84
organized, but they still can fail because of social or political rejection. All existing
and future infrastructures and institutions have to be established against or before
the background of former decisions and institutions. The role of history therefore
cannot be overestimated in its effect of how things work out. The strong political,
technical, and fi nancial support, e.g. for the irrigation systems; the leading technicians and organizations; and the dominant role cotton played in the Fergana Valley
during Soviet times were all demonstrations of economic strength. Economic
strength then was a currency for inner and outer legitimacy of both communism in
general, and of the political Soviet Union system in particular. For good or bad, the
leftovers of the former water technocracy are still highly infl uential on the performance and stability of the water sector nowadays. On the one hand, the remaining
organizational structures and personal connections are a guaranteeing factor, possibly the only one, for the survival of the technical functionality of the complex
irrigation system. On the other hand, the remaining structures are a severe obstacle
for institutional reforms such as establishing water pricing, land ownership, or individual agricultural decisions. The soviet legacy is therefore an important factor in
the persistence of viable institutions as well as being a severe hindrance to institutional change. Historical institutions must also be seen as a background for newer
political decisions: the agricultural output of the Fergana Valley counts for 20 % of
the state income of sovereign Uzbekistan, thereby relying on a system of water
distribution which was stable only under the conditions of the former political union
with Kyrgyzstan (which by now has other things in mind with the water desperately
needed downstream for agriculture) and the agricultural system of a planned economy. Sustainable agricultural production was for ecological reasons – foremost the
mismatch between water availability in the valley itself and the water greed of cotton – never achievable, and is unlikely in the future. Political decisions, of course,
are intertwined with fi nancial and economic aspects. As far as the new post-soviet
economy is built on the ruins of an unsustainable agronomic revolution, it will be in
the way of any capitalistic reform. But the intervention of capitalism, on the other
hand, is one of leading demands of international donors such as the World Bank.
Given the fact that former agricultural arrangements and the leftovers of soviet technology are the backbone of domestic economic income, any international intervention is doomed to be nothing other than a mock capitalist economy, severely
hindered by soviet organizational and staffi ng structures and ideologies of the former republic.
Equally complex is the multifaceted context of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Project
(RSDS). While it is certain that the shrinkage of the Dead Sea is severely impacting
the surrounding landscape and seashore, the groundwater with salinization and
depletion, and the economy and ecology of all riparian states; so far there are no
agreements on the ecological and political outcomes of the project. Some promoters
believe the technical feasibilities, others the goals – increasing and stabilizing water
and power supply – are not realistic, nor are the potential damages to the environment foreseeable. Since the intervention is to take place in a highly variable climatological, hydrological, and geological surrounding, many factors should be taken
into account, but there can be no certainty that the scientifi c models will provide an
P. Dobner and H.-G. Frede
organized, but they still can fail because of social or political rejection. All existing
and future infrastructures and institutions have to be established against or before
the background of former decisions and institutions. The role of history therefore
cannot be overestimated in its effect of how things work out. The strong political,
technical, and fi nancial support, e.g. for the irrigation systems; the leading technicians and organizations; and the dominant role cotton played in the Fergana Valley
during Soviet times were all demonstrations of economic strength. Economic
strength then was a currency for inner and outer legitimacy of both communism in
general, and of the political Soviet Union system in particular. For good or bad, the
leftovers of the former water technocracy are still highly infl uential on the performance and stability of the water sector nowadays. On the one hand, the remaining
organizational structures and personal connections are a guaranteeing factor, possibly the only one, for the survival of the technical functionality of the complex
irrigation system. On the other hand, the remaining structures are a severe obstacle
for institutional reforms such as establishing water pricing, land ownership, or individual agricultural decisions. The soviet legacy is therefore an important factor in
the persistence of viable institutions as well as being a severe hindrance to institutional change. Historical institutions must also be seen as a background for newer
political decisions: the agricultural output of the Fergana Valley counts for 20 % of
the state income of sovereign Uzbekistan, thereby relying on a system of water
distribution which was stable only under the conditions of the former political union
with Kyrgyzstan (which by now has other things in mind with the water desperately
needed downstream for agriculture) and the agricultural system of a planned economy. Sustainable agricultural production was for ecological reasons – foremost the
mismatch between water availability in the valley itself and the water greed of cotton – never achievable, and is unlikely in the future. Political decisions, of course,
are intertwined with fi nancial and economic aspects. As far as the new post-soviet
economy is built on the ruins of an unsustainable agronomic revolution, it will be in
the way of any capitalistic reform. But the intervention of capitalism, on the other
hand, is one of leading demands of international donors such as the World Bank.
Given the fact that former agricultural arrangements and the leftovers of soviet technology are the backbone of domestic economic income, any international intervention is doomed to be nothing other than a mock capitalist economy, severely
hindered by soviet organizational and staffi ng structures and ideologies of the former republic.
Equally complex is the multifaceted context of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Project
(RSDS). While it is certain that the shrinkage of the Dead Sea is severely impacting
the surrounding landscape and seashore, the groundwater with salinization and
depletion, and the economy and ecology of all riparian states; so far there are no
agreements on the ecological and political outcomes of the project. Some promoters
believe the technical feasibilities, others the goals – increasing and stabilizing water
and power supply – are not realistic, nor are the potential damages to the environment foreseeable. Since the intervention is to take place in a highly variable climatological, hydrological, and geological surrounding, many factors should be taken
into account, but there can be no certainty that the scientifi c models will provide an
P. Dobner and H.-G. Frede