§l. Convergent sequences and series
87
declaration of war by Hitler. With the exception of the USA, which
came out of the war much more powerful that it was at the beginning, and without comparatively great human loss (300 000 dead -
the War of Secession caused double - against the twenty millions of
the USSR, seven of Germany, etc.), all the belligerents were ruined
or demolished to a point heretofore unimaginable; as the American
diplomat George Kennan wrote from Moscow, "one has to see it to
believe it" .
(2) It has been recognised in the USA since 1947 that the East-West
conflict takes place on an ideological much more than territorial level.
The theoretical programme of the Soviets put much more stress on
helping the internal revolutions in the Third World rather than on
military conquests; their occupation of Central Europe, was, from the
point of view of their strategy, in the first place justified by a possible
resurrection of the German peril (also as much feared by the French)
and, later, to provide them a defense or advance starting point in
case of war against NATO. The first priority of the Soviets has always been to preserve their regime: no adventurism, except under
Khrushchev who lost his position on this account. That of the Americans since 1945 is to retain their "preponderance of power', as Leffler
says, their influence on the noncommunist world, and a technological
superiority intended to maximise the losses of a possible adversary
while minimising their own. The Pacific War cost one hundred and
four thousand American dead but at least nine hundred thousand to
the Japanese military (and nearly as many civilians). The wars of
Korea and Vietnam each brought some tens of thousands of American dead, but two or three million Koreans and Chinese and as many
in the Indo-Chinese population; they were not all due to the Americans - all the belligerents behaved like savages - but the. enormous
superiority of American arms explains a great deal. The first war in
Iraq cost 147 or 148 American dead, and maybe 100 000 Iraqis.
(3) It was the Hiroshima bomb which instantly convinced the Soviets
that America constituted a "mortal menace" to them and engaged
them in a frenetic nuclear arms race; one knows now that, from the
end of August 1945, the Pentagon had a list of several dozens of Soviet
cities and industrial zones to atomise in case of war21. Addressed in
particular to the head of the Manhattan Project, the plan of 1945
and those, much more apocalyptic, which have followed it, clearly
indicated the desire of the military to be in a position to devastate
the USSR in future if need be.
21 Edward Zuckerman, The Day After World War III (Avon Books, 1987),pp.181183, who refers on p. 368 to a memorandum of General Norstad, and Richard
Rhodes, Dark Sun. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1995),
pp. 23-24, who cites the archives of the Manhattan Project.
87
declaration of war by Hitler. With the exception of the USA, which
came out of the war much more powerful that it was at the beginning, and without comparatively great human loss (300 000 dead -
the War of Secession caused double - against the twenty millions of
the USSR, seven of Germany, etc.), all the belligerents were ruined
or demolished to a point heretofore unimaginable; as the American
diplomat George Kennan wrote from Moscow, "one has to see it to
believe it" .
(2) It has been recognised in the USA since 1947 that the East-West
conflict takes place on an ideological much more than territorial level.
The theoretical programme of the Soviets put much more stress on
helping the internal revolutions in the Third World rather than on
military conquests; their occupation of Central Europe, was, from the
point of view of their strategy, in the first place justified by a possible
resurrection of the German peril (also as much feared by the French)
and, later, to provide them a defense or advance starting point in
case of war against NATO. The first priority of the Soviets has always been to preserve their regime: no adventurism, except under
Khrushchev who lost his position on this account. That of the Americans since 1945 is to retain their "preponderance of power', as Leffler
says, their influence on the noncommunist world, and a technological
superiority intended to maximise the losses of a possible adversary
while minimising their own. The Pacific War cost one hundred and
four thousand American dead but at least nine hundred thousand to
the Japanese military (and nearly as many civilians). The wars of
Korea and Vietnam each brought some tens of thousands of American dead, but two or three million Koreans and Chinese and as many
in the Indo-Chinese population; they were not all due to the Americans - all the belligerents behaved like savages - but the. enormous
superiority of American arms explains a great deal. The first war in
Iraq cost 147 or 148 American dead, and maybe 100 000 Iraqis.
(3) It was the Hiroshima bomb which instantly convinced the Soviets
that America constituted a "mortal menace" to them and engaged
them in a frenetic nuclear arms race; one knows now that, from the
end of August 1945, the Pentagon had a list of several dozens of Soviet
cities and industrial zones to atomise in case of war21. Addressed in
particular to the head of the Manhattan Project, the plan of 1945
and those, much more apocalyptic, which have followed it, clearly
indicated the desire of the military to be in a position to devastate
the USSR in future if need be.
21 Edward Zuckerman, The Day After World War III (Avon Books, 1987),pp.181183, who refers on p. 368 to a memorandum of General Norstad, and Richard
Rhodes, Dark Sun. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1995),
pp. 23-24, who cites the archives of the Manhattan Project.