94
4 Institutional Frameworks for the Exchange and Utilization of PGRFA
The value of genetically coded information can never be determined a priori
but rather only from an a posteriori observation, i.e., as a result of their success on
the market. In order to remain viable the system must therefore sooner or later
provide mechanisms of profit sharing.
4.4.2
Bilateral System of PGRFA Exchange
A bilateral agreement for the exchange of PGRFA is negotiated between two
countries and is formalized through a contract. It can be restricted to a single
exchange of germplasm between two countries, e.g., the bilateral agreement
between Brazil and Malaysia for the exchange of a specific quantity of wild
material of Hevea for a specific quantity of elite clones for other Hevea varieties
(IPGRI, 1996). The bilateral agreement may also be a contract for a longer period
of time, e.g., the Merck-InBio agreement on the collection, screening, and
utilization of genetic resources from the Costa Rican tropical forest. The third
potential category of a bilateral exchange system for PGRF A is the exchange of
germplasm for financial resources. Hence, in addition to the time horizon, the
exchange system may also differ with respect to the means of exchange: wild
material for improved germplasm, wild material for technology or financial
transfer.
According to IPGRI (1996) the main advantages of the bilateral exchange
system are its flexibility in terms of negotiations, adoption and fulfillment of the
contract, the good exploitation of respective comparative advantages, and low
overhead costs because of missing permanent institutional structures.
The main structural disadvantage of bilateral agreements is related to the issue
of benefit sharing. In contrast to pharmaceuticals, modern varieties are derived
from other very different varieties, lines and germplasm. If benefit sharing must be
realized by crediting the cascade effect involved in breeding, the benefit
distribution through specific agreements seems to be operational, only if countries
are involved as recipients from the benefits. But even then, there needs to be some
intelligent infrastractural solution. Taking the Veery wheat released by CIMMYT
in 1977 as an example, the complexity of a benefit sharing system may be
visualized. The Veery wheat lines were developed from approximately 3170
crosses, made between 51 individual parents originating in 26 countries around the
world; 62 varieties were released from the Veery lines and cultivated on
approximately 3 million hectares around the world. (Skovmand, quoted in IPGRI,
1996, p. 26). Another question is whether every genetically coded information,
integrated in the new variety at one time or the other, is equally credited or
whether there should be any gradation depending on the novelty or the specific
impact of the genetically coded information, i.e., will there be a possibility to
assign a marginal value to each genetically coded information's contribution to a
newly bred variety?
One of the most important arguments given by IPGRI (1996) and Cooper et al.
(1994) for a multilateral exchange system is the problem of benefit agreements
between a breeding company or a country and all the countries from which the
4 Institutional Frameworks for the Exchange and Utilization of PGRFA
The value of genetically coded information can never be determined a priori
but rather only from an a posteriori observation, i.e., as a result of their success on
the market. In order to remain viable the system must therefore sooner or later
provide mechanisms of profit sharing.
4.4.2
Bilateral System of PGRFA Exchange
A bilateral agreement for the exchange of PGRFA is negotiated between two
countries and is formalized through a contract. It can be restricted to a single
exchange of germplasm between two countries, e.g., the bilateral agreement
between Brazil and Malaysia for the exchange of a specific quantity of wild
material of Hevea for a specific quantity of elite clones for other Hevea varieties
(IPGRI, 1996). The bilateral agreement may also be a contract for a longer period
of time, e.g., the Merck-InBio agreement on the collection, screening, and
utilization of genetic resources from the Costa Rican tropical forest. The third
potential category of a bilateral exchange system for PGRF A is the exchange of
germplasm for financial resources. Hence, in addition to the time horizon, the
exchange system may also differ with respect to the means of exchange: wild
material for improved germplasm, wild material for technology or financial
transfer.
According to IPGRI (1996) the main advantages of the bilateral exchange
system are its flexibility in terms of negotiations, adoption and fulfillment of the
contract, the good exploitation of respective comparative advantages, and low
overhead costs because of missing permanent institutional structures.
The main structural disadvantage of bilateral agreements is related to the issue
of benefit sharing. In contrast to pharmaceuticals, modern varieties are derived
from other very different varieties, lines and germplasm. If benefit sharing must be
realized by crediting the cascade effect involved in breeding, the benefit
distribution through specific agreements seems to be operational, only if countries
are involved as recipients from the benefits. But even then, there needs to be some
intelligent infrastractural solution. Taking the Veery wheat released by CIMMYT
in 1977 as an example, the complexity of a benefit sharing system may be
visualized. The Veery wheat lines were developed from approximately 3170
crosses, made between 51 individual parents originating in 26 countries around the
world; 62 varieties were released from the Veery lines and cultivated on
approximately 3 million hectares around the world. (Skovmand, quoted in IPGRI,
1996, p. 26). Another question is whether every genetically coded information,
integrated in the new variety at one time or the other, is equally credited or
whether there should be any gradation depending on the novelty or the specific
impact of the genetically coded information, i.e., will there be a possibility to
assign a marginal value to each genetically coded information's contribution to a
newly bred variety?
One of the most important arguments given by IPGRI (1996) and Cooper et al.
(1994) for a multilateral exchange system is the problem of benefit agreements
between a breeding company or a country and all the countries from which the