16
A third argument focuses on strong limitations of value assignments for meeting
major water challenges even within the same culture. For example, the Asian cultures express deep respect of water for life in general in highly abstract philosophical terms. While these may allow for a deeper understanding of water, life and
nature, they will usually not be helpful in solving specifi c water confl icts, in orientating a more effi cient use of water facing scarcity, and in deriving priorities in case
of competing usage demands. Also a statement of the kind “Water offers a medium
for creating a culture of peace” (Young et al. 1994 , p. 4) is not helpful in spite of its
truth: the opposite case could happen as well, and water could give rise to confl ict
instead to peace. The problem with high expectations on value assignments is that
they are vague and not operable for specifi c contexts. They even do not prevent
confl ict in a morally homogeneous culture or religion. Confl icts of crude interest
may occur between members of the same cultural or religious community. Then,
obviously, the value assignments cannot help at all because all of the confl icting
actors will share the same values. For example, some of the classical water confl icts
in the Near East occurred between Islamic states (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Jordan).
Summing up it becomes clear that the value dimension of water has to be considered carefully in water ethics because of its relevance to cultural attitudes to and
perceptions of water. However, values assigned by religions, cultures and traditions
are particular and not per se ethically legitimate, can often not prevent confl icts or
orientate confl ict resolution but have to be critically scrutinised with respect to
their argumentative grounding. Situations in which existing values do not suffi ce to
orientate action (e.g. in the case of confl icts between different value systems) shall
be denoted as situations showing normative uncertainty . Ethics has developed
exactly to facilitate coping by argumentation with such situations (Gethmann and
Sander 1999 ).
2.3 Water Ethics
Based on a brief and critical review on existing literature on water ethics and a
refl ection on the very subject of any water ethics, the basic approach will be developed and structured into a substantial and a procedural branch. The section is completed by considerations on the precondition of this approach being applicable.
2.3.1 Review of the Literature on Water Ethics
The body of literature on water ethics is rather small and heterogeneous in terms of
the ethics approach chosen. A fi rst bundle of papers take the value of water in different cultural and religious respects into consideration (e.g. Priscoli Delli et al.
2004 ; UNESCO 2011 ). Most of the pieces on water ethics explain the demand for
developing and implementing such an ethics. High expectations are raised such as:
A. Grunwald
A third argument focuses on strong limitations of value assignments for meeting
major water challenges even within the same culture. For example, the Asian cultures express deep respect of water for life in general in highly abstract philosophical terms. While these may allow for a deeper understanding of water, life and
nature, they will usually not be helpful in solving specifi c water confl icts, in orientating a more effi cient use of water facing scarcity, and in deriving priorities in case
of competing usage demands. Also a statement of the kind “Water offers a medium
for creating a culture of peace” (Young et al. 1994 , p. 4) is not helpful in spite of its
truth: the opposite case could happen as well, and water could give rise to confl ict
instead to peace. The problem with high expectations on value assignments is that
they are vague and not operable for specifi c contexts. They even do not prevent
confl ict in a morally homogeneous culture or religion. Confl icts of crude interest
may occur between members of the same cultural or religious community. Then,
obviously, the value assignments cannot help at all because all of the confl icting
actors will share the same values. For example, some of the classical water confl icts
in the Near East occurred between Islamic states (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Jordan).
Summing up it becomes clear that the value dimension of water has to be considered carefully in water ethics because of its relevance to cultural attitudes to and
perceptions of water. However, values assigned by religions, cultures and traditions
are particular and not per se ethically legitimate, can often not prevent confl icts or
orientate confl ict resolution but have to be critically scrutinised with respect to
their argumentative grounding. Situations in which existing values do not suffi ce to
orientate action (e.g. in the case of confl icts between different value systems) shall
be denoted as situations showing normative uncertainty . Ethics has developed
exactly to facilitate coping by argumentation with such situations (Gethmann and
Sander 1999 ).
2.3 Water Ethics
Based on a brief and critical review on existing literature on water ethics and a
refl ection on the very subject of any water ethics, the basic approach will be developed and structured into a substantial and a procedural branch. The section is completed by considerations on the precondition of this approach being applicable.
2.3.1 Review of the Literature on Water Ethics
The body of literature on water ethics is rather small and heterogeneous in terms of
the ethics approach chosen. A fi rst bundle of papers take the value of water in different cultural and religious respects into consideration (e.g. Priscoli Delli et al.
2004 ; UNESCO 2011 ). Most of the pieces on water ethics explain the demand for
developing and implementing such an ethics. High expectations are raised such as:
A. Grunwald