sustainable and environment-friendly practices on parts of their land; for example,
by planting grass strips to curb soil erosion and by adopting bio-insecticides and
water-saving irrigation techniques, if adequate compensation were provided. An
interesting finding of this study was that poorer groups among the upstream
resource managers were more likely to engage in compensation schemes for
ecological services, because payments would provide a rather secure and regular
benefits stream, and that the establishment of such schemes would likely improve
their tenure security in this protected watershed area. Willingness to accept compensation for the adoption of environment-friendly practices was also found to be
positively influenced by the age and education of the respondents and their previous
experiences with on-site soil erosion, water shortages and drought (Sangkapitux
et al. 2009). Another study in the Mae Sa watershed by Punyawadee et al. (2010)
found that downstream water users showed a marginal willingness to pay an
additional 40–90 % of their monthly tap water fees for clean, non-chemical
contaminated drinkable water.
9.4.4.2 PES Processes and Relationships
The types and forms of payments or rewards given for the provision of environmental services need to be clearly defined. Sangkapitux and Neef (2006) found that
payment schemes have to take into account the complex inter-relationships between
land and water tenure security, resource conservation practices and rural
livelihoods. Combining rewards in cash and in-kind is often seen as a more
attractive reward package than just giving cash payments, particularly in the case
of Thailand, where the level of tenure security among most upland farmers is
extremely low. Rewards in-kind may not only include the provision of more secure
access to natural resources, but also technical training and other forms of human
capacity building and community empowerment. When PES rewards are made inkind; however, it may be more difficult to maintain conditionality, particularly
when they are provided as a one-off reward (Ahlheim and Neef 2006). In cases of
the allocation of formal resource rights as PES rewards, these rights may need to be
attached to certain management practices, for recent studies have found that upland
farmers with less secure rights appear to adopt environment-friendly practices
primarily to gain a reputation as “conservers of the environment” (Sangkapitux
et al. 2009), and may resort to their former resource-mining practices if unconditional land titles are bestowed on them or if specified conditions are not enforced.
Measuring actual control of and access to common-pool resources is crucial in
order to identify those groups most vulnerable to resource scarcity, and to determine which communities and stakeholder groups are to be compensated if they
need to reduce their water demand and/or invest their time in conserving water
resources. Sangkapitux and Neef (2006) assessed water tenure security in upstream
and downstream communities in a highland watershed of northern Thailand by
developing a locally adapted Water Security Index (WSI), which considered three
dimensions, namely: (1) the diversity of available water sources, (2) access to those
348
A. Neef et al.
by planting grass strips to curb soil erosion and by adopting bio-insecticides and
water-saving irrigation techniques, if adequate compensation were provided. An
interesting finding of this study was that poorer groups among the upstream
resource managers were more likely to engage in compensation schemes for
ecological services, because payments would provide a rather secure and regular
benefits stream, and that the establishment of such schemes would likely improve
their tenure security in this protected watershed area. Willingness to accept compensation for the adoption of environment-friendly practices was also found to be
positively influenced by the age and education of the respondents and their previous
experiences with on-site soil erosion, water shortages and drought (Sangkapitux
et al. 2009). Another study in the Mae Sa watershed by Punyawadee et al. (2010)
found that downstream water users showed a marginal willingness to pay an
additional 40–90 % of their monthly tap water fees for clean, non-chemical
contaminated drinkable water.
9.4.4.2 PES Processes and Relationships
The types and forms of payments or rewards given for the provision of environmental services need to be clearly defined. Sangkapitux and Neef (2006) found that
payment schemes have to take into account the complex inter-relationships between
land and water tenure security, resource conservation practices and rural
livelihoods. Combining rewards in cash and in-kind is often seen as a more
attractive reward package than just giving cash payments, particularly in the case
of Thailand, where the level of tenure security among most upland farmers is
extremely low. Rewards in-kind may not only include the provision of more secure
access to natural resources, but also technical training and other forms of human
capacity building and community empowerment. When PES rewards are made inkind; however, it may be more difficult to maintain conditionality, particularly
when they are provided as a one-off reward (Ahlheim and Neef 2006). In cases of
the allocation of formal resource rights as PES rewards, these rights may need to be
attached to certain management practices, for recent studies have found that upland
farmers with less secure rights appear to adopt environment-friendly practices
primarily to gain a reputation as “conservers of the environment” (Sangkapitux
et al. 2009), and may resort to their former resource-mining practices if unconditional land titles are bestowed on them or if specified conditions are not enforced.
Measuring actual control of and access to common-pool resources is crucial in
order to identify those groups most vulnerable to resource scarcity, and to determine which communities and stakeholder groups are to be compensated if they
need to reduce their water demand and/or invest their time in conserving water
resources. Sangkapitux and Neef (2006) assessed water tenure security in upstream
and downstream communities in a highland watershed of northern Thailand by
developing a locally adapted Water Security Index (WSI), which considered three
dimensions, namely: (1) the diversity of available water sources, (2) access to those
348
A. Neef et al.