and to develop increasingly advanced systems to keep rivals from attacking its
assets.
9
In theory, the space around the Earth should be considered a unicum, a place
that does not belong geopolitically to anyone but that is owned by humankind. Of
course, the reality is quite different, and the political use of space-based assets is
intrinsic to the very origin of astronautics.
International regulations would be desirable to limit the risks of uncontrolled
weaponisation of space. But the three leading powers, namely the US, Russia and
China, have never truly encouraged the introduction of limiting regulations, nor
do they seem willing to do so. Indeed, they often act unilaterally. In 1999, for
example, the US amended its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
law
10
on arms export to include satellite technologies, impacting the entire global
industrial sector. Washington’s blunt decision arose from controversy, wherein
Beijing authorities vetoed US technicians from recovering the remains of an
American satellite destroyed in the explosion of a Long March launcher at the
Xichang base.
11
The California-based manufacturer Space Systems Loral had
bought a Chinese rocket to launch one of its satellites for Intelsat. Loral had
received a much lower price for the rocket than that offered by western
competitors.
12
Once the accident happened, the US technicians onsite were banned from
recovering any piece of the satellite. The Pentagon accused Loral of putting
national security at risk, and the ITAR law was immediately amended to extend
the export limitations to any US space products. This meant that any company in
the world was banned from delivering its satellite to China if even a single US
component had been installed. Many congressmen and women have been advocating for years to loosen this rule so that US companies can regain a significant
market share, but the ITAR law has not changed this under any administration.
In 2017, the Director of US National Intelligence Daniel Coats presented before
the Senate a report called the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community,
13
affirming that space warfare operations would soon become an
unavoidable reality:
9
Idem: “the US will take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US
national interests”.
10
https://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/index.htm.
11
Harvey, Brian. 2004. China’s Space Program - From Conception to Manned Spaceflight.
Cham: Springer-Praxis Books, 122.
12
https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/disaster-at-xichang-2873673/.
13
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI_SFR_Unclassified_
Final.pdf.
Battlestar Galactica: The Space Cyberwar of the Future 103
assets.
9
In theory, the space around the Earth should be considered a unicum, a place
that does not belong geopolitically to anyone but that is owned by humankind. Of
course, the reality is quite different, and the political use of space-based assets is
intrinsic to the very origin of astronautics.
International regulations would be desirable to limit the risks of uncontrolled
weaponisation of space. But the three leading powers, namely the US, Russia and
China, have never truly encouraged the introduction of limiting regulations, nor
do they seem willing to do so. Indeed, they often act unilaterally. In 1999, for
example, the US amended its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
law
10
on arms export to include satellite technologies, impacting the entire global
industrial sector. Washington’s blunt decision arose from controversy, wherein
Beijing authorities vetoed US technicians from recovering the remains of an
American satellite destroyed in the explosion of a Long March launcher at the
Xichang base.
11
The California-based manufacturer Space Systems Loral had
bought a Chinese rocket to launch one of its satellites for Intelsat. Loral had
received a much lower price for the rocket than that offered by western
competitors.
12
Once the accident happened, the US technicians onsite were banned from
recovering any piece of the satellite. The Pentagon accused Loral of putting
national security at risk, and the ITAR law was immediately amended to extend
the export limitations to any US space products. This meant that any company in
the world was banned from delivering its satellite to China if even a single US
component had been installed. Many congressmen and women have been advocating for years to loosen this rule so that US companies can regain a significant
market share, but the ITAR law has not changed this under any administration.
In 2017, the Director of US National Intelligence Daniel Coats presented before
the Senate a report called the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community,
13
affirming that space warfare operations would soon become an
unavoidable reality:
9
Idem: “the US will take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US
national interests”.
10
https://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/index.htm.
11
Harvey, Brian. 2004. China’s Space Program - From Conception to Manned Spaceflight.
Cham: Springer-Praxis Books, 122.
12
https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/disaster-at-xichang-2873673/.
13
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI_SFR_Unclassified_
Final.pdf.
Battlestar Galactica: The Space Cyberwar of the Future 103