development, multi-year plan covering aerospace, robotics, digital information,
agriculture, medicine, innovative energy and ocean engineering. It is based on the
assumption that the current low-cost mass production model will no longer favour
growth, while new high value-added manufacturing could lead to a 15% increase
in GDP in ten years. Although Beijing declares that Made in China 2025
52
could
be downsized as a counterpart to a possible agreement on current trade disputes
with Washington, it is clear that its strategic objectives will remain as they are.
Space exploration will represent one of the most crucial elements of its future
strategy.
From a military standpoint, the conflict between the two countries is becoming
more evident along the Indo-Pakistani fault line, the South China Sea, the two
Koreas and the Arctic zone. On the other hand, some analysts such as George
Friedman do not consider a clash plausible. Friedman, the founder of the geopolitical think-tank Stratfor, excludes the hypothesis of a military escalation due to
China’s geographical location, the lack of an adequate military fleet and the intrinsically unstable nature of its economy.
53
Undoubtedly, Beijing has limited territorial options for expansion, as it faces the Himalayas and Indochinese jungle to the
south, Siberia and the Arctic to the north, thousands of miles of Mongolian steppes
to the west and the Pacific Ocean to the east – all areas where it is not easy to get
an army through, however large and well equipped.
The easiest way to expand China’s military power is by sea. This is why China
has launched an ambitious naval rearmament plan.
54
As of 2020, the Chinese navy
plans to have seven nuclear-powered submarines, two new aircraft carriers in
addition to the one currently operating – the Liaoning, a Soviet Kuznetsov model
of the nineties. Moreover, the Chinese fleet should also count on 20 destroyer
ships, 30 frigates and various landing ships
55
for a total of 270 frontline warships,
excluding the underwater drones still under development.
It is an impressive upgrade, but it will not undermine the supremacy of the US
Navy, which employs ten Nimitz class aircraft carriers and one Gerald Ford class
ship that entered into service in 2017, and which will be followed by three more
units within the 2024-2032 timeframe.
56
Within the decade, the Navy is expected
to deploy 90 brand-new destroyers and 14 missile submarines, with potential for
several hundred frontline warships.
52
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-china-trade-war-made-in-china-2025-trump-win-201812?IR=T.
53
George Friedman. 2009. The Next Hundred Years, A Forecast for the 21st Century. Anchor
Books, 6.
54
China’s Military Strategy. 2015. The State Council Information Office of the People’s
Republic of China.
55
http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/01/il-risiko-navale-tra-trump-e-pechino/.
56
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf.
Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik 77
agriculture, medicine, innovative energy and ocean engineering. It is based on the
assumption that the current low-cost mass production model will no longer favour
growth, while new high value-added manufacturing could lead to a 15% increase
in GDP in ten years. Although Beijing declares that Made in China 2025
52
could
be downsized as a counterpart to a possible agreement on current trade disputes
with Washington, it is clear that its strategic objectives will remain as they are.
Space exploration will represent one of the most crucial elements of its future
strategy.
From a military standpoint, the conflict between the two countries is becoming
more evident along the Indo-Pakistani fault line, the South China Sea, the two
Koreas and the Arctic zone. On the other hand, some analysts such as George
Friedman do not consider a clash plausible. Friedman, the founder of the geopolitical think-tank Stratfor, excludes the hypothesis of a military escalation due to
China’s geographical location, the lack of an adequate military fleet and the intrinsically unstable nature of its economy.
53
Undoubtedly, Beijing has limited territorial options for expansion, as it faces the Himalayas and Indochinese jungle to the
south, Siberia and the Arctic to the north, thousands of miles of Mongolian steppes
to the west and the Pacific Ocean to the east – all areas where it is not easy to get
an army through, however large and well equipped.
The easiest way to expand China’s military power is by sea. This is why China
has launched an ambitious naval rearmament plan.
54
As of 2020, the Chinese navy
plans to have seven nuclear-powered submarines, two new aircraft carriers in
addition to the one currently operating – the Liaoning, a Soviet Kuznetsov model
of the nineties. Moreover, the Chinese fleet should also count on 20 destroyer
ships, 30 frigates and various landing ships
55
for a total of 270 frontline warships,
excluding the underwater drones still under development.
It is an impressive upgrade, but it will not undermine the supremacy of the US
Navy, which employs ten Nimitz class aircraft carriers and one Gerald Ford class
ship that entered into service in 2017, and which will be followed by three more
units within the 2024-2032 timeframe.
56
Within the decade, the Navy is expected
to deploy 90 brand-new destroyers and 14 missile submarines, with potential for
several hundred frontline warships.
52
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-china-trade-war-made-in-china-2025-trump-win-201812?IR=T.
53
George Friedman. 2009. The Next Hundred Years, A Forecast for the 21st Century. Anchor
Books, 6.
54
China’s Military Strategy. 2015. The State Council Information Office of the People’s
Republic of China.
55
http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/01/il-risiko-navale-tra-trump-e-pechino/.
56
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf.
Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik 77