151
transition countries in general (Dombrowsky et al. 2011 ; Dukhovny et al. 2013 ).
Globally, WUAs are projected to play a critical role in promoting IWRM reform at
the community level.
Whilst the aspirations for WUAs are high, it is now recognised that, to be successful, they are hugely dependent on favourable conditions. On the basis of past
experiences worldwide, Merrey ( 1996 , p. 4, also cited in Gunchinmaa and Yakubov
2010 , p. 168) cites four principles as preconditions for an effective WUA. These are
(1) a supportive institutional environment, (2) the capacity to operate and maintain
infrastructure, (3) the benefi ts of user participation exceeding the costs and (4)
effective collective choice arrangements. We will use these four principles to assess
the performance of the Fergana Valley WUAs in Sect. 11.4.
Experiences from around the world indicate that some WUAs do live up to the
aspirations placed in them and benefi t from favourable institutional frameworks, at
least in part. Frequently cited instances of largely successful WUAs include those
created in Mexico in response to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, when responsibility for local irrigation management and infrastructure was transferred to water
users (Rap and Wester 2013 ). In Turkey, WUAs were set up as part of a national
decentralisation policy in response to the inability of the State Hydraulic Works
(DSI) to continue funding the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
(Uysal and Atis 2010 ). In Nepal, experience indicates that farmers with long-term
irrigation management traditions can, through the development of autonomous and
self-governing WUAs, improve communication, develop their own agreements,
regulate compliance and sanction those who do not comply with their own rules
(Ostrom 2000 , p. 4). Such groups were able to distribute water equitably and keep
their irrigation systems better maintained than those systems run by central government agencies ( ibid ). These examples corroborate the expectations placed in WUAs
to enable people within a community to pool their resources (e.g. knowledge, expertise and money), to allocate water more effectively amongst members, to keep irrigation and drainage infrastructure in a good condition, to resolve water-related
disputes and to impose sanction mechanisms against noncontributors or rulebreaking individuals.
Many other examples from around the world, however, present a very different
story of failure and confl ict. The diffi culties encountered in setting up and operating
WUAs are manifold and include fi nancial, political, institutional and administrative
constraints. The driving forces for establishing WUAs differ hugely from country to
country, depending on political and economic circumstances (World Bank 2007 ). In
most places, the development of WUAs was promoted either through government
programmes or by external donor-funded investment projects. These reforms often
disregarded local knowledge and experiences. Instead, policies drew on blueprint
models with little consideration for the specifi c sociopolitical context of a country
and its institutional capacities. Moreover, implementation mostly followed a topdown bureaucratic approach, allowing little space for the active involvement of civil
society (Theesfeld 2005 ; Yalcin and Mollinga 2007 ; Abdullaev et al. 2010 ).
A closer review of the literature on post-socialist countries shows that the strong
push of the World Bank and other donor agencies to establish WUAs in communities
11 Where Water Meets Agriculture: The Ambivalent Role of Water Users Associations
transition countries in general (Dombrowsky et al. 2011 ; Dukhovny et al. 2013 ).
Globally, WUAs are projected to play a critical role in promoting IWRM reform at
the community level.
Whilst the aspirations for WUAs are high, it is now recognised that, to be successful, they are hugely dependent on favourable conditions. On the basis of past
experiences worldwide, Merrey ( 1996 , p. 4, also cited in Gunchinmaa and Yakubov
2010 , p. 168) cites four principles as preconditions for an effective WUA. These are
(1) a supportive institutional environment, (2) the capacity to operate and maintain
infrastructure, (3) the benefi ts of user participation exceeding the costs and (4)
effective collective choice arrangements. We will use these four principles to assess
the performance of the Fergana Valley WUAs in Sect. 11.4.
Experiences from around the world indicate that some WUAs do live up to the
aspirations placed in them and benefi t from favourable institutional frameworks, at
least in part. Frequently cited instances of largely successful WUAs include those
created in Mexico in response to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, when responsibility for local irrigation management and infrastructure was transferred to water
users (Rap and Wester 2013 ). In Turkey, WUAs were set up as part of a national
decentralisation policy in response to the inability of the State Hydraulic Works
(DSI) to continue funding the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
(Uysal and Atis 2010 ). In Nepal, experience indicates that farmers with long-term
irrigation management traditions can, through the development of autonomous and
self-governing WUAs, improve communication, develop their own agreements,
regulate compliance and sanction those who do not comply with their own rules
(Ostrom 2000 , p. 4). Such groups were able to distribute water equitably and keep
their irrigation systems better maintained than those systems run by central government agencies ( ibid ). These examples corroborate the expectations placed in WUAs
to enable people within a community to pool their resources (e.g. knowledge, expertise and money), to allocate water more effectively amongst members, to keep irrigation and drainage infrastructure in a good condition, to resolve water-related
disputes and to impose sanction mechanisms against noncontributors or rulebreaking individuals.
Many other examples from around the world, however, present a very different
story of failure and confl ict. The diffi culties encountered in setting up and operating
WUAs are manifold and include fi nancial, political, institutional and administrative
constraints. The driving forces for establishing WUAs differ hugely from country to
country, depending on political and economic circumstances (World Bank 2007 ). In
most places, the development of WUAs was promoted either through government
programmes or by external donor-funded investment projects. These reforms often
disregarded local knowledge and experiences. Instead, policies drew on blueprint
models with little consideration for the specifi c sociopolitical context of a country
and its institutional capacities. Moreover, implementation mostly followed a topdown bureaucratic approach, allowing little space for the active involvement of civil
society (Theesfeld 2005 ; Yalcin and Mollinga 2007 ; Abdullaev et al. 2010 ).
A closer review of the literature on post-socialist countries shows that the strong
push of the World Bank and other donor agencies to establish WUAs in communities
11 Where Water Meets Agriculture: The Ambivalent Role of Water Users Associations