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5 The Mind-Made Firmament
various positions and from different angles. It includes general notions of the
temperament and character of dogs, and the knowledge that dogs may be both
loving and, in some circumstances, dangerous.
If you look around you, you will notice that you are not so much discerning
particular objects, but categories of objects. You don’t inwardly note, “that’s the
tree I planted last summer”, or “that’s the chair that usually lies in the corner”,
but more commonly, “there’s a tree” and “there’s a chair”. You categorize first,
and if specifically needed, you individualize next. All animals perceive the world
in categories, for nature has designed brains to do just that. If one perceives a
category, one also understands the associated concept, for example hard, soft,
large, small, moving, still. Philosophers say the category is the extension of the
concept, that is, the set of things the concept applies to.
There is a great deal of traditional resistance to the idea that non-human
animals might have concepts. Often the behavior of animals can easily be
explained and correctly predicted if we grant them the capacity to have beliefs,
intentions, and concepts. Instead, for ideological reasons, many scientists refuse
to grant these capacities to lower animals, and devise complex hypothetical
mechanisms to account for the ways they behave. Nonetheless, as research
on animal behavior becomes more refined and sophisticated, the resistance to
recognizing their mentality is softening. We no longer believe there is a rigid
barrier separating our mentality from that of other species.
A concept does not have to be a product of an advanced intellect: At its
simplest, the concept of a dog (for example) is simply a general image of
dogs or “dogness” and a propensity to behave in a certain way when one is
recognized. There may be an emotional component to the concept, resulting
from one’s memories of previous encounters (pleasant or not) with dogs.
We tend to believe that concepts must be held consciously. This, however, is a
mistake, because we can have concepts tacitly. Frequently, an animal’s behavior
betrays the fact that it is effectively using a certain concept in making choices.
Foraging animals, even insects, find the shortest distance between sites, which
shows they recognize the concept of distance (and short). In experimental
situations, animals can be forced to discriminate in order to get a reward, and
even honeybees are found to be responsive to shape categories, line length, and
even set size (one, two or three—and even zero). The bees tacitly possess the
abstract concept of number, but they don’t “know” it. 5
When humans possess a concept tacitly by using it in some aspect of behavior, there is an additional mental step involved in bringing the concept to
conscious awareness. Much has been written about the difference between
knowing something “with the body” and knowing it with the intellect. In
5 The Mind-Made Firmament
various positions and from different angles. It includes general notions of the
temperament and character of dogs, and the knowledge that dogs may be both
loving and, in some circumstances, dangerous.
If you look around you, you will notice that you are not so much discerning
particular objects, but categories of objects. You don’t inwardly note, “that’s the
tree I planted last summer”, or “that’s the chair that usually lies in the corner”,
but more commonly, “there’s a tree” and “there’s a chair”. You categorize first,
and if specifically needed, you individualize next. All animals perceive the world
in categories, for nature has designed brains to do just that. If one perceives a
category, one also understands the associated concept, for example hard, soft,
large, small, moving, still. Philosophers say the category is the extension of the
concept, that is, the set of things the concept applies to.
There is a great deal of traditional resistance to the idea that non-human
animals might have concepts. Often the behavior of animals can easily be
explained and correctly predicted if we grant them the capacity to have beliefs,
intentions, and concepts. Instead, for ideological reasons, many scientists refuse
to grant these capacities to lower animals, and devise complex hypothetical
mechanisms to account for the ways they behave. Nonetheless, as research
on animal behavior becomes more refined and sophisticated, the resistance to
recognizing their mentality is softening. We no longer believe there is a rigid
barrier separating our mentality from that of other species.
A concept does not have to be a product of an advanced intellect: At its
simplest, the concept of a dog (for example) is simply a general image of
dogs or “dogness” and a propensity to behave in a certain way when one is
recognized. There may be an emotional component to the concept, resulting
from one’s memories of previous encounters (pleasant or not) with dogs.
We tend to believe that concepts must be held consciously. This, however, is a
mistake, because we can have concepts tacitly. Frequently, an animal’s behavior
betrays the fact that it is effectively using a certain concept in making choices.
Foraging animals, even insects, find the shortest distance between sites, which
shows they recognize the concept of distance (and short). In experimental
situations, animals can be forced to discriminate in order to get a reward, and
even honeybees are found to be responsive to shape categories, line length, and
even set size (one, two or three—and even zero). The bees tacitly possess the
abstract concept of number, but they don’t “know” it. 5
When humans possess a concept tacitly by using it in some aspect of behavior, there is an additional mental step involved in bringing the concept to
conscious awareness. Much has been written about the difference between
knowing something “with the body” and knowing it with the intellect. In