7
Materialism: The Brain As Computer
Mind and Matter
The single most hotly debated issue in philosophy today is whether mental
states, such as our sensations and perceptions, are of a physical nature or
exist outside of physical law—governed instead by principles of some other,
non-physical kind. This question is argued not only among philosophers, but
among psychologists, linguists, biologists and physicists, because many other
profound questions hang on this one. The most widely shared opinion today is
that mental phenomena are subject to physical law, and can be fully explained
by the principles of physics. However, this view is far from unanimous, and is
vigorously contested.
Common sense points to what ought to be an easy solution: Physical
mechanisms in the brain induce sensations, but the sensations themselves—as
they are experienced subjectively—are not physical. However, if sensations are
not physical, then in what sense can we say they exist at all? That’s the crux
of the problem introduced by Descartes. His solution is that thoughts and
sensations truly exist, but they’re a different kind of existing thing. Physical
objects and forces exist and, separately from them, so do ideas and feelings in
minds. So according to Descartes, we live in a two-tiered universe, with two
entirely different categories of existing things.
That might not be a problem if the two orders of things remained separate.
But they don’t: Through our sensory systems, facts of the world impact our
thoughts. And conversely, because our brains connect to our motor systems,
our minds affect the world. It is therefore undeniable that the physical world
and the realm of sensation are connected. Logically, we are left with three
alternatives to choose from:
© The Author(s) 2021
C. Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50083-2_7
105
Materialism: The Brain As Computer
Mind and Matter
The single most hotly debated issue in philosophy today is whether mental
states, such as our sensations and perceptions, are of a physical nature or
exist outside of physical law—governed instead by principles of some other,
non-physical kind. This question is argued not only among philosophers, but
among psychologists, linguists, biologists and physicists, because many other
profound questions hang on this one. The most widely shared opinion today is
that mental phenomena are subject to physical law, and can be fully explained
by the principles of physics. However, this view is far from unanimous, and is
vigorously contested.
Common sense points to what ought to be an easy solution: Physical
mechanisms in the brain induce sensations, but the sensations themselves—as
they are experienced subjectively—are not physical. However, if sensations are
not physical, then in what sense can we say they exist at all? That’s the crux
of the problem introduced by Descartes. His solution is that thoughts and
sensations truly exist, but they’re a different kind of existing thing. Physical
objects and forces exist and, separately from them, so do ideas and feelings in
minds. So according to Descartes, we live in a two-tiered universe, with two
entirely different categories of existing things.
That might not be a problem if the two orders of things remained separate.
But they don’t: Through our sensory systems, facts of the world impact our
thoughts. And conversely, because our brains connect to our motor systems,
our minds affect the world. It is therefore undeniable that the physical world
and the realm of sensation are connected. Logically, we are left with three
alternatives to choose from:
© The Author(s) 2021
C. Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50083-2_7
105