as passive knowledge recipients rather than as actively contributing to group
activities. In order to assemble people motivated enough to benefit from the social
dimension of group work, common practices used to ‘buy in’ members such as
providing free inputs or other types of subsidies, needed to be replaced by a clear
portrayal of social objectives, expected benefits and risks, and the efforts required to
change processes.
Like its communist neighbors China and Laos, Vietnam conceptualizes upland
development as the need to integrate minority groups into the national sphere by
controlling them politically (Henin 2002; Friederichsen and Neef 2010). This is
achieved by means of a highly hierarchical administrative structure in rural areas,
which was also reflected in the group structures we identified. This tendency was
aggravated when the groups were made up of relatively homogeneous members,
which transferred long-standing, hierarchical positions into the group. A homogeneous group of this kind is not necessarily disadvantageous for group functioning,
for unlike the findings of Bergevoet and van Woerkum (2006) in their analysis of
study groups in the Netherlands, most farmers in our study tended to see other
smallholders beyond their immediate social networks as competitors rather than
partners. It can be speculated that group initiators were aware of this and therefore,
recruited group members from relatively homogeneous villages and along ethnic
gradients. Thus, the knowledge gains that could have been achieved by bringing
together the respective local knowledge of the various ethnic groups were not
realized.
All the groups lacked what Anandajayasekeram (2007) coined “built-in flexibility”, whereby concepts and procedures can be modified to suit local conditions.
Groups designed to offer more flexibility did not make use of it, since either no
actor was mandated or nobody knew how to make use of such a mechanism. Again,
explanations can be found in the lack of appropriate training given to the facilitators
and group representatives.
11.4.4.2 Clear Distinctions Between Social Processes and Technical
Procedures Needed
This study supports Peters’ (2001) assertion that in a society like Vietnam, which is
predicated on rapid development through the boosting of technical innovation within
a very short time frame, combining the introduction of collaborative methods with
the introduction of a complex innovation that is ‘en vogue’ rather than suited to local
conditions, can block the beneficiaries’ view of a program’s social objectives. A
setting that did not include major technical innovations would have provided a more
focused basis for the identification and prioritization of key bottlenecks in group
functioning, and moreover, would have provided greater flexibility in adjusting
group methods. But again, this does not fully explain the difficulties experienced in
the cases analyzed, where an insufficient conceptualization of the learning outcomes
11 Rethinking Knowledge Provision for the Marginalized: Rural Networks. . .
451
activities. In order to assemble people motivated enough to benefit from the social
dimension of group work, common practices used to ‘buy in’ members such as
providing free inputs or other types of subsidies, needed to be replaced by a clear
portrayal of social objectives, expected benefits and risks, and the efforts required to
change processes.
Like its communist neighbors China and Laos, Vietnam conceptualizes upland
development as the need to integrate minority groups into the national sphere by
controlling them politically (Henin 2002; Friederichsen and Neef 2010). This is
achieved by means of a highly hierarchical administrative structure in rural areas,
which was also reflected in the group structures we identified. This tendency was
aggravated when the groups were made up of relatively homogeneous members,
which transferred long-standing, hierarchical positions into the group. A homogeneous group of this kind is not necessarily disadvantageous for group functioning,
for unlike the findings of Bergevoet and van Woerkum (2006) in their analysis of
study groups in the Netherlands, most farmers in our study tended to see other
smallholders beyond their immediate social networks as competitors rather than
partners. It can be speculated that group initiators were aware of this and therefore,
recruited group members from relatively homogeneous villages and along ethnic
gradients. Thus, the knowledge gains that could have been achieved by bringing
together the respective local knowledge of the various ethnic groups were not
realized.
All the groups lacked what Anandajayasekeram (2007) coined “built-in flexibility”, whereby concepts and procedures can be modified to suit local conditions.
Groups designed to offer more flexibility did not make use of it, since either no
actor was mandated or nobody knew how to make use of such a mechanism. Again,
explanations can be found in the lack of appropriate training given to the facilitators
and group representatives.
11.4.4.2 Clear Distinctions Between Social Processes and Technical
Procedures Needed
This study supports Peters’ (2001) assertion that in a society like Vietnam, which is
predicated on rapid development through the boosting of technical innovation within
a very short time frame, combining the introduction of collaborative methods with
the introduction of a complex innovation that is ‘en vogue’ rather than suited to local
conditions, can block the beneficiaries’ view of a program’s social objectives. A
setting that did not include major technical innovations would have provided a more
focused basis for the identification and prioritization of key bottlenecks in group
functioning, and moreover, would have provided greater flexibility in adjusting
group methods. But again, this does not fully explain the difficulties experienced in
the cases analyzed, where an insufficient conceptualization of the learning outcomes
11 Rethinking Knowledge Provision for the Marginalized: Rural Networks. . .
451