160
with the emergence of WUAs. The mirab is the sole operator of the weirs, sluices
and settings regulating the amount of water distributed to each farmer. He/she is the
one who sanctions farmers that manipulate weirs to their advantage, imposing fi nes
or a reduction in the water allocation. A WUA is heavily dependent on its chairman,
who is occasionally the only person in full-time employment. This dependency on
persons of authority is a product not only of a WUA’s internal structure and staffi ng
but also of a strong cultural reliance on hierarchical forms of rule in a community.
In many WUAs, old elites remain fi gures of considerable infl uence. This raises the
risk of patronage, clientelism and expected codes of conduct (Schlüter et al. 2010 ).
Here lies the ambivalence of leadership in the Fergana Valley. Strong leadership of
a WUA or WUG is needed to gain the respect and support of water users internally
and water offi cials externally. The lack of leadership skills is widely regarded as a
serious impediment to the performance of WUAs. However, strong leadership can
be a vehicle for sustaining predominant power relations in a community at the
expense of inclusive, collaborative modes of governance.
11.3.3 Practices of Regulation
On paper, the tasks of WUAs in regulating water fl ows via irrigation systems are
straightforward. WUAs are expected to draw up a water use plan for their area,
distribute water to their members according to this plan, monitor fl ow rates on irrigation and drainage canals, keep records of water use, repair and maintain irrigation
and drainage systems and conduct land reclamation and drainage (Dukhovny et al.
2008 ). In practice, their ability to regulate water fl ows is severely constrained not
only by limited resources but also by the stringent quotas set by higher authorities.
The water use plan developed by the WUAs in a bottom-up process of data collection from the farmers on the basis of their water requirements for planned crops is
frequently rendered redundant by the top-down practice of setting water use quotas
by state bodies. These quotas emerge from the national Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Resources and are then passed down the water management hierarchy, being
translated into quotas for the Basin Irrigation Systems Authority, then for the
Irrigation Systems Authority at district level and fi nally for the WUAs and the farmers they serve (Kenjabaev 2014 , pp. 16, 26–27; see Fig. 11.3 ). Even this top-down
allocation regime does not work as intended in practice. Inadequate monitoring and
lack of staff make it diffi cult for WUAs to ensure adherence to the quotas for irrigated water at the fi eld level. More fundamentally, there is a lack of incentive for
most actors at the local level to adhere to the water-use limits. As Kenjabaev discovered in his research, “[…] neither WUAs nor farmers and other water users have an
incentive to know the applied and delivered amount of water as no price is set for
water in Uzbekistan” (Kenjabaev 2014 , p. 27, footnote 6). The result is extensive
non-compliance of the quotas set by the water authorities.
The problem is further complicated by the different modes of water regulation
applied to cash crops on the one hand and household crops on the other. Whereas
T. Moss and A. Hamidov
with the emergence of WUAs. The mirab is the sole operator of the weirs, sluices
and settings regulating the amount of water distributed to each farmer. He/she is the
one who sanctions farmers that manipulate weirs to their advantage, imposing fi nes
or a reduction in the water allocation. A WUA is heavily dependent on its chairman,
who is occasionally the only person in full-time employment. This dependency on
persons of authority is a product not only of a WUA’s internal structure and staffi ng
but also of a strong cultural reliance on hierarchical forms of rule in a community.
In many WUAs, old elites remain fi gures of considerable infl uence. This raises the
risk of patronage, clientelism and expected codes of conduct (Schlüter et al. 2010 ).
Here lies the ambivalence of leadership in the Fergana Valley. Strong leadership of
a WUA or WUG is needed to gain the respect and support of water users internally
and water offi cials externally. The lack of leadership skills is widely regarded as a
serious impediment to the performance of WUAs. However, strong leadership can
be a vehicle for sustaining predominant power relations in a community at the
expense of inclusive, collaborative modes of governance.
11.3.3 Practices of Regulation
On paper, the tasks of WUAs in regulating water fl ows via irrigation systems are
straightforward. WUAs are expected to draw up a water use plan for their area,
distribute water to their members according to this plan, monitor fl ow rates on irrigation and drainage canals, keep records of water use, repair and maintain irrigation
and drainage systems and conduct land reclamation and drainage (Dukhovny et al.
2008 ). In practice, their ability to regulate water fl ows is severely constrained not
only by limited resources but also by the stringent quotas set by higher authorities.
The water use plan developed by the WUAs in a bottom-up process of data collection from the farmers on the basis of their water requirements for planned crops is
frequently rendered redundant by the top-down practice of setting water use quotas
by state bodies. These quotas emerge from the national Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Resources and are then passed down the water management hierarchy, being
translated into quotas for the Basin Irrigation Systems Authority, then for the
Irrigation Systems Authority at district level and fi nally for the WUAs and the farmers they serve (Kenjabaev 2014 , pp. 16, 26–27; see Fig. 11.3 ). Even this top-down
allocation regime does not work as intended in practice. Inadequate monitoring and
lack of staff make it diffi cult for WUAs to ensure adherence to the quotas for irrigated water at the fi eld level. More fundamentally, there is a lack of incentive for
most actors at the local level to adhere to the water-use limits. As Kenjabaev discovered in his research, “[…] neither WUAs nor farmers and other water users have an
incentive to know the applied and delivered amount of water as no price is set for
water in Uzbekistan” (Kenjabaev 2014 , p. 27, footnote 6). The result is extensive
non-compliance of the quotas set by the water authorities.
The problem is further complicated by the different modes of water regulation
applied to cash crops on the one hand and household crops on the other. Whereas
T. Moss and A. Hamidov