182
changes in a societal system (from centralised planning to a market economy) can
only be achieved if all its elements (market economy for the economic system,
democratic decision-making for the political system, separation of powers, legal
provisions for protecting individuals’ rights) are changed simultaneously. There is
an “interdependence of orders” (Eucken 1952/1990 ). If only certain elements of
system transformation are taken into account, transformations will fail.
There is a second closely related argument that highlights the relevance of individual responsibilities: the polluter pays principle. This principle states that the polluter or user of a resource has to pay for the costs associated with resource use. In
general, this principle is primarily seen as a distributional principle, contributing to
the fairness of environmental burden sharing between resource users. It should be
noted, however, that it also follows an underlying effi ciency principle: The resource
user knows best how to use a resource effi ciently (Hansjürgens 2001 ). This effi -
ciency argument also emphasises that water pricing schemes should address the
user of resources – seen here as the individual who knows best how to change his or
her behaviour.
As long as farmers’ property rights in the Fergana Valley are not clearly defi ned,
it is likely that water prices will not work properly. Water prices may succeed in
generating public revenues that may in turn help to fi nance infrastructure investments. However, they will fail as an information and steering mechanism. Thus, the
general theoretical claim that water prices lead to more effi cient water resource use
may fail unless real-world obstacles in the agricultural sector are taken into account.
12.3.3 Lack of Clearly Defi ned Water Rights and Unclear Role
of Water Users Associations
Closely related to the aforementioned argument regarding property rights (which
referred to farmers’ discretionary powers to use their land) is the role of property
rights with regard to water – water rights. Setting price incentives also requires
property rights for water uses. However, farmers in the Fergana Valley lack not only
property rights over the use of inputs and outputs, they particularly lack property
rights over water resources (an input in agricultural production); water management
is subordinate to agricultural needs (Abdullaev and Mollinga 2010 , p. 93).
Historically, the allocation of water was placed in the hands of water users associations (WUAs). WUAs not only own and maintain pumps and clean the smaller
irrigation canals, they also introduce their own rules for water distribution and monitor water allocations (Abdullaev et al. 2010 ). These organisations were implemented in the early 2000s (Moss and Hamidov 2015 , in this volume) as a reaction
to the water allocation problems in Uzbekistan at that time. The increasing individualism of the agricultural sector after decentralisation, involving a transition
from the former Soviet type of large-scale farming to a more diverse structure with
smaller fi elds and a considerably higher number of farmers, led to a mismatch
B. Hansjürgens
changes in a societal system (from centralised planning to a market economy) can
only be achieved if all its elements (market economy for the economic system,
democratic decision-making for the political system, separation of powers, legal
provisions for protecting individuals’ rights) are changed simultaneously. There is
an “interdependence of orders” (Eucken 1952/1990 ). If only certain elements of
system transformation are taken into account, transformations will fail.
There is a second closely related argument that highlights the relevance of individual responsibilities: the polluter pays principle. This principle states that the polluter or user of a resource has to pay for the costs associated with resource use. In
general, this principle is primarily seen as a distributional principle, contributing to
the fairness of environmental burden sharing between resource users. It should be
noted, however, that it also follows an underlying effi ciency principle: The resource
user knows best how to use a resource effi ciently (Hansjürgens 2001 ). This effi -
ciency argument also emphasises that water pricing schemes should address the
user of resources – seen here as the individual who knows best how to change his or
her behaviour.
As long as farmers’ property rights in the Fergana Valley are not clearly defi ned,
it is likely that water prices will not work properly. Water prices may succeed in
generating public revenues that may in turn help to fi nance infrastructure investments. However, they will fail as an information and steering mechanism. Thus, the
general theoretical claim that water prices lead to more effi cient water resource use
may fail unless real-world obstacles in the agricultural sector are taken into account.
12.3.3 Lack of Clearly Defi ned Water Rights and Unclear Role
of Water Users Associations
Closely related to the aforementioned argument regarding property rights (which
referred to farmers’ discretionary powers to use their land) is the role of property
rights with regard to water – water rights. Setting price incentives also requires
property rights for water uses. However, farmers in the Fergana Valley lack not only
property rights over the use of inputs and outputs, they particularly lack property
rights over water resources (an input in agricultural production); water management
is subordinate to agricultural needs (Abdullaev and Mollinga 2010 , p. 93).
Historically, the allocation of water was placed in the hands of water users associations (WUAs). WUAs not only own and maintain pumps and clean the smaller
irrigation canals, they also introduce their own rules for water distribution and monitor water allocations (Abdullaev et al. 2010 ). These organisations were implemented in the early 2000s (Moss and Hamidov 2015 , in this volume) as a reaction
to the water allocation problems in Uzbekistan at that time. The increasing individualism of the agricultural sector after decentralisation, involving a transition
from the former Soviet type of large-scale farming to a more diverse structure with
smaller fi elds and a considerably higher number of farmers, led to a mismatch
B. Hansjürgens