The Grand Design
63
its goals. The intentionality is built into such a system from the start, and is
immediately noticeable if you observe its activity. The behavior of a purposefully behaving system is fully comprehensible if you attribute intentionality to
it—and when you do that, you are adopting what he calls the intentional stance
toward it. 5
Dennett distinguishes between original and derived intentionality, and
presents the following example: The RNA enzyme has the very specific function of proof-reading and correcting amino acid sequences, but the enzyme
has absolutely no inkling of what it’s doing or why. It is acting in pursuance
of a definite goal, but the intentionality is not its own: It is acquired from the
intentionality of nature.
The same logic can be extended to animals such as ourselves. We are driven
by our genes to hunt or farm, to court and have sex, to clothe ourselves in
winter. Is this truly our own intentionality at work? Or is it possible that the
evolutionary process is the original source of our intentionality. If that is the
case, then perhaps we are mere instruments of an impersonal natural process,
and everything we do—including having thoughts and creating new ideas—
comes from an external source, and we have no authorship over any of it.
Clearly evolution designed animals to have wants and needs, together with
arousal, which is the zeal to pursue their goals. (Without arousal they might
have goals but no inclination to pursue them.) Animals are not consciously
aware what their ultimate goals are: They are aware only of a strong drive to do
certain things (eat, have sex) which—it so happens—lead to the attainment of
nature’s goals. Nature’s way of insuring that organisms actively work to achieve
biological imperatives is to build into the animal Sensorium the will to carry
out certain activities—activities designed precisely to achieve these goals. But
as human animals, we’re aware only of the desire to eat and drink, mate, be
safe, be free of pain. It might be argued that we are pawns of a vast system that
manipulates us to carry out its grand design.
Daniel Dennett is very convinced that original intentionality dwells in the
mechanism of evolution and not in individual people or animals. We feel
ourselves to be free agents, but in fact we are ingeniously misled to carry
out the commands of nature. To achieve this, nature acts through the animal
Sensorium, which makes us want to do everything necessary for the survival
of the species. It uses both a carrot and a stick: We are driven to act by our
wants and needs, and if not successful, we are punished with pain and distress.
The animal Sensorium is an instrument of Nature for prodding individuals to
follow a certain path.
63
its goals. The intentionality is built into such a system from the start, and is
immediately noticeable if you observe its activity. The behavior of a purposefully behaving system is fully comprehensible if you attribute intentionality to
it—and when you do that, you are adopting what he calls the intentional stance
toward it. 5
Dennett distinguishes between original and derived intentionality, and
presents the following example: The RNA enzyme has the very specific function of proof-reading and correcting amino acid sequences, but the enzyme
has absolutely no inkling of what it’s doing or why. It is acting in pursuance
of a definite goal, but the intentionality is not its own: It is acquired from the
intentionality of nature.
The same logic can be extended to animals such as ourselves. We are driven
by our genes to hunt or farm, to court and have sex, to clothe ourselves in
winter. Is this truly our own intentionality at work? Or is it possible that the
evolutionary process is the original source of our intentionality. If that is the
case, then perhaps we are mere instruments of an impersonal natural process,
and everything we do—including having thoughts and creating new ideas—
comes from an external source, and we have no authorship over any of it.
Clearly evolution designed animals to have wants and needs, together with
arousal, which is the zeal to pursue their goals. (Without arousal they might
have goals but no inclination to pursue them.) Animals are not consciously
aware what their ultimate goals are: They are aware only of a strong drive to do
certain things (eat, have sex) which—it so happens—lead to the attainment of
nature’s goals. Nature’s way of insuring that organisms actively work to achieve
biological imperatives is to build into the animal Sensorium the will to carry
out certain activities—activities designed precisely to achieve these goals. But
as human animals, we’re aware only of the desire to eat and drink, mate, be
safe, be free of pain. It might be argued that we are pawns of a vast system that
manipulates us to carry out its grand design.
Daniel Dennett is very convinced that original intentionality dwells in the
mechanism of evolution and not in individual people or animals. We feel
ourselves to be free agents, but in fact we are ingeniously misled to carry
out the commands of nature. To achieve this, nature acts through the animal
Sensorium, which makes us want to do everything necessary for the survival
of the species. It uses both a carrot and a stick: We are driven to act by our
wants and needs, and if not successful, we are punished with pain and distress.
The animal Sensorium is an instrument of Nature for prodding individuals to
follow a certain path.