Even in a unipolar world order, free trade and free market may not guarantee
peace. They are necessary to create the conditions for it, but undoubtedly new
forces will rise to counter this situation. Currently, the rise of protectionism and
trade restrictions calls for new international balances and regulations, precisely
because when economies are so expansive, even the weakest market signals can
become precursors of serious conflicts.
The growing trade disputes between the US, China, Russia and the European
Union
65
should not be underestimated. The US is geopolitically obliged to maintain its role within a unipolar world order, and therefore they will limit by all
means the strategic and economic growth of other nations, especially China.
66
Space is going to be a terrain of hard confrontation, a place where, as Thucydides
wrote in the fifth century B.C., “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they have to”.
67
The great European empires of history have disappeared, with some having
lasted over five centuries. Russia, another great empire of the past, is still militarily impressive but economically fragile. Moscow does not have a manufacturing
industry comparable to those of the Europeans, Americans or Chinese. Russia
exports in large quantities natural resources such as oil, gas, coal, aluminium, but
it does not have a transformative industry to compete globally. And despite its
military power, Moscow will not be able to decouple from Beijing, its main economic partner. It will certainly try to strengthen its influence on Europe more and
more, for example with natural gas supplies.
The US has already expanded militarily across the world, for example in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and continues to impose its influence everywhere with its
pervasive air, marine, submarine and satellite fleets.
China centralizes its power and uses huge financial levers to gain influence over
the planet, for example in Africa and South America. It aims to become the technological pivot of the future. At the same time, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented military rearmament that influences its space missions.
Europe is politically dwarfed and economically giant. With over half a billion
inhabitants in its free trade area, its GDP amounted in 2019
68
to $15.6 trillion. But
it suffers from an inconsistent political and military integration led by a struggling
Franco-German diarchy. In theory, the Brussels-based European Commission can
impose rules and fines on American and Chinese corporations, but in practice
Europe does not have technological and commercial actors capable of competing
65
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/us/politics/us-allies-trade-war-tariff-negotiations.
html.
66
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/12/02/the-dangers-of-a-rising-china.
67
Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Book 5 89, 1.
68
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU.
80 Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik
peace. They are necessary to create the conditions for it, but undoubtedly new
forces will rise to counter this situation. Currently, the rise of protectionism and
trade restrictions calls for new international balances and regulations, precisely
because when economies are so expansive, even the weakest market signals can
become precursors of serious conflicts.
The growing trade disputes between the US, China, Russia and the European
Union
65
should not be underestimated. The US is geopolitically obliged to maintain its role within a unipolar world order, and therefore they will limit by all
means the strategic and economic growth of other nations, especially China.
66
Space is going to be a terrain of hard confrontation, a place where, as Thucydides
wrote in the fifth century B.C., “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they have to”.
67
The great European empires of history have disappeared, with some having
lasted over five centuries. Russia, another great empire of the past, is still militarily impressive but economically fragile. Moscow does not have a manufacturing
industry comparable to those of the Europeans, Americans or Chinese. Russia
exports in large quantities natural resources such as oil, gas, coal, aluminium, but
it does not have a transformative industry to compete globally. And despite its
military power, Moscow will not be able to decouple from Beijing, its main economic partner. It will certainly try to strengthen its influence on Europe more and
more, for example with natural gas supplies.
The US has already expanded militarily across the world, for example in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and continues to impose its influence everywhere with its
pervasive air, marine, submarine and satellite fleets.
China centralizes its power and uses huge financial levers to gain influence over
the planet, for example in Africa and South America. It aims to become the technological pivot of the future. At the same time, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented military rearmament that influences its space missions.
Europe is politically dwarfed and economically giant. With over half a billion
inhabitants in its free trade area, its GDP amounted in 2019
68
to $15.6 trillion. But
it suffers from an inconsistent political and military integration led by a struggling
Franco-German diarchy. In theory, the Brussels-based European Commission can
impose rules and fines on American and Chinese corporations, but in practice
Europe does not have technological and commercial actors capable of competing
65
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/us/politics/us-allies-trade-war-tariff-negotiations.
html.
66
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/12/02/the-dangers-of-a-rising-china.
67
Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Book 5 89, 1.
68
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU.
80 Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik