Only since the fall of the Soviet Union 1991 has the US generally been considered
to be the world’s only remaining superpower. It is therefore only now fully facing
the advantages and challenges of being the world-leading nation – including how
to deal with the rise of other emergent powers, such as China.
In August 2020, the Union of Concerned Scientists estimated that there were
2,787 satellites operating in orbit, of which 1,425 were US spacecraft (381 of
them military or governmental), while the entire Chinese and Russian space fleets
were estimated respectively at a total of 172 and 382 satellites.
23
Moscow will
struggle to bridge its space gap, while Beijing is constantly reducing it. And since
their technological level is still behind that of the US, both countries will be forced
to implement strategic programs capable of innovating their efficiency rather than
simply compensating for the numerical unbalance of their space fleets.
The Soviet Union collapse in 1989 had an extensive impact from Pakistan to
the former Yugoslavia. Serious political instabilities arose first in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Chechnya and then in Syria. The post-communist governments of Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin failed to curb the economic collapse and the expansion of NATO to the Russian borders,
24
and they had to witness the eastward
enlargement of the European Union in former Soviet territories.
25
Since then however, the new Russian Federation, ruled by Vladimir Putin, has
rebuilt its military power and performed many interventions on several fronts,
including in Syria, Crimea and Libya. Obviously, this has deteriorated relations
with western countries, which since 2014 have imposed economic sanctions on
Russia and supported the riots of the so-called Arab Springs, hoping to weaken
Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa. This European attitude has
however contributed to bringing Russia closer to China and deteriorating its
mutual relationships with Moscow. Moreover, the US disengagement from North
Africa has not been compensated by a coherent European military presence in the
region, allowing the Russians, and even the Turkish, to establish an almost permanent military outpost in Libya.
During Putin’s fourth presidential term, he stated that the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the greatest political disaster of the twentieth century. This implicitly
outlined his nation’s ongoing goal: to regain, by any means, the status of world
superpower that had been lost in the last century. Certainly, Moscow will pursue
its strategy
26
in part by investing in technological sectors such as aerospace, cyber
23
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.
24
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/world/yeltsin-opposes-expansion-of-nato-in-easterneurope.html.
25
National
Security
Archive.
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early.
26
Dugin, Alexander. 2015. Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism. Arktos
Edition.
72 Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik
to be the world’s only remaining superpower. It is therefore only now fully facing
the advantages and challenges of being the world-leading nation – including how
to deal with the rise of other emergent powers, such as China.
In August 2020, the Union of Concerned Scientists estimated that there were
2,787 satellites operating in orbit, of which 1,425 were US spacecraft (381 of
them military or governmental), while the entire Chinese and Russian space fleets
were estimated respectively at a total of 172 and 382 satellites.
23
Moscow will
struggle to bridge its space gap, while Beijing is constantly reducing it. And since
their technological level is still behind that of the US, both countries will be forced
to implement strategic programs capable of innovating their efficiency rather than
simply compensating for the numerical unbalance of their space fleets.
The Soviet Union collapse in 1989 had an extensive impact from Pakistan to
the former Yugoslavia. Serious political instabilities arose first in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Chechnya and then in Syria. The post-communist governments of Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin failed to curb the economic collapse and the expansion of NATO to the Russian borders,
24
and they had to witness the eastward
enlargement of the European Union in former Soviet territories.
25
Since then however, the new Russian Federation, ruled by Vladimir Putin, has
rebuilt its military power and performed many interventions on several fronts,
including in Syria, Crimea and Libya. Obviously, this has deteriorated relations
with western countries, which since 2014 have imposed economic sanctions on
Russia and supported the riots of the so-called Arab Springs, hoping to weaken
Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa. This European attitude has
however contributed to bringing Russia closer to China and deteriorating its
mutual relationships with Moscow. Moreover, the US disengagement from North
Africa has not been compensated by a coherent European military presence in the
region, allowing the Russians, and even the Turkish, to establish an almost permanent military outpost in Libya.
During Putin’s fourth presidential term, he stated that the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the greatest political disaster of the twentieth century. This implicitly
outlined his nation’s ongoing goal: to regain, by any means, the status of world
superpower that had been lost in the last century. Certainly, Moscow will pursue
its strategy
26
in part by investing in technological sectors such as aerospace, cyber
23
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.
24
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/world/yeltsin-opposes-expansion-of-nato-in-easterneurope.html.
25
National
Security
Archive.
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early.
26
Dugin, Alexander. 2015. Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism. Arktos
Edition.
72 Technopolitics of Space Between History and Realpolitik
