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decision-makers is crucial (Green 1979; Connor and Simberloff 1986; Cairns et al. 1993;
Caughley 1994). It also requires adequate a priori statements of the precise nature of the
problems, their time-courses and how much change matters, so that adequate resources
are made available to get precise enough information to be useful (Hilborn and Walters
1981; Peterman 1990; Fairweather 1991; Gray and Bewers 1996; Underwood 1997).
Unfortunately, it also requires managers and decision-makers to be precise about
what they are doing and what they expect to happen and potentially involves them in
risks of being shown to have made the wrong decisions (Longood and Simme11972;
Ward and Kassebaum 1972; Peterson 1993). It also involves proper planning of environmental sampling and this needs trained, qualified and experienced scientists. If the
object of the exercise is improved environmental management, neither is a disadvantage. If, in contrast, the aim is to preserve the status of decision-makers and to increase
ele~toral favours by funding community groups and environmental activists, both the
risks of being wrong and the need to involve professionals would be seen as disadvantages.
6.4.2
Reduction of Scientific Uncertainty for Managerial Decisions
As in all other science, public funding of fundamental and strategic coastal environmental science has declined, in southeast Australia. Nevertheless, per capita of population, particularly given the large geographical area involved, there has been considerable return in terms of publications, findings, innovations, etc., from the scientific
community. It is a great pity that so much of the available information is not used -
even though it is readily available.
The reasons for this are beyond the scope of the present discussion, but include the
failure of scientists to take any initiative in environmental issues or to spend adequate
time explaining what is the purpose of the work they do. It also involves the "turf wars"
of State and Federal agencies spending more effort protecting their own boundaries
than seeking the best collaborative solutions to problems by involving outside (and
sometimes demonstrably better informed) scientists (a point made well in the analyses by Longood andSimmel1972; Ward and Kassebaum 1972). A further issue is the
various and non-transparent political agendas of community and environmental
groups. These are often composed of "domestic elites" (Jamison 1996) - who have filled
the vacuum of responsibility for long-term environmental issues. In doing so, however,
they have created a new radicalism that is self-centred and self-absorbed. Political necessity has created an activism that has often lost touch with the need for real information (Princen et al. 1994). Instead, increasingly and without question or the possibility of criticism, "local" or "folk" or "indigenous" knowledge has supplanted real
knowledge. There are huge and well-known dangers in this shift of the nature of environmental knowledge - e.g. discussions of local knowledge in Agrawal (1995), Jackson
(1995) and Jewitt (1995). So-called "cultural ecology" is slowly catching up with scientific ecology to include the scientifically well-known realization that the very landscapes
and seascapes in which we live are created by human influences. There has been a widespread non-scientific view that, somehow, environmental processes are external to
human actions, but environmental problems are caused by such actions (Conklin 1954;
Netting 1993). Fortunately, this may now be fad!ng.
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