It is likely, in fact, that the increasing geopolitical confrontation among states,
leading also to competitive rearmament, will push governments to more aggressive financing as well as patent protection.
A fourth new research field concerns the geopolitical method that will sustain
the costs associated with these coming exo-systems. The higher the number of
nations contributing, the more sustainable the cost per nation. America is too small
to compete with China and will have to join with the EU and other allied countries. Therefore, it can be expected that the exo-competition will have an impact
on alliances and on the geopolitical treaties, considering that the current architecture is inadequate for a possible new future configuration.
Last but not least, there is strategic reflection about the potential Italian collocation in the scenario of new exo-competition, well described in the book, considering that the national industrial base has developed capabilities and skills well
considered worldwide and in particular by NASA, which has often signed bilateral agreements with Italy for scientific missions as well as for special contributions to the ISS. Surely, the industrial system can be competitive in the building of
exo-habitats, shipbuilding and robotics and even in several other sectors of special
elements such as space communications, satellite control and future exo-drones.
The problem is that a large part of this industrial base is connected to French
industry. If Paris does not want to converge with Washington or tries to move the
EU towards an autonomous post-NATO attitude, Italy risks finding itself in a secondary position within less advanced EU military programs with respect to the US
ones, which provide less incentives for a civilian market. Therefore, it would be of
national interest to envisage the creation of an Italian space program under the
control of the Ministry of Defence, possibly even reducing contributions to ESA
if the latter took a position more unbalanced on the French strategy. However, it
would be of great interest for Europe, as well as for Japan, to converge most of its
resources with the US and other allies. In fact, the real competition is between two
systems: democracies versus authoritarian regimes. And it would be a serious
defeat of the former system if the latter dominated space and, consequently, the
technological and economic standards on Earth.
140 Afterword by Professor Carlo Pelanda
leading also to competitive rearmament, will push governments to more aggressive financing as well as patent protection.
A fourth new research field concerns the geopolitical method that will sustain
the costs associated with these coming exo-systems. The higher the number of
nations contributing, the more sustainable the cost per nation. America is too small
to compete with China and will have to join with the EU and other allied countries. Therefore, it can be expected that the exo-competition will have an impact
on alliances and on the geopolitical treaties, considering that the current architecture is inadequate for a possible new future configuration.
Last but not least, there is strategic reflection about the potential Italian collocation in the scenario of new exo-competition, well described in the book, considering that the national industrial base has developed capabilities and skills well
considered worldwide and in particular by NASA, which has often signed bilateral agreements with Italy for scientific missions as well as for special contributions to the ISS. Surely, the industrial system can be competitive in the building of
exo-habitats, shipbuilding and robotics and even in several other sectors of special
elements such as space communications, satellite control and future exo-drones.
The problem is that a large part of this industrial base is connected to French
industry. If Paris does not want to converge with Washington or tries to move the
EU towards an autonomous post-NATO attitude, Italy risks finding itself in a secondary position within less advanced EU military programs with respect to the US
ones, which provide less incentives for a civilian market. Therefore, it would be of
national interest to envisage the creation of an Italian space program under the
control of the Ministry of Defence, possibly even reducing contributions to ESA
if the latter took a position more unbalanced on the French strategy. However, it
would be of great interest for Europe, as well as for Japan, to converge most of its
resources with the US and other allies. In fact, the real competition is between two
systems: democracies versus authoritarian regimes. And it would be a serious
defeat of the former system if the latter dominated space and, consequently, the
technological and economic standards on Earth.
140 Afterword by Professor Carlo Pelanda