No surprise if in today’s information society, it is becoming increasingly urgent
to ask the following question: How is knowledge creation and utilization different
from information processing, say within a firm or an organization? Earlier, I have
already suggested that these two cannot be taken as synonymous, particularly in the
context of globalization, in the context of our knowledge of markets for knowledge
(Clemenz 2007), and in the context of science. Markets for knowledge deal with
knowledge as a public good, as a resource with a dynamics that is highly
context-dependent. Context-specific knowledge is not as homogeneous as the
philosophical schools of epistemology debating the nature of knowledge over past
thousands of years have assumed it to be. It must be made clear that it is the
assumption of context-independence of knowledge, on which most epistemologies
of the past have been founded, which is responsible for the divide between philosophy and the sciences on those very issues that are today at the forefront,
becoming so crucial to grasping the very idea of knowledge resources dynamics, a
new research tool I am introducing here (Pandit and Meusburger 2015).
As if knowledge was something that could be acquired or produced independent
of the cultural, social and economic interactive contexts, it is the philosophers who
are ‘famous’ for asking the following celebrated question: What is knowledge?
Different philosophical traditions have for thousands of years argued for
context-independent boundaries of knowledge, while attempting to define it by
distinguishing it sharply and decisively from (systems of) belief or bodies of
information. With very few exceptions, this is also true of the dominant traditions of
contemporary schools of philosophy across the globe. This kind of situation makes
the just posed question “How is information different from knowledge?” more
complicated and challenging. Should we, then, say that this is not a correct way to
asking questions concerning knowledge? In the context of our search for knowledge, both information and communication tend to function analogous to infrastructure, as the roads, railways, airways and their sign posts do across the globe,
across different geographical areas and regions, facilitating local and regional
interaction. However, like infrastructure, the flow of information always comes at a
price and requires enabling environments in which local interactions among
interested people can take place. More importantly, unlike information and belief,
scientific theories and problems—taken as the developmental structures/resources
of scientific knowledge (Pandit 1982, 1989, 1991, 2010a, b, c, 2012a, b; Pandit and
Dosch 2013)—do not necessarily have to reside in somebody’s head or mind. On
the other hand, a belief without an owner, like information without a receiver,
makes no sense at all.
Most important of all, therefore, it is imperative not only to distinguish between
explicit and tacit knowledge but to articulate the concept of knowledge in two major
dimensions and contexts. First, in the context of scientific discovery of the laws of
the physical universe, we can speak of context-independence of knowledge in the
following sense. Once knowledge is produced within a theory-problem interactive
system, its existence does not depend on the individual knowing subject or an
epistemic community, e.g. in an institute of research or a university. The books,
libraries and discussions embody knowledge in this sense, quite independent of the
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G.L. Pandit
to ask the following question: How is knowledge creation and utilization different
from information processing, say within a firm or an organization? Earlier, I have
already suggested that these two cannot be taken as synonymous, particularly in the
context of globalization, in the context of our knowledge of markets for knowledge
(Clemenz 2007), and in the context of science. Markets for knowledge deal with
knowledge as a public good, as a resource with a dynamics that is highly
context-dependent. Context-specific knowledge is not as homogeneous as the
philosophical schools of epistemology debating the nature of knowledge over past
thousands of years have assumed it to be. It must be made clear that it is the
assumption of context-independence of knowledge, on which most epistemologies
of the past have been founded, which is responsible for the divide between philosophy and the sciences on those very issues that are today at the forefront,
becoming so crucial to grasping the very idea of knowledge resources dynamics, a
new research tool I am introducing here (Pandit and Meusburger 2015).
As if knowledge was something that could be acquired or produced independent
of the cultural, social and economic interactive contexts, it is the philosophers who
are ‘famous’ for asking the following celebrated question: What is knowledge?
Different philosophical traditions have for thousands of years argued for
context-independent boundaries of knowledge, while attempting to define it by
distinguishing it sharply and decisively from (systems of) belief or bodies of
information. With very few exceptions, this is also true of the dominant traditions of
contemporary schools of philosophy across the globe. This kind of situation makes
the just posed question “How is information different from knowledge?” more
complicated and challenging. Should we, then, say that this is not a correct way to
asking questions concerning knowledge? In the context of our search for knowledge, both information and communication tend to function analogous to infrastructure, as the roads, railways, airways and their sign posts do across the globe,
across different geographical areas and regions, facilitating local and regional
interaction. However, like infrastructure, the flow of information always comes at a
price and requires enabling environments in which local interactions among
interested people can take place. More importantly, unlike information and belief,
scientific theories and problems—taken as the developmental structures/resources
of scientific knowledge (Pandit 1982, 1989, 1991, 2010a, b, c, 2012a, b; Pandit and
Dosch 2013)—do not necessarily have to reside in somebody’s head or mind. On
the other hand, a belief without an owner, like information without a receiver,
makes no sense at all.
Most important of all, therefore, it is imperative not only to distinguish between
explicit and tacit knowledge but to articulate the concept of knowledge in two major
dimensions and contexts. First, in the context of scientific discovery of the laws of
the physical universe, we can speak of context-independence of knowledge in the
following sense. Once knowledge is produced within a theory-problem interactive
system, its existence does not depend on the individual knowing subject or an
epistemic community, e.g. in an institute of research or a university. The books,
libraries and discussions embody knowledge in this sense, quite independent of the
142
G.L. Pandit