Some Epicritical Remarks (Instead of a Summary)
A. LOCKER
In dealing with the most outstanding implications of the foregoing
discussion, the following points deserve some attention: (1) the relationship between the continuous and the discrete system (or model) description
as well as between the deterministic and the stochastic description, (2) the
problem-closely connected with the one mentioned above-of the ultimately valid form of description of "reality" or, in other words, of the
ultimately possible theory, (3) the problem of optimization and (4) the
problem of different ways of looking at the world.
The formulation of a certain correspondence principle for two possible
descriptions of a given system [4] in terms of a continuous and discrete
description renders the two forms equally valid. Therefore, it seems hopeless to search for the truly conformable representation. On the contrary,
for the purpose of serving certain prescribed needs, the selection between
the two depends on our own decision. Thus, the correspondence principle
seems to be a kind of mapping. The epistemological interest, however,
centers around the problem as to whether or not the system conceived may
exist without or independently of at least one of its possible representations; the answer inevitably will be that the system does exist within the
human mind and by dint of its creative ability.
Concerning the problem of an adequate description of "reality" by means
of deterministic or stochastic models, the question was raised during the
symposium [1] as to whether or not a scientifically valid description has to
be based on quantum physics. We clearly have to distinguish between two
facts: (1) By applying quantum physics within the range of reality where the
separation of 8 1 (t) and 8 2 (t) makes sense, we have to take into consideration
the complementary 3-valued logic with the consequence that an equivalence
relation between thinking and being, as pre-supposed by classical logic, no
longer holds true. Nevertheless, it may be shown that this fact still remains
compatible with critical gnoseology. Moreover, it does not suffice to
support the exclusiveness of a probabilistic concept; rather, an epistemologically satisfactory explanation of nature has to include both possibilities, viz.
the classical deterministic as well as the quantum physical and classical
indeterministic one. Only the two together would constitute a generally
valid framework for a universal explanation of nature. (2) By accepting
A. LOCKER
In dealing with the most outstanding implications of the foregoing
discussion, the following points deserve some attention: (1) the relationship between the continuous and the discrete system (or model) description
as well as between the deterministic and the stochastic description, (2) the
problem-closely connected with the one mentioned above-of the ultimately valid form of description of "reality" or, in other words, of the
ultimately possible theory, (3) the problem of optimization and (4) the
problem of different ways of looking at the world.
The formulation of a certain correspondence principle for two possible
descriptions of a given system [4] in terms of a continuous and discrete
description renders the two forms equally valid. Therefore, it seems hopeless to search for the truly conformable representation. On the contrary,
for the purpose of serving certain prescribed needs, the selection between
the two depends on our own decision. Thus, the correspondence principle
seems to be a kind of mapping. The epistemological interest, however,
centers around the problem as to whether or not the system conceived may
exist without or independently of at least one of its possible representations; the answer inevitably will be that the system does exist within the
human mind and by dint of its creative ability.
Concerning the problem of an adequate description of "reality" by means
of deterministic or stochastic models, the question was raised during the
symposium [1] as to whether or not a scientifically valid description has to
be based on quantum physics. We clearly have to distinguish between two
facts: (1) By applying quantum physics within the range of reality where the
separation of 8 1 (t) and 8 2 (t) makes sense, we have to take into consideration
the complementary 3-valued logic with the consequence that an equivalence
relation between thinking and being, as pre-supposed by classical logic, no
longer holds true. Nevertheless, it may be shown that this fact still remains
compatible with critical gnoseology. Moreover, it does not suffice to
support the exclusiveness of a probabilistic concept; rather, an epistemologically satisfactory explanation of nature has to include both possibilities, viz.
the classical deterministic as well as the quantum physical and classical
indeterministic one. Only the two together would constitute a generally
valid framework for a universal explanation of nature. (2) By accepting