projected parameters – thus undermining the entire land reclamation system’s
economic efficiency.
The defective exploitation and the resulting low yields were known at the
highest executive levels yet, the land reclamation programme was being continued
at too great a speed (261.6 thousands ha are being made available in 1985) and this
goes on into the regime’s final years, by which time the economy had become
unable to support such obsessive delusions of grandeur (with only 45.0 thousands
ha, in 1988 and 27.7 thousands ha, the following year being made available for
exploitation).
All of this took place with the manifest connivance of the communist authorities,
as even the Head of state and President of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae
Ceausescu appeared to be admitting, in a speech made at the beginning of 1981: “I
do not wish to revisit the problems encountered with our irrigation and land
reclamation programmes yet, since some of our comrades have raised the issue of
supplementing investments to this end, I would wish them to note that for the period
1981–1982 there will be no new works being started. Let us complete the irrigation
systems that were done, let’s fix the systems that are in place – because some of
them have already started degrading. Let us ensure their proper functioning first.
Only after all the systems that are currently in place will operate properly will we go
on to building new ones.” Footnote 2: the Programme.
Thus, the continuation and expansion of the land reclamation works while
neglecting the proper functioning of the systems that had been put in place is the
first and foremost mistake made concerning the issue of resource management.
Some of the main deficiencies that became manifest during these systems’ usage
will be looked at over the following chapters.
(a) The degree to which reclaimed land was being irrigated and its irrigation
norms. The land that had been equipped for this purpose over the period
1986–1989 grew from 2731.1 thousands ha to 3280.8 thousands ha, with an
average of 2988 thousands ha over these 4 years. The actual surface being
irrigated (at least once) stood at an average of 2406 ha, representing 80% of the
total surface of equipped land (Table 41.2).
The irrigation norm varied between 2000 m
ɜ /ha in 1988 and 1310 m
ɜ /ha in 1986,
with an average of 1746 m
ɜ /ha against average projected norms of 2700 m
ɜ /ha
ensuring a 50% Active Humidity Interval (AHI) or 3550 m
ɜ
/ha ensuring an 80%
AHI. In reality, the water provided for the irrigated areas stood at 64.3% and 48.9%
respectively.
The failure to ensure the irrigation norms as projected was partly caused by the
fact that the pumping equipment had been substandard; however, this failure was
mostly the result of water losses that occurred through seepages due to the inadequate waterproofing of the canals.
(b) The failure to water the crops as many times as it should have been necessary.
Statistically speaking, the area where at least one watering was applied is
considered irrigated. For most crops though, several watering sessions are
41 Land and Water in Romania’s Food Economy
671
economic efficiency.
The defective exploitation and the resulting low yields were known at the
highest executive levels yet, the land reclamation programme was being continued
at too great a speed (261.6 thousands ha are being made available in 1985) and this
goes on into the regime’s final years, by which time the economy had become
unable to support such obsessive delusions of grandeur (with only 45.0 thousands
ha, in 1988 and 27.7 thousands ha, the following year being made available for
exploitation).
All of this took place with the manifest connivance of the communist authorities,
as even the Head of state and President of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae
Ceausescu appeared to be admitting, in a speech made at the beginning of 1981: “I
do not wish to revisit the problems encountered with our irrigation and land
reclamation programmes yet, since some of our comrades have raised the issue of
supplementing investments to this end, I would wish them to note that for the period
1981–1982 there will be no new works being started. Let us complete the irrigation
systems that were done, let’s fix the systems that are in place – because some of
them have already started degrading. Let us ensure their proper functioning first.
Only after all the systems that are currently in place will operate properly will we go
on to building new ones.” Footnote 2: the Programme.
Thus, the continuation and expansion of the land reclamation works while
neglecting the proper functioning of the systems that had been put in place is the
first and foremost mistake made concerning the issue of resource management.
Some of the main deficiencies that became manifest during these systems’ usage
will be looked at over the following chapters.
(a) The degree to which reclaimed land was being irrigated and its irrigation
norms. The land that had been equipped for this purpose over the period
1986–1989 grew from 2731.1 thousands ha to 3280.8 thousands ha, with an
average of 2988 thousands ha over these 4 years. The actual surface being
irrigated (at least once) stood at an average of 2406 ha, representing 80% of the
total surface of equipped land (Table 41.2).
The irrigation norm varied between 2000 m
ɜ /ha in 1988 and 1310 m
ɜ /ha in 1986,
with an average of 1746 m
ɜ /ha against average projected norms of 2700 m
ɜ /ha
ensuring a 50% Active Humidity Interval (AHI) or 3550 m
ɜ
/ha ensuring an 80%
AHI. In reality, the water provided for the irrigated areas stood at 64.3% and 48.9%
respectively.
The failure to ensure the irrigation norms as projected was partly caused by the
fact that the pumping equipment had been substandard; however, this failure was
mostly the result of water losses that occurred through seepages due to the inadequate waterproofing of the canals.
(b) The failure to water the crops as many times as it should have been necessary.
Statistically speaking, the area where at least one watering was applied is
considered irrigated. For most crops though, several watering sessions are
41 Land and Water in Romania’s Food Economy
671