
synthetically produced information.
Because of this and the other theoretical values discussed, different optima of
conservation levels exists. These optima can be reached only through the right
incentives, internalization of positive external effects and compensation for
conservation efforts. While a very flexible and self-targeting incentive mechanism
" See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.