However, “global public funding of at least US$ 1 trillion annually is available for
(. . .) unsustainable environmental practices, such as subsidies for fossil fuels”
(p. 17). In other words, the GEF is ten times out-funded by others, whereas ten
times more than overall public funding for global environmental public goods is
required, and ten times more than that is actually spent through public funding on
subsidies that destroy our environment. The paradox is thus revealed as a veridical
paradox
2 : a seeming conflict between impact of GEF versus impact on global
environmental trends, that is resolved if competing funding channels are taking
into account.
3
The questions we pose in this chapter are whether the other comprehensive
evaluations provide further evidence for this; whether the historical path that the
GEF has followed to arrive at this situation has been matched by others, or whether
they have been able to tackle the barriers to impact; and whether their specific
routes offer insights into what may be done to increase the chances of success at
systems level – i.e. whether they provide insights into what works, when and where,
for whom and under what circumstances to achieve success in humanity’s efforts to
address the potentially disastrous consequences of climate change over time.
2.3 From Early Results to the Slow Materialization
of Impact
In the years leading up to OPS5 the project portfolio of interventions supported by
the GEF has matured over time, since its inception in 1992, to enable a judgment on
the effectiveness and impact of these interventions. The First and Second Overall
Performance Studies of the GEF were not able to provide comprehensive assessments of the results and impact of the GEF, due to the fact that many interventions
had just been completed or were still on-going at the time of the evaluations
4 (this
paragraph based on ICF 2005, 21–22). The Third Overall Performance Study was
expected to be the first to report on results and impact, and it had to disappoint its
readers on impact. It was able to report on results, as these were mostly at the
outcome level. On longer term impact the OPS3 team was confronted with “general
unavailability of impact-level results data” (ICF 2005, 21). Several reasons were
identified why these data were unavailable: lack of an overall results measurement
framework including baselines, indicators and targets; lack of efforts at the project
2 As defined by the logician W.V. Quine (1966) in The Ways of Paradox and other essays.
New York: Random House: a veridical paradox is a statement that seems to contradict itself but
may nonetheless be true.
3 For an update on energy subsidies alone, see IMF Working Paper 15/105 How large are Global
Energy Subsidies? by David Coady, Louis Sears and Baoping Shang, that estimates subsidies and
related costs to be higher than $5 trillion in 2015.
4 This paragraph based on ICF, 2005, 21–22.
2 Action on Climate Change: What Does It Mean and Where Does It Lead To?
17
(. . .) unsustainable environmental practices, such as subsidies for fossil fuels”
(p. 17). In other words, the GEF is ten times out-funded by others, whereas ten
times more than overall public funding for global environmental public goods is
required, and ten times more than that is actually spent through public funding on
subsidies that destroy our environment. The paradox is thus revealed as a veridical
paradox
2 : a seeming conflict between impact of GEF versus impact on global
environmental trends, that is resolved if competing funding channels are taking
into account.
3
The questions we pose in this chapter are whether the other comprehensive
evaluations provide further evidence for this; whether the historical path that the
GEF has followed to arrive at this situation has been matched by others, or whether
they have been able to tackle the barriers to impact; and whether their specific
routes offer insights into what may be done to increase the chances of success at
systems level – i.e. whether they provide insights into what works, when and where,
for whom and under what circumstances to achieve success in humanity’s efforts to
address the potentially disastrous consequences of climate change over time.
2.3 From Early Results to the Slow Materialization
of Impact
In the years leading up to OPS5 the project portfolio of interventions supported by
the GEF has matured over time, since its inception in 1992, to enable a judgment on
the effectiveness and impact of these interventions. The First and Second Overall
Performance Studies of the GEF were not able to provide comprehensive assessments of the results and impact of the GEF, due to the fact that many interventions
had just been completed or were still on-going at the time of the evaluations
4 (this
paragraph based on ICF 2005, 21–22). The Third Overall Performance Study was
expected to be the first to report on results and impact, and it had to disappoint its
readers on impact. It was able to report on results, as these were mostly at the
outcome level. On longer term impact the OPS3 team was confronted with “general
unavailability of impact-level results data” (ICF 2005, 21). Several reasons were
identified why these data were unavailable: lack of an overall results measurement
framework including baselines, indicators and targets; lack of efforts at the project
2 As defined by the logician W.V. Quine (1966) in The Ways of Paradox and other essays.
New York: Random House: a veridical paradox is a statement that seems to contradict itself but
may nonetheless be true.
3 For an update on energy subsidies alone, see IMF Working Paper 15/105 How large are Global
Energy Subsidies? by David Coady, Louis Sears and Baoping Shang, that estimates subsidies and
related costs to be higher than $5 trillion in 2015.
4 This paragraph based on ICF, 2005, 21–22.
2 Action on Climate Change: What Does It Mean and Where Does It Lead To?
17