233
damage pipes. The second reason cited to the author was the loss of resources from
the grid and illegal wells, through theft – resulting from lax enforcement and lenient
penalties.
15.1.3.4 Reforming Water Institutions
Decision-makers have long recognised that developing sector institutional capacity
to manage and deliver effi cient operations would be a pre-requisite for coping with
the water crisis. Progress was blocked, however, due to the sector’s inability to sort
the overlapping responsibilities of the MWI and the government-owned WAJ and
Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) – all three with ties to traditional constituencies, and
the confl icts of interest these generated: MWI planning and projects were hampered
by a lack of overall responsibility for supplies; the WAJ’s dual supply and retail
roles complicated water management but their separation remained politically constrained; lack of agreement over use of multiple data sources hindered sector planning; and over-staffed institutions suffered from low morale and a “brain drain”.
The above record demonstrates that despite some achievements, efforts were ad
hoc and partial and failed to set in train transformative reforms that could signifi -
cantly change water outcomes. The sector lacked capacity on its own to fulfi l its
goals in key areas, was inhibited by factors outside the sector and disadvantaged by
weak organisation. Overall, this suggests Jordan’s water crisis is not only one of
supply and demand, but also one of national governance. Understanding why this is
so requires consideration of a wider structural problem.
15.2 The Shadow State
15.2.1 The Politics of Co-option
The longevity of Hashemite rule and Jordan’s present governance problems are
linked. Both are rooted in the distinctive organisation of power to which state formation and Hashemite rule gave rise, and in its restructuring over time (Yorke 1988 ,
1990 ). In Jordan, as in other Middle East states formed on the back of colonial
legacy and weak institutions, personalised leadership based on patron-client relations, underpinned by patronage and lubricated by outside rents, remains key.
7
Although the Kingdom has a constitution and formal executive, legislative and judicial structures over which the king enjoys broad powers, Hashemite rule has been
underpinned by parallel informal neo-patrimonial structures, which bind military
and civilian elites into a web of support, and by a costly “social contract” between
Throne and people. Patronage underpins the system: privileges, benefi ts and cheap
7 A. Peters and P.W. Moore provide a valuable account of rentierism (Peters and Moore 2009 ,
pp. 256–285).
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…
damage pipes. The second reason cited to the author was the loss of resources from
the grid and illegal wells, through theft – resulting from lax enforcement and lenient
penalties.
15.1.3.4 Reforming Water Institutions
Decision-makers have long recognised that developing sector institutional capacity
to manage and deliver effi cient operations would be a pre-requisite for coping with
the water crisis. Progress was blocked, however, due to the sector’s inability to sort
the overlapping responsibilities of the MWI and the government-owned WAJ and
Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) – all three with ties to traditional constituencies, and
the confl icts of interest these generated: MWI planning and projects were hampered
by a lack of overall responsibility for supplies; the WAJ’s dual supply and retail
roles complicated water management but their separation remained politically constrained; lack of agreement over use of multiple data sources hindered sector planning; and over-staffed institutions suffered from low morale and a “brain drain”.
The above record demonstrates that despite some achievements, efforts were ad
hoc and partial and failed to set in train transformative reforms that could signifi -
cantly change water outcomes. The sector lacked capacity on its own to fulfi l its
goals in key areas, was inhibited by factors outside the sector and disadvantaged by
weak organisation. Overall, this suggests Jordan’s water crisis is not only one of
supply and demand, but also one of national governance. Understanding why this is
so requires consideration of a wider structural problem.
15.2 The Shadow State
15.2.1 The Politics of Co-option
The longevity of Hashemite rule and Jordan’s present governance problems are
linked. Both are rooted in the distinctive organisation of power to which state formation and Hashemite rule gave rise, and in its restructuring over time (Yorke 1988 ,
1990 ). In Jordan, as in other Middle East states formed on the back of colonial
legacy and weak institutions, personalised leadership based on patron-client relations, underpinned by patronage and lubricated by outside rents, remains key.
7
Although the Kingdom has a constitution and formal executive, legislative and judicial structures over which the king enjoys broad powers, Hashemite rule has been
underpinned by parallel informal neo-patrimonial structures, which bind military
and civilian elites into a web of support, and by a costly “social contract” between
Throne and people. Patronage underpins the system: privileges, benefi ts and cheap
7 A. Peters and P.W. Moore provide a valuable account of rentierism (Peters and Moore 2009 ,
pp. 256–285).
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…