‘a hot world is a hungry world’. Additionally, as discussed below, increases in food
prices can spark further processes of social and political instability that aggravate
affect access to food, especially for poor population segments.
The IPCC in AR5-WG II propose that it is ‘very likely’ that temperature and
precipitation changes due to climate change will increase food prices by 2050,
without consideration of the effects of carbon fertilization (which, as suggested
earlier, is probably of lesser significance overall to these macro-trends) (IPCC 2014:
512). Models vary (the IPCC indicates that model ranges vary from 3 to 84 %
increase in prices) but with ‘medium confidence’ suggests that global food prices
will have risen substantially by 2050.
The effects of higher food prices will be socially complex. After the food price
shock of 2007–08, a stylized interpretation of food price inflation was that it was
bad for (food buying) urban populations, but good for (food producing) rural
populations. Yet whilst the numerous urban food riots across the world in 2007–08
certainly seems to bear out the validity of the former, the sanguine view of food
prices enhancing rural populations’ welfare has come under considerable scrutiny
over the past few years. While it might appear that higher food prices should mean
better returns for farmers, substantial proportions of the population of the rural
global South have become de-agrarianized, as their livelihoods become detached
from farming. For these households, food needs are met from market purchases,
and higher food prices will have undeniably negative effects. It is therefore likely
that even in rural populations climate-related increases in food prices would have
negative effects on economic access to food (Pritchard 2014).
Reduced economic welfare and food insecurity arising from higher food prices
would trigger a range of adaptive responses. It may lead to return migration to rural
areas by some urban populations. But as noted, net food buying households in rural
areas, which would commonly be expected to in the lower social strata, would also
be negatively impacted by higher food prices. Hence, higher food prices could
(perversely) encourage new streams of rural-to-urban migration among disadvantaged rural populations in greater degrees of distress. In short, it is difficult to
foresee the complex interplay between economic welfare and migration that may
arise from higher food prices.
These problems are certainly germane to India. There is a high proportion of net
food buying households in rural India. Data is scarce, and often disputed, but one
well-regarded study estimated that 74 % of rice smallholders in India are net food
buyers (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2012: 21). This seems intuitively consistent with
the fact that it has been estimated that an Indian farm household requires at least
4 ha of cultivated land to meet all their consumption requirements through farming
(NSSO 2006; cited in Bhalla 2012: 19), and less than 5 % of Indian farmer
households have holdings of this size. Nevertheless, as Headey (2014) has
observed, these negative immediate effects could be turned around over the longer
term if higher food prices flow into higher agricultural wages, and thereby bolster
rural households’ capacities to feed themselves through local labour markets. Using
data from Bangladesh, Headey argues that rural wages are elastic over the longer
16
B. Pritchard
prices can spark further processes of social and political instability that aggravate
affect access to food, especially for poor population segments.
The IPCC in AR5-WG II propose that it is ‘very likely’ that temperature and
precipitation changes due to climate change will increase food prices by 2050,
without consideration of the effects of carbon fertilization (which, as suggested
earlier, is probably of lesser significance overall to these macro-trends) (IPCC 2014:
512). Models vary (the IPCC indicates that model ranges vary from 3 to 84 %
increase in prices) but with ‘medium confidence’ suggests that global food prices
will have risen substantially by 2050.
The effects of higher food prices will be socially complex. After the food price
shock of 2007–08, a stylized interpretation of food price inflation was that it was
bad for (food buying) urban populations, but good for (food producing) rural
populations. Yet whilst the numerous urban food riots across the world in 2007–08
certainly seems to bear out the validity of the former, the sanguine view of food
prices enhancing rural populations’ welfare has come under considerable scrutiny
over the past few years. While it might appear that higher food prices should mean
better returns for farmers, substantial proportions of the population of the rural
global South have become de-agrarianized, as their livelihoods become detached
from farming. For these households, food needs are met from market purchases,
and higher food prices will have undeniably negative effects. It is therefore likely
that even in rural populations climate-related increases in food prices would have
negative effects on economic access to food (Pritchard 2014).
Reduced economic welfare and food insecurity arising from higher food prices
would trigger a range of adaptive responses. It may lead to return migration to rural
areas by some urban populations. But as noted, net food buying households in rural
areas, which would commonly be expected to in the lower social strata, would also
be negatively impacted by higher food prices. Hence, higher food prices could
(perversely) encourage new streams of rural-to-urban migration among disadvantaged rural populations in greater degrees of distress. In short, it is difficult to
foresee the complex interplay between economic welfare and migration that may
arise from higher food prices.
These problems are certainly germane to India. There is a high proportion of net
food buying households in rural India. Data is scarce, and often disputed, but one
well-regarded study estimated that 74 % of rice smallholders in India are net food
buyers (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2012: 21). This seems intuitively consistent with
the fact that it has been estimated that an Indian farm household requires at least
4 ha of cultivated land to meet all their consumption requirements through farming
(NSSO 2006; cited in Bhalla 2012: 19), and less than 5 % of Indian farmer
households have holdings of this size. Nevertheless, as Headey (2014) has
observed, these negative immediate effects could be turned around over the longer
term if higher food prices flow into higher agricultural wages, and thereby bolster
rural households’ capacities to feed themselves through local labour markets. Using
data from Bangladesh, Headey argues that rural wages are elastic over the longer
16
B. Pritchard