114
5 Conservation Costs of PGRFA
distinct varieties because of their richness in agrobiodiversity55. On the other hand,
there may be countries, which need less than the average 1 %. Because of the
interdependency in PGRFA already utilized and needed in the future, the countries
having to spend less than average may compensate countries which need more than
1 % of their arable land.
India and Germany are examples of an agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor country;
it can be stated that while in India land under agricultural use is still expanding to
meet the increasing food needs, in Germany 12% of arable land is left as fallow due
to the EC's set-aside programs (GCR, 1996). Consequently, the social costs on
national level for a controlled in situ conservation, in terms of opportunity costs for
foregone benefit, will be much higher in India than in Germany. From a simplistic
point of view, the resources would seem allocated best if Germany could take over
India's controlled in situ conservation. The different ecological conditions,
however, restrict a transfer of in situ conservation activities from India to Germany.
Consequently, Germany and other agrobiodiversity-poor countries could
compensate India for the conservation which is in a global interest similar to the
joint implementation programs, known from the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
5.1.3
Transaction Costs of PGRFA Conservation
The institutional and political negotiations and arrangements for developing and
maintaining a system of PGRF A conservation and exchange can be seen as the
system's transaction costs, as was defined by Coase (1960) and Williamson (1975).
The following costs belong to specific transaction costs of the system of PGRFA
conservation and exchange in its miscellaneous possibilities:
• the costs for the negotiations in the different fora (FAO, WTO, UPOV, and
CBD),
• the costs for running any international and national approved PGRFA exchange
system,
• the costs for the information and control management and
• the costs for any other activity related to the implementation and maintenance of
the evolving system.
Mainly the costs emerging from international negotiations and arrangements are
reflected in this study. Additionally, there are significant hidden transaction costs,
mainly on a national level. Activities like the harmonization of national policies
concerning the conservation and utilization of PGRFA between the different
ministries, i.e., the agricultural ministry and the ministry for environment, trade or
others, the development of one consistent system for a national program or
institutional arrangements therefore could not be quantified in this study.
Another area of activities concerning conservation of PGRFA, even though with
more indirect impact, are all activities for institution and capacity building and the
" See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.
5 Conservation Costs of PGRFA
distinct varieties because of their richness in agrobiodiversity55. On the other hand,
there may be countries, which need less than the average 1 %. Because of the
interdependency in PGRFA already utilized and needed in the future, the countries
having to spend less than average may compensate countries which need more than
1 % of their arable land.
India and Germany are examples of an agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor country;
it can be stated that while in India land under agricultural use is still expanding to
meet the increasing food needs, in Germany 12% of arable land is left as fallow due
to the EC's set-aside programs (GCR, 1996). Consequently, the social costs on
national level for a controlled in situ conservation, in terms of opportunity costs for
foregone benefit, will be much higher in India than in Germany. From a simplistic
point of view, the resources would seem allocated best if Germany could take over
India's controlled in situ conservation. The different ecological conditions,
however, restrict a transfer of in situ conservation activities from India to Germany.
Consequently, Germany and other agrobiodiversity-poor countries could
compensate India for the conservation which is in a global interest similar to the
joint implementation programs, known from the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
5.1.3
Transaction Costs of PGRFA Conservation
The institutional and political negotiations and arrangements for developing and
maintaining a system of PGRF A conservation and exchange can be seen as the
system's transaction costs, as was defined by Coase (1960) and Williamson (1975).
The following costs belong to specific transaction costs of the system of PGRFA
conservation and exchange in its miscellaneous possibilities:
• the costs for the negotiations in the different fora (FAO, WTO, UPOV, and
CBD),
• the costs for running any international and national approved PGRFA exchange
system,
• the costs for the information and control management and
• the costs for any other activity related to the implementation and maintenance of
the evolving system.
Mainly the costs emerging from international negotiations and arrangements are
reflected in this study. Additionally, there are significant hidden transaction costs,
mainly on a national level. Activities like the harmonization of national policies
concerning the conservation and utilization of PGRFA between the different
ministries, i.e., the agricultural ministry and the ministry for environment, trade or
others, the development of one consistent system for a national program or
institutional arrangements therefore could not be quantified in this study.
Another area of activities concerning conservation of PGRFA, even though with
more indirect impact, are all activities for institution and capacity building and the
" See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.