Symbols in Nature
151
design are various machines, each with its own specifications and capabilities:
The engineer is indifferent to how the individual machines work. What this
example suggests is that reality itself is multi-tiered: Each level works according
to its own principles, and is not affected by things at the next-lower or nexthigher tier. Scientists say that each level has its own emergent properties. These
properties are fully accounted for by the laws operating at their level.
Returning to our discussion of symbols, a symbol is used as a token to
represent an object when that object is indivisible at its level of specification,
hence it would be redundant to analyze that object further. When you say “the
dog bit John”, the proper level of that claim has three objects, namely dog, John
and the act of biting. A description of the dog or its teeth, or details of John’s
life, would add nothing at all to the claim being made. Thus, the words dog,
John and bit are correctly used as symbols in that proposition.
In consequence of all this, if a bird habitually uses twigs to fish for ants
in holes, or picks up pebbles to crush tough seeds, it is not wrong to say the
bird has mental symbols for twigs and pebbles. It knows what they are, returns
to them habitually, and they are objects in its ontology. I believe it is fair to
say that all living beings have symbols, or tokens in their mind, for all the
different objects in their ontology, for otherwise, how could you say they have
an ontology at all?
If an animal, or even an insect, has learned to solve a problem, for example
by using a twig, it must be true that the solution found is placed as a record in
memory, and can be retrieved for later use. The format of this record is analytic
and may be called a proposition. As mentioned earlier, we mainly think of
propositions as sentences in language, but the content of a proposition can
exist in mind, and does not have to be articulated in words. Long before the
introduction of language, ancient man did many intelligent things: He made
sophisticated stone tools, cooked food on fires, made clothing and shelters,
and discovered soap when animal fat mixed with the ashes of the hearth. The
ideas underlying these activities surely existed as propositions in mind.
The Rational Animal
The main purpose of the last three sections has been to discuss the analytic
mode of mental processing. In order to successfully act on the world, animals
must have a mode of “precision thinking”, corresponding to man’s precision
grip—metaphorically speaking, a way to take the bull by the horns in order to
get things done. This requires narrowing visual attention to small functional
parts of the environment, picturing how they fit together, and representing
151
design are various machines, each with its own specifications and capabilities:
The engineer is indifferent to how the individual machines work. What this
example suggests is that reality itself is multi-tiered: Each level works according
to its own principles, and is not affected by things at the next-lower or nexthigher tier. Scientists say that each level has its own emergent properties. These
properties are fully accounted for by the laws operating at their level.
Returning to our discussion of symbols, a symbol is used as a token to
represent an object when that object is indivisible at its level of specification,
hence it would be redundant to analyze that object further. When you say “the
dog bit John”, the proper level of that claim has three objects, namely dog, John
and the act of biting. A description of the dog or its teeth, or details of John’s
life, would add nothing at all to the claim being made. Thus, the words dog,
John and bit are correctly used as symbols in that proposition.
In consequence of all this, if a bird habitually uses twigs to fish for ants
in holes, or picks up pebbles to crush tough seeds, it is not wrong to say the
bird has mental symbols for twigs and pebbles. It knows what they are, returns
to them habitually, and they are objects in its ontology. I believe it is fair to
say that all living beings have symbols, or tokens in their mind, for all the
different objects in their ontology, for otherwise, how could you say they have
an ontology at all?
If an animal, or even an insect, has learned to solve a problem, for example
by using a twig, it must be true that the solution found is placed as a record in
memory, and can be retrieved for later use. The format of this record is analytic
and may be called a proposition. As mentioned earlier, we mainly think of
propositions as sentences in language, but the content of a proposition can
exist in mind, and does not have to be articulated in words. Long before the
introduction of language, ancient man did many intelligent things: He made
sophisticated stone tools, cooked food on fires, made clothing and shelters,
and discovered soap when animal fat mixed with the ashes of the hearth. The
ideas underlying these activities surely existed as propositions in mind.
The Rational Animal
The main purpose of the last three sections has been to discuss the analytic
mode of mental processing. In order to successfully act on the world, animals
must have a mode of “precision thinking”, corresponding to man’s precision
grip—metaphorically speaking, a way to take the bull by the horns in order to
get things done. This requires narrowing visual attention to small functional
parts of the environment, picturing how they fit together, and representing