The Epistemological Significance of Models in Science
A. LOCKER
Abstract
The usefulness of models for science is associated with the role they play in
human thinking in general. The main features of models as well as of systems-the
objects mapped by models and called originals in this respect-may be described
in terms of the set theory based on certain pre-suppositions; the original model
relationship may be formalized. A special class of systems or models is represented
by automata, the elaborate theory of which for certain kinds of them allows a
more profound application to biology.
Introduction
The term and concept of a model, now a familiar phenomenon in all
branches of science as well as in everyday life, nonetheless requires a
careful theoretical study with respect to its scientific meaning and its
epistemological implications, i.e. its relationship to human thinking. In
other words, what is required is not only a careful study of the possibilities
man has in obtaining knowledge, but also an analysis of the basic conditions
for carrying out this task. The present use of the term model indicates a
new turning point in present-day thinking, the opening of a scientifically
orientated era in which, however, science can no longer-as it did in the
past-neglect the philosophical background.
In order to understand what a model actually does represent, it would
be desirable to start with an object that is only vaguely conceived and of
which a model has to be built. An object of this kind may be called a
system-provided we bear in mind that systems too do not exist per se but,
on the contrary, are products of the creative or constructive capability of
the human mind. Assuming the critical position of KANT'S gnoseologywhich is by no means a the on suspended in midair but rather a doctrine
well founded in ontology [21-we have to establish its constructive nature,
the well known "productive power of imagination", which in its transcendental synthesis lends to the concept its image, although the concept
as such can only be formed by means of perception. This interrelated
creative actIvIty of reason and perception-analogous to intellect
and ideas-is obviously what was meant by MILLER [9] when he studied
the implications of sntems theory for biology. He distinguishes between
"conceived" systems, "concrete" and "abstract" systems [9]. Since conceiving
1 3. Symp. Quant. BioI.
A. LOCKER
Abstract
The usefulness of models for science is associated with the role they play in
human thinking in general. The main features of models as well as of systems-the
objects mapped by models and called originals in this respect-may be described
in terms of the set theory based on certain pre-suppositions; the original model
relationship may be formalized. A special class of systems or models is represented
by automata, the elaborate theory of which for certain kinds of them allows a
more profound application to biology.
Introduction
The term and concept of a model, now a familiar phenomenon in all
branches of science as well as in everyday life, nonetheless requires a
careful theoretical study with respect to its scientific meaning and its
epistemological implications, i.e. its relationship to human thinking. In
other words, what is required is not only a careful study of the possibilities
man has in obtaining knowledge, but also an analysis of the basic conditions
for carrying out this task. The present use of the term model indicates a
new turning point in present-day thinking, the opening of a scientifically
orientated era in which, however, science can no longer-as it did in the
past-neglect the philosophical background.
In order to understand what a model actually does represent, it would
be desirable to start with an object that is only vaguely conceived and of
which a model has to be built. An object of this kind may be called a
system-provided we bear in mind that systems too do not exist per se but,
on the contrary, are products of the creative or constructive capability of
the human mind. Assuming the critical position of KANT'S gnoseologywhich is by no means a the on suspended in midair but rather a doctrine
well founded in ontology [21-we have to establish its constructive nature,
the well known "productive power of imagination", which in its transcendental synthesis lends to the concept its image, although the concept
as such can only be formed by means of perception. This interrelated
creative actIvIty of reason and perception-analogous to intellect
and ideas-is obviously what was meant by MILLER [9] when he studied
the implications of sntems theory for biology. He distinguishes between
"conceived" systems, "concrete" and "abstract" systems [9]. Since conceiving
1 3. Symp. Quant. BioI.