Tools of the Mind
145
minimal in the sense that if you subtracted anything away from it, it would
no longer have the same meaning.
In the context of the human mind, a unit of knowledge in this sense is called
a proposition. Humans are able to put propositions into words, but they can
exist in thought without words. The content of a proposition is a Gestalt, and
activates that Gestalt in the mind of the listener. If you say, for example, “the
dog is asleep under my bed”, this proposition gives rise to a Gestalt picture of a
canine sleeping under a bed. The mental picture is wordless, and may exist in
mind even if not spoken. This should be obvious, because even a pre-linguistic
child or an animal may notice that there’s a dog under your bed, and they
know that fact in precisely the same way that you know it. There is a Gestalt
in mind whose content is that fact. I don’t wish to belabor the obvious, but if
it were otherwise then the minds of animals and infants would be empty of all
meaning and understanding.
A proposition does not have to conjure up a picture as in the previous
example. A proposition may be a complex idea, and evoke a thought-image in
mind. If you say something like “Smith claims the elections were rigged”, that
too evokes a Gestalt in the appropriate context. Though not pictorial, this is
a mental image with a crisp and precise meaning. Just as our brain constructs
visual scenes in such a way that we understand what we’re seeing, the brain
works in the very same way to construct thought-images. As stated above, a
proposition is the smallest independent, self-contained unit of meaning.
Note that propositional knowledge of an object—that is, knowledge via a
description—is entirely different from knowledge of the object as a Gestalt—
the knowledge we get by looking at it. For example, to know the letter A by sight
is one way of knowing it: the pattern is discerned as an undivided whole. In
contrast, learning that it consists of two oblique line segments leaning against
each other, and joined in their middle by a horizontal crossbar, is another way
of acquiring the same knowledge. If you are required to draw the letter A, as
a school child is, you must have the knowledge in the second way. Indeed, in
order to do something with your knowledge, for instance to draw an A, you
must have the propositional description, because it instructs you on what to
do.
In practice, the partition between these two kinds of knowledge is porous.
When given a verbal description of the letter A, you simultaneously try to
visualize it. And when looking at a letter A, you have an inkling of how it
can be built out of three line segments. Earlier, we referred to descriptive
knowledge as analytic. Both types of cognition—the analytic and the Gestalt—
are indispensable for any animal to function in its environment. They operate
145
minimal in the sense that if you subtracted anything away from it, it would
no longer have the same meaning.
In the context of the human mind, a unit of knowledge in this sense is called
a proposition. Humans are able to put propositions into words, but they can
exist in thought without words. The content of a proposition is a Gestalt, and
activates that Gestalt in the mind of the listener. If you say, for example, “the
dog is asleep under my bed”, this proposition gives rise to a Gestalt picture of a
canine sleeping under a bed. The mental picture is wordless, and may exist in
mind even if not spoken. This should be obvious, because even a pre-linguistic
child or an animal may notice that there’s a dog under your bed, and they
know that fact in precisely the same way that you know it. There is a Gestalt
in mind whose content is that fact. I don’t wish to belabor the obvious, but if
it were otherwise then the minds of animals and infants would be empty of all
meaning and understanding.
A proposition does not have to conjure up a picture as in the previous
example. A proposition may be a complex idea, and evoke a thought-image in
mind. If you say something like “Smith claims the elections were rigged”, that
too evokes a Gestalt in the appropriate context. Though not pictorial, this is
a mental image with a crisp and precise meaning. Just as our brain constructs
visual scenes in such a way that we understand what we’re seeing, the brain
works in the very same way to construct thought-images. As stated above, a
proposition is the smallest independent, self-contained unit of meaning.
Note that propositional knowledge of an object—that is, knowledge via a
description—is entirely different from knowledge of the object as a Gestalt—
the knowledge we get by looking at it. For example, to know the letter A by sight
is one way of knowing it: the pattern is discerned as an undivided whole. In
contrast, learning that it consists of two oblique line segments leaning against
each other, and joined in their middle by a horizontal crossbar, is another way
of acquiring the same knowledge. If you are required to draw the letter A, as
a school child is, you must have the knowledge in the second way. Indeed, in
order to do something with your knowledge, for instance to draw an A, you
must have the propositional description, because it instructs you on what to
do.
In practice, the partition between these two kinds of knowledge is porous.
When given a verbal description of the letter A, you simultaneously try to
visualize it. And when looking at a letter A, you have an inkling of how it
can be built out of three line segments. Earlier, we referred to descriptive
knowledge as analytic. Both types of cognition—the analytic and the Gestalt—
are indispensable for any animal to function in its environment. They operate