government tends to exercise tight control over natural resource use (e.g., Wunder
2005; Pham et al. 2008).
It has been found that transaction costs in pilot PES schemes in Vietnam are
relatively high, owing to the very small landholdings and the often rugged terrain,
features which make monitoring and payment transfers a difficult task (The and
Ngoc 2006). Group certification has been proposed as one solution for such
transaction cost problems (Pham et al. 2008); however, the negative experience
farmers had with the cooperative period in the 1970s and 1980s has made them
reluctant to work together towards a common goal, and has thus reduced the level of
collective action taking place, an important prerequisite for environmental conservation at the community level. Collective action has been further undermined by an
individualization of forestland, particularly of production forests, which has led to
fragmentation of the forests and has made the monitoring of environmental service
provision an extremely difficult and expensive task (The and Ngoc 2006).
9.4.3.3 Institutional Environment of PES
Since 1990, the National Assembly of Vietnam has promulgated several laws that
have established a legal framework for the management of environment and natural
resources. Major laws include the Land Law and its various revisions (1993, 1998,
2000, 2001), the Law on Forest Protection and Development (1991) and its revision
draft (2004) and the Law on Environmental Protection (1991). Under the existing
forest laws, individual households can obtain the right to control parcels of protection forests against encroachment and are paid a small amount of compensation for
this work. In addition, they are allowed to harvest non-timber forest products and
dry, dead and diseased trees and – under certain conditions – harvest bamboo and
timber through selective logging (The and Ngoc 2006).
Pilot PES schemes in Vietnam’s Son La and Lam Dong provinces have been
backed by Decision No 380, which provides general guidance for provincial
administrations on how to collect fees from hydropower companies, water
companies and tourism businesses, yet fails to provide details on how the income
from such fees should be distributed (Pham et al. 2008).
A land allocation and registration program in Vietnam that includes both agricultural and forest land use certificates for individual farm households could – in
principle – provides a relatively sound basis for the establishment of PES schemes.
Yet, all land officially belongs to the state and there are often overlapping
jurisdictions over land, leaving ES providers, including the poor, with few options
with respect to their right to trade in environmental services (Pham et al. 2008). In
addition, the frequent reallocation of land leads to tenure insecurity and thus
reduces the incentives individual farmers have to invest in ecosystem management.
In sum, the institutional environment in Vietnam does not seem conducive to the
establishment of viable and voluntary PES systems, beyond some specific local
cases such as payments from hydroelectric power companies to villagers settling
upstream of big reservoirs.
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A. Neef et al.
2005; Pham et al. 2008).
It has been found that transaction costs in pilot PES schemes in Vietnam are
relatively high, owing to the very small landholdings and the often rugged terrain,
features which make monitoring and payment transfers a difficult task (The and
Ngoc 2006). Group certification has been proposed as one solution for such
transaction cost problems (Pham et al. 2008); however, the negative experience
farmers had with the cooperative period in the 1970s and 1980s has made them
reluctant to work together towards a common goal, and has thus reduced the level of
collective action taking place, an important prerequisite for environmental conservation at the community level. Collective action has been further undermined by an
individualization of forestland, particularly of production forests, which has led to
fragmentation of the forests and has made the monitoring of environmental service
provision an extremely difficult and expensive task (The and Ngoc 2006).
9.4.3.3 Institutional Environment of PES
Since 1990, the National Assembly of Vietnam has promulgated several laws that
have established a legal framework for the management of environment and natural
resources. Major laws include the Land Law and its various revisions (1993, 1998,
2000, 2001), the Law on Forest Protection and Development (1991) and its revision
draft (2004) and the Law on Environmental Protection (1991). Under the existing
forest laws, individual households can obtain the right to control parcels of protection forests against encroachment and are paid a small amount of compensation for
this work. In addition, they are allowed to harvest non-timber forest products and
dry, dead and diseased trees and – under certain conditions – harvest bamboo and
timber through selective logging (The and Ngoc 2006).
Pilot PES schemes in Vietnam’s Son La and Lam Dong provinces have been
backed by Decision No 380, which provides general guidance for provincial
administrations on how to collect fees from hydropower companies, water
companies and tourism businesses, yet fails to provide details on how the income
from such fees should be distributed (Pham et al. 2008).
A land allocation and registration program in Vietnam that includes both agricultural and forest land use certificates for individual farm households could – in
principle – provides a relatively sound basis for the establishment of PES schemes.
Yet, all land officially belongs to the state and there are often overlapping
jurisdictions over land, leaving ES providers, including the poor, with few options
with respect to their right to trade in environmental services (Pham et al. 2008). In
addition, the frequent reallocation of land leads to tenure insecurity and thus
reduces the incentives individual farmers have to invest in ecosystem management.
In sum, the institutional environment in Vietnam does not seem conducive to the
establishment of viable and voluntary PES systems, beyond some specific local
cases such as payments from hydroelectric power companies to villagers settling
upstream of big reservoirs.
346
A. Neef et al.