117
8 Access to Raw Materials
to US$ 60 billion in 2009, giving an 89 % rise
5
. China’s share of asset purchases,
which represented 24 % of global acquisitions, lagged in 2010 (11 %)
6
. Such a concentration clearly has a considerable impact on the price setting mechanism.
Thirdly, a concentration of power in the hands of certain States. How, once again,
could we not mention China and the control it directly exerts on its own raw material resources? Yet, as we know, it possess the majority of some of these exploited
materials, such as rare earths, with 130,000 of the 133,600 t produced worldwide in
2010
7
. It thus controls practically the whole world market for this resource, deciding
at what price, but also to whom, it shall be sold. We can fairly easily, given the circumstances, imagine both the legal and economic consequences of such a position.
Bolivia is another example, notably with its lithium reserves, whereby the new
Constitution of 25 January 2009 states that its natural resources are the indivisible
property of the Bolivian people and are administered by the State
8
.
Yet such evolution towards a concentration of power in the hands of States today
constitutes a very marked trend in many producer countries.
These Threats are also Generated by the Reappearance
of Judicial Nationalism
This judicial nationalism is found in various forms.
By the Reappearance or Reinforcement of Legal and Tax-Related Obstacles
We note that in 2009, the European Commission recorded no less than 450 export
restrictions on over 400 raw materials. This shows the extent of the phenomenon
which is illustrated by mechanisms such as quotas, exportation rights and various
systems designed, whether openly or not, to restrict the access of foreign mining
operators, whether in capitalistic or operational terms.
By the Establishment of Protectionism
It is worth remembering in this respect that the Chinese 2009–2015 provisional plan
went as far as including an outright ban on the exportation of certain rare earths
whose importance is well known, in particular for electronics, computers, telephones and other technologies. We can only imagine the consequences such a ban
could have had. The fact that China dropped its plan following Japan’s complaint to
the WTO shows that the use of legal instruments, which will be addressed below, or
even the prospect of their use can have a dissuasive effect.
5
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
6
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
7
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
8
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
8 Access to Raw Materials
to US$ 60 billion in 2009, giving an 89 % rise
5
. China’s share of asset purchases,
which represented 24 % of global acquisitions, lagged in 2010 (11 %)
6
. Such a concentration clearly has a considerable impact on the price setting mechanism.
Thirdly, a concentration of power in the hands of certain States. How, once again,
could we not mention China and the control it directly exerts on its own raw material resources? Yet, as we know, it possess the majority of some of these exploited
materials, such as rare earths, with 130,000 of the 133,600 t produced worldwide in
2010
7
. It thus controls practically the whole world market for this resource, deciding
at what price, but also to whom, it shall be sold. We can fairly easily, given the circumstances, imagine both the legal and economic consequences of such a position.
Bolivia is another example, notably with its lithium reserves, whereby the new
Constitution of 25 January 2009 states that its natural resources are the indivisible
property of the Bolivian people and are administered by the State
8
.
Yet such evolution towards a concentration of power in the hands of States today
constitutes a very marked trend in many producer countries.
These Threats are also Generated by the Reappearance
of Judicial Nationalism
This judicial nationalism is found in various forms.
By the Reappearance or Reinforcement of Legal and Tax-Related Obstacles
We note that in 2009, the European Commission recorded no less than 450 export
restrictions on over 400 raw materials. This shows the extent of the phenomenon
which is illustrated by mechanisms such as quotas, exportation rights and various
systems designed, whether openly or not, to restrict the access of foreign mining
operators, whether in capitalistic or operational terms.
By the Establishment of Protectionism
It is worth remembering in this respect that the Chinese 2009–2015 provisional plan
went as far as including an outright ban on the exportation of certain rare earths
whose importance is well known, in particular for electronics, computers, telephones and other technologies. We can only imagine the consequences such a ban
could have had. The fact that China dropped its plan following Japan’s complaint to
the WTO shows that the use of legal instruments, which will be addressed below, or
even the prospect of their use can have a dissuasive effect.
5
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
6
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
7
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.
8
Cyclope 2011, p. 534.