Strategic Planning for Operational Oceanography
13
Depending upon assumptions made in solving the ambiguities, the apparent cost
of operational oceanography can be made to appear larger or smaller through an
order of magnitude. Accounting procedures need to be agreed and transparent, at
least at the nationallevel, and preferably at the regionallevel.
This is not just a question of trying to limit the misleading impression which can
be given by presenting accounts in a deliberately distorted way. The assumptions
that are needed before costs of different systems can be aggregated are fundamental. For example, to what extent should the cost of remote sensing by satellite be
included, when alI satellites so far have been funded for scientific research purposes, and the same sensors sometimes fulfil different functions over land and sea,
thus satisfying different user communities? (How are we going to fund truly operational ocean observing satellites?). How do we cost the deployment of instruments which are dropped from ships of opportunity? How do we account for data,
such as bathymetric charts, or other services which may be provided by the military? How do we reconcile costs between agencies or countries which use different
principles for estimating total or marginal costs, or different rates of amortising
capital? Ifthere were no planning for GOOS or EuroGOOS at alI there would be a
hap-hazard development of numerous observing systems and models producing a
very poor overall performance. The apparent "cost" of GOOS/EuroGOOS would
be zero, since alI the costs would be incurred for other reasons. Once GOOS or
EuroGOOS exists the costs become apparent, but so does the gain to be achieved
by analysis, planning and design. In the extreme case the introduction of a planned
and designed system might actualIy reduce the true costs of an observing system
while increasing the benefits. This may be overly optimistic, but it illustrates the
difficulty in identifying the cost of GOOS and EuroGOOS or MedGOOS.
This section does not provide answers to the problem of trying to predict the
costs of operational oceanography, but it does illustrate that a sophisticated cost
model wilI be required, fully taking into account standard procedures for coping
with sunk costs, shared overheads, shared benefits, self-funded new technology,
rented and leased equipment, etc. While such an approach may be justified, in
practice agencies seem to be adopting a pragmatic step-by step process, committing to successive stages of ocean observation as each phase appears to provide
benefits.
Surveys in France and the UK (IFREMER, 1997, 1999; Pugh and Skinner, 1996)
have estimated the scale of different govemment marine activities, commercial
operations, commercial services, living and mineral resources, and social activities
such as tourism and enjoyment of parks and wildlife. These studies have not
attempted to evaluate the more qualitative benefits such as impacts on public
health, or the longer term effects of marine observations on climate, agriculture,
and energy or water utilisation. One side effect of these studies is to provide a set
of categories of activity in which the organisations are more or less intensive users
of marine information and forecasts. Starting from this base, and using lists of
members of trade associations, government departmental mailing lists, university
departments, and exhibitors in various marine engineering and trade exhibitions, it
13
Depending upon assumptions made in solving the ambiguities, the apparent cost
of operational oceanography can be made to appear larger or smaller through an
order of magnitude. Accounting procedures need to be agreed and transparent, at
least at the nationallevel, and preferably at the regionallevel.
This is not just a question of trying to limit the misleading impression which can
be given by presenting accounts in a deliberately distorted way. The assumptions
that are needed before costs of different systems can be aggregated are fundamental. For example, to what extent should the cost of remote sensing by satellite be
included, when alI satellites so far have been funded for scientific research purposes, and the same sensors sometimes fulfil different functions over land and sea,
thus satisfying different user communities? (How are we going to fund truly operational ocean observing satellites?). How do we cost the deployment of instruments which are dropped from ships of opportunity? How do we account for data,
such as bathymetric charts, or other services which may be provided by the military? How do we reconcile costs between agencies or countries which use different
principles for estimating total or marginal costs, or different rates of amortising
capital? Ifthere were no planning for GOOS or EuroGOOS at alI there would be a
hap-hazard development of numerous observing systems and models producing a
very poor overall performance. The apparent "cost" of GOOS/EuroGOOS would
be zero, since alI the costs would be incurred for other reasons. Once GOOS or
EuroGOOS exists the costs become apparent, but so does the gain to be achieved
by analysis, planning and design. In the extreme case the introduction of a planned
and designed system might actualIy reduce the true costs of an observing system
while increasing the benefits. This may be overly optimistic, but it illustrates the
difficulty in identifying the cost of GOOS and EuroGOOS or MedGOOS.
This section does not provide answers to the problem of trying to predict the
costs of operational oceanography, but it does illustrate that a sophisticated cost
model wilI be required, fully taking into account standard procedures for coping
with sunk costs, shared overheads, shared benefits, self-funded new technology,
rented and leased equipment, etc. While such an approach may be justified, in
practice agencies seem to be adopting a pragmatic step-by step process, committing to successive stages of ocean observation as each phase appears to provide
benefits.
Surveys in France and the UK (IFREMER, 1997, 1999; Pugh and Skinner, 1996)
have estimated the scale of different govemment marine activities, commercial
operations, commercial services, living and mineral resources, and social activities
such as tourism and enjoyment of parks and wildlife. These studies have not
attempted to evaluate the more qualitative benefits such as impacts on public
health, or the longer term effects of marine observations on climate, agriculture,
and energy or water utilisation. One side effect of these studies is to provide a set
of categories of activity in which the organisations are more or less intensive users
of marine information and forecasts. Starting from this base, and using lists of
members of trade associations, government departmental mailing lists, university
departments, and exhibitors in various marine engineering and trade exhibitions, it