3.4 Incentives for the Conservation of PGRFA
65
3.4.2.1
Feasible Incentives for the in Situ Conservation of PGRFA
As has been discussed, the value of PGRFA cannot be accurately assessed yet (see
Chap. 3.2). The main differences in genetic resources to other natural resources
are their irreversibility of extinction and the complex feed-back system 28 • In
contrast to the induced innovation theory (Hayami and Rutan, 1985; Boserup,
1965) the decline of PGRFA diversity, i.e., the extinction of a specific variety, is
not self-correcting. Resource scarcity as well as rising private and social costs,
arising from the decline of genetic resources, may induce an increased awareness
of the value of genetic diversity. But because of the free-rider situation and the
specific feed-back system, it is not self-correcting at the farmer level. Bearing this
in mind, the risk of PGRFA decline is the irreversible loss of genetically coded
information, if specific varieties were not conserved before their extinction.
When technological and economic changes occur, institutional arrangements
have to be implemented to foster PGRFA conservation with increased incentives.
Given the appropriate economic incentives, farmers could continue to cultivate
traditional varieties and do so for the sake of conservation. Few countries
presently provide incentives to farmers to support in situ conservation of their
landraces. Proposals for such incentives have, however, been put forward in
countries like India, the Philippines, and Tanzania (respective Country Reports).
Incentives attempt to influence the behavior of individuals (farmers) and of
whole groups (countries) and may be divided into educational, institutional, and
economic incentives. Educational incentives, e.g., awareness promotion, may
sensitize farmers to the social importance of the conservation of agrobiodiversity,
but as Morris and Heisey (1997) emphasize, profit-motivated farmers will in
general not be willing to renounce the additional benefit of a less agrobiodiverse
production system to benefit society.
On the one hand institutional incentives are the internalization of the positive
external effects by improving the property rights situation for the farmers, which
will be discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, institutional incentives may
force farmers to conserve PGRFA diversity. In addition to being undemocratic,
the efficiency of such a method may be questioned, and the enforcement of any
sanction is difficult in countries with poor infrastructure.
The problem of enforcing mechanisms internalizing the costs of diversity loss
outrules all economic disincentives, e.g., taxes or charges for reducing
agrobiodiversity in the field. The specific situation of agrobiodiversity
conservation, namely to reduce the area under different traditional varieties to a
safety minimum, only permits the utilization of positive incentives. Direct and
indirect positive incentives may succeed in using market mechanisms to target
individual farmers and to influence their decision making. These incentives should
" The breeding value, as main utility value of PGRFA, is utilized mainly by professional
breeders. Consequently, the lack of sufficient genetically coded information for breeding will
occur first at the breeding level - the farmers, reducing diversity in their fields, will probably
receive no signal of value change for a long time, if at all.
65
3.4.2.1
Feasible Incentives for the in Situ Conservation of PGRFA
As has been discussed, the value of PGRFA cannot be accurately assessed yet (see
Chap. 3.2). The main differences in genetic resources to other natural resources
are their irreversibility of extinction and the complex feed-back system 28 • In
contrast to the induced innovation theory (Hayami and Rutan, 1985; Boserup,
1965) the decline of PGRFA diversity, i.e., the extinction of a specific variety, is
not self-correcting. Resource scarcity as well as rising private and social costs,
arising from the decline of genetic resources, may induce an increased awareness
of the value of genetic diversity. But because of the free-rider situation and the
specific feed-back system, it is not self-correcting at the farmer level. Bearing this
in mind, the risk of PGRFA decline is the irreversible loss of genetically coded
information, if specific varieties were not conserved before their extinction.
When technological and economic changes occur, institutional arrangements
have to be implemented to foster PGRFA conservation with increased incentives.
Given the appropriate economic incentives, farmers could continue to cultivate
traditional varieties and do so for the sake of conservation. Few countries
presently provide incentives to farmers to support in situ conservation of their
landraces. Proposals for such incentives have, however, been put forward in
countries like India, the Philippines, and Tanzania (respective Country Reports).
Incentives attempt to influence the behavior of individuals (farmers) and of
whole groups (countries) and may be divided into educational, institutional, and
economic incentives. Educational incentives, e.g., awareness promotion, may
sensitize farmers to the social importance of the conservation of agrobiodiversity,
but as Morris and Heisey (1997) emphasize, profit-motivated farmers will in
general not be willing to renounce the additional benefit of a less agrobiodiverse
production system to benefit society.
On the one hand institutional incentives are the internalization of the positive
external effects by improving the property rights situation for the farmers, which
will be discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, institutional incentives may
force farmers to conserve PGRFA diversity. In addition to being undemocratic,
the efficiency of such a method may be questioned, and the enforcement of any
sanction is difficult in countries with poor infrastructure.
The problem of enforcing mechanisms internalizing the costs of diversity loss
outrules all economic disincentives, e.g., taxes or charges for reducing
agrobiodiversity in the field. The specific situation of agrobiodiversity
conservation, namely to reduce the area under different traditional varieties to a
safety minimum, only permits the utilization of positive incentives. Direct and
indirect positive incentives may succeed in using market mechanisms to target
individual farmers and to influence their decision making. These incentives should
" The breeding value, as main utility value of PGRFA, is utilized mainly by professional
breeders. Consequently, the lack of sufficient genetically coded information for breeding will
occur first at the breeding level - the farmers, reducing diversity in their fields, will probably
receive no signal of value change for a long time, if at all.