At its core, the welfare of the client should be of utmost importance, so support
should focus on those who are most in need, such as the poor and the smaller scale
farmers, those who cannot afford to help themselves by paying for extension
services (Hoffmann et al. 2009).
The consequence of such thinking is to blame the transfer of technology,
innovation bias and top-down orientations, and instead propagate a bottom-up
and client orientation, as well as participation and joint learning. As a consequence,
for advisors, this school of thought means shifting their own role from being the
propagators of technical innovations, to acting as the facilitators of new institutional arrangements, from being teachers to knowledge brokers and changing the
process from one involving teaching to one that focuses on enhanced mutual
learning (Gabathuler et al. 2011). This kind of attitude has grown out of liberalism,
and a belief in the superiority of democracy and a free market economy. These
views developed out of the enlightenment movement in central Europe, as best
expressed in the ideals of the French Revolution and in the American Constitution,
and work best in highly developed industrial countries (Hoffmann et al. 2009, 29f.).
When applied to countries in transition and/or in the early phase of a
restructuring process, such expectations are unrealistic and demonstrate a lack of
understanding of the situation and challenges faced in such areas.
The case of Vietnam, and especially its northern mountainous region,
demonstrates this most clearly. In this area, what and where is the demand and
who can articulate it? In the situation of an underdeveloped infrastructure, widespread poverty and food insecurity, and no tradition or experience in terms of
individual decision-making and responsibility, how can farmers articulate their
demands for support? As in most developing countries, farmers look to the government and expect all betterment to come from above. And in Vietnam’s case, it has
indeed come; with economic growth rates averaging around 10 %, the country
turning from a net importer to a net exporter of food, and with outstanding
reductions in poverty rates.
However, instead of comparing Vietnam with the European Union (EU) and its
standards, it would be more appropriate to compare it with other countries in
transition, or maybe with African states. By doing so, we may get a totally different
picture, and instead of criticizing the top-down programs and the environmental
problems created by quickly rising production levels, we may first of all have to
admire the agricultural extension system developed there, and recognize it as a rather
unique success story. The initial transfer of technology in the Vietnam case was not
so poorly managed, as the hybrid technology available at first (for rice, corn and pigs)
provided a first and quick step to escape the problems caused by the transition, and
policies were developed and implemented nationwide. The farmers did not resist
these policies, even as programs failed, and the officials involved learned quickly
from the failures and adapted the policies and programs accordingly. The mass
organizations – whose outreach has already been acknowledged here – have since
proved invaluable, and although built-up during the communist time, now serve as
442
I. Schad et al.
should focus on those who are most in need, such as the poor and the smaller scale
farmers, those who cannot afford to help themselves by paying for extension
services (Hoffmann et al. 2009).
The consequence of such thinking is to blame the transfer of technology,
innovation bias and top-down orientations, and instead propagate a bottom-up
and client orientation, as well as participation and joint learning. As a consequence,
for advisors, this school of thought means shifting their own role from being the
propagators of technical innovations, to acting as the facilitators of new institutional arrangements, from being teachers to knowledge brokers and changing the
process from one involving teaching to one that focuses on enhanced mutual
learning (Gabathuler et al. 2011). This kind of attitude has grown out of liberalism,
and a belief in the superiority of democracy and a free market economy. These
views developed out of the enlightenment movement in central Europe, as best
expressed in the ideals of the French Revolution and in the American Constitution,
and work best in highly developed industrial countries (Hoffmann et al. 2009, 29f.).
When applied to countries in transition and/or in the early phase of a
restructuring process, such expectations are unrealistic and demonstrate a lack of
understanding of the situation and challenges faced in such areas.
The case of Vietnam, and especially its northern mountainous region,
demonstrates this most clearly. In this area, what and where is the demand and
who can articulate it? In the situation of an underdeveloped infrastructure, widespread poverty and food insecurity, and no tradition or experience in terms of
individual decision-making and responsibility, how can farmers articulate their
demands for support? As in most developing countries, farmers look to the government and expect all betterment to come from above. And in Vietnam’s case, it has
indeed come; with economic growth rates averaging around 10 %, the country
turning from a net importer to a net exporter of food, and with outstanding
reductions in poverty rates.
However, instead of comparing Vietnam with the European Union (EU) and its
standards, it would be more appropriate to compare it with other countries in
transition, or maybe with African states. By doing so, we may get a totally different
picture, and instead of criticizing the top-down programs and the environmental
problems created by quickly rising production levels, we may first of all have to
admire the agricultural extension system developed there, and recognize it as a rather
unique success story. The initial transfer of technology in the Vietnam case was not
so poorly managed, as the hybrid technology available at first (for rice, corn and pigs)
provided a first and quick step to escape the problems caused by the transition, and
policies were developed and implemented nationwide. The farmers did not resist
these policies, even as programs failed, and the officials involved learned quickly
from the failures and adapted the policies and programs accordingly. The mass
organizations – whose outreach has already been acknowledged here – have since
proved invaluable, and although built-up during the communist time, now serve as
442
I. Schad et al.