experimental psychologists distort the probability of a nuclear accident
7 and
increase our aversion vis-à-vis such a disaster.
As a consequence, public decision exclusively based on perceived risk entails a
series of drawbacks. Firstly, it tends to an over-investment in nuclear safety. The
perceived risk of a nuclear accident being amplified, the benefits to decrease it
seems higher and therefore efforts to reduce it seems more worth to be undertaken.
Secondly, the choice of technology is distorted in favor of ways generating electricity which are not less hazardous. Coal is perceived as less dangerous whereas
according to data on fatalities it is more [12]. Thirdly, public decisions exclusively
based on perceived probabilities could lead to costly premature phase-outs. After
Fukushima-Daiichi, the German government decided to accelerate the decommissioning of NPPs. It entails an economic loss estimated to a 100 billion of euros in
comparison to the previous more progressive nuclear exit as enacted in the Atomic
law passed a few months before the accident [13].
However, public decisions ignoring perception biases can also result in wasting a
lot of money. It could be costly to treat the attitude of the general public as the
expression of fleeting fears which can quickly be allayed, through call to reason or
the reassuring communication of the ‘true’ facts and figures. The reality test, in the
form of hostile demonstration or electoral reversals, may substantially add to the
cost for society of going back on past decisions ignoring public perception. Nuclear
power history is full of cases of abandoned projects after several years of construction. In France, for instance, about 10 billion of euros have been spent to build
the fast breeder commercial reactor Superphénix for nearly nothing. It had only
produced a modest quantity of electricity when it was shut down.
In short, public decision-making must avoid two pitfalls: ignoring how probabilities of nuclear accident are perceived and exclusively taking them into account.
3 Economic Assessment of Nuclear Damage and Their
Insights into Mitigation Policies
3.1 Existing Assessments of the Cost of a Nuclear Accident
A review of existing studies
Assessments of the cost of nuclear accidents have been carried out since the
mid-seventies and the beginning of probabilistic safety assessments. Since then,
numerous studies have been published, and several reviews of these studies exist.
Namely, in 2000, the Nuclear Energy Agency published a methodological review in
which several cost assessments were described [14]. In 2011, after the
Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the German Renewable Energy Foundation performed a
7
See [3] pp. 115–117.
86
R. Bizet and F. Lévêque
7 and
increase our aversion vis-à-vis such a disaster.
As a consequence, public decision exclusively based on perceived risk entails a
series of drawbacks. Firstly, it tends to an over-investment in nuclear safety. The
perceived risk of a nuclear accident being amplified, the benefits to decrease it
seems higher and therefore efforts to reduce it seems more worth to be undertaken.
Secondly, the choice of technology is distorted in favor of ways generating electricity which are not less hazardous. Coal is perceived as less dangerous whereas
according to data on fatalities it is more [12]. Thirdly, public decisions exclusively
based on perceived probabilities could lead to costly premature phase-outs. After
Fukushima-Daiichi, the German government decided to accelerate the decommissioning of NPPs. It entails an economic loss estimated to a 100 billion of euros in
comparison to the previous more progressive nuclear exit as enacted in the Atomic
law passed a few months before the accident [13].
However, public decisions ignoring perception biases can also result in wasting a
lot of money. It could be costly to treat the attitude of the general public as the
expression of fleeting fears which can quickly be allayed, through call to reason or
the reassuring communication of the ‘true’ facts and figures. The reality test, in the
form of hostile demonstration or electoral reversals, may substantially add to the
cost for society of going back on past decisions ignoring public perception. Nuclear
power history is full of cases of abandoned projects after several years of construction. In France, for instance, about 10 billion of euros have been spent to build
the fast breeder commercial reactor Superphénix for nearly nothing. It had only
produced a modest quantity of electricity when it was shut down.
In short, public decision-making must avoid two pitfalls: ignoring how probabilities of nuclear accident are perceived and exclusively taking them into account.
3 Economic Assessment of Nuclear Damage and Their
Insights into Mitigation Policies
3.1 Existing Assessments of the Cost of a Nuclear Accident
A review of existing studies
Assessments of the cost of nuclear accidents have been carried out since the
mid-seventies and the beginning of probabilistic safety assessments. Since then,
numerous studies have been published, and several reviews of these studies exist.
Namely, in 2000, the Nuclear Energy Agency published a methodological review in
which several cost assessments were described [14]. In 2011, after the
Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the German Renewable Energy Foundation performed a
7
See [3] pp. 115–117.
86
R. Bizet and F. Lévêque