The Heart of Physicalism
115
observe others, we mistakenly impute sensation to them, and by extension to
ourselves.
According to this viewpoint, “as-if ” meaning is not merely the way of computers, but all meaning is “as-if ”. This is entirely consistent with materialist
philosophy, because it presumes that brains are physical devices with analogies
to computers, and carry out their functions linearly, in the form of sequential
computations.
The Berkeley philosopher John Searle vigorously opposes this viewpoint, and
has written an influential critique called the Chinese Room which has generated
as much commentary as the Mary Chronicles.This thought-experiment begins,
just as Mary’s story does, with a scientist locked in a room. His task is to receive
questions written in Chinese through a slit in the door: He has a great pile of
Chinese characters on the floor, and among them he must find a match for the
question that has just come in. Then he slides the answer out through another
slit. He must do this although he doesn’t know any Chinese at all. In order to
help him, he is given a rule book—and by comparing the shapes of Chinese
characters to similar shapes in the rule book, he picks out the correct answer.
What he does is based on the shapes of symbols, and nothing else. 5
After awhile, the scientist becomes so proficient at following the rules that,
from the point of view of a Chinese speaker outside the room, his answers are
indistinguishable from those of a Chinese native. This is true even though he
actually knows no Chinese.
Now forget the scientist locked in his room, and imagine the same situation
with a computer having the rules in its program. Such a computer would give
polished answers to questions posed in Chinese. Could one argue that the
computer knows Chinese?
Of course not: The computer acts mechanically, just like the scientist in his
room when he compares the shapes of written characters. The computer—and
the scientist—pay attention only to the syntax and have no access to meaning.
The computer is merely simulating intelligence, and hasn’t solved the problem
using authentic understanding. What Searle is telling us with this story is that
computers are not truly intelligent, and in addition, syntax cannot give us
semantics.
Physicalists respond that if the computer accomplishes the very same task as
a person who has understanding, it is meaningless to claim that the computer
lacks understanding. It is merely our human bias to assume that if it doesn’t
feel intelligent to us, then it isn’t. We associate understanding with a particular
sensation—but understanding may come in many different forms. The physicalist would tell us that if only we opened our mind to a wider perspective, we
would see that understanding can occur outside the human context, in a form
115
observe others, we mistakenly impute sensation to them, and by extension to
ourselves.
According to this viewpoint, “as-if ” meaning is not merely the way of computers, but all meaning is “as-if ”. This is entirely consistent with materialist
philosophy, because it presumes that brains are physical devices with analogies
to computers, and carry out their functions linearly, in the form of sequential
computations.
The Berkeley philosopher John Searle vigorously opposes this viewpoint, and
has written an influential critique called the Chinese Room which has generated
as much commentary as the Mary Chronicles.This thought-experiment begins,
just as Mary’s story does, with a scientist locked in a room. His task is to receive
questions written in Chinese through a slit in the door: He has a great pile of
Chinese characters on the floor, and among them he must find a match for the
question that has just come in. Then he slides the answer out through another
slit. He must do this although he doesn’t know any Chinese at all. In order to
help him, he is given a rule book—and by comparing the shapes of Chinese
characters to similar shapes in the rule book, he picks out the correct answer.
What he does is based on the shapes of symbols, and nothing else. 5
After awhile, the scientist becomes so proficient at following the rules that,
from the point of view of a Chinese speaker outside the room, his answers are
indistinguishable from those of a Chinese native. This is true even though he
actually knows no Chinese.
Now forget the scientist locked in his room, and imagine the same situation
with a computer having the rules in its program. Such a computer would give
polished answers to questions posed in Chinese. Could one argue that the
computer knows Chinese?
Of course not: The computer acts mechanically, just like the scientist in his
room when he compares the shapes of written characters. The computer—and
the scientist—pay attention only to the syntax and have no access to meaning.
The computer is merely simulating intelligence, and hasn’t solved the problem
using authentic understanding. What Searle is telling us with this story is that
computers are not truly intelligent, and in addition, syntax cannot give us
semantics.
Physicalists respond that if the computer accomplishes the very same task as
a person who has understanding, it is meaningless to claim that the computer
lacks understanding. It is merely our human bias to assume that if it doesn’t
feel intelligent to us, then it isn’t. We associate understanding with a particular
sensation—but understanding may come in many different forms. The physicalist would tell us that if only we opened our mind to a wider perspective, we
would see that understanding can occur outside the human context, in a form