expertise based on experience and intuition. While all of this may be true, it also
seems necessary to understand the negotiation processes and power relations
internal and external to the group in order to understand its actions. We argue that
the social regulation dimension in a constrained timeframe exists, and is the result
of negotiations that enable collective action.
Moreover, it appears that there was a significant bias in the analysis of a decision
that was temporarily successful. de Terssac’s [1] safety paradox states that it is
possible to act safely and still not avoid disaster. This leads us to believe, given the
limited rationality of actors, that rules that are negotiated in periods of normal
operation or crisis may also lead to disaster (which was the case for the AZF
accident in particular).
6 Conclusions
The aftermath of accidents does not prevent social regulation processes, which
appear to be constrained by time and the emergency. Negotiations between actors
occur despite conflicting interests and value systems—in this case, protecting the
population, making decisions in line with international expectations, and protecting
equipment and the workforce.
All of these interests are the subject of negotiations that create cooperation (or in
some cases conflict) between actors in the system. We are therefore far from the
situation where safety in a crisis is governed by universal basic procedures, or the
intervention of a providential hero. The resilience capacity of a system is based on
its capacity to adapt, and therefore knowledge of the dynamics governing the
relationships between its actors.
References
1. G. de Terssac, J. Mignard. Les paradoxes de la sécurité, le cas d’AZF, Coll. Le Travail
Humain, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (2011)
2. J.D. Reynaud, Les régulations dans les organisations: régulation de contrôle et régulation
autonome. Revue française de sociologie (1988)
3. C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. Princeton University
Press (2011)
4. J. Reason, Human Error. Cambridge University Press (1990)
5. J. Reason, A systems approach to organizational error. Ergonomics 38(8), 1708–1721 (1995)
6. International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Culture, No. 75-INSAG-4 (1991)
7. K.H Roberts, Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization. Organ. Sci. 1
(2), 160–176 (1990)
8. E. Hollnagel, D. Woods, N. Leveson, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. (2007)
9. M. Bourrier, Le nucléaire à l’épreuve de l’organisation. Presses universitaires de France
(1999)
Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents …
53
seems necessary to understand the negotiation processes and power relations
internal and external to the group in order to understand its actions. We argue that
the social regulation dimension in a constrained timeframe exists, and is the result
of negotiations that enable collective action.
Moreover, it appears that there was a significant bias in the analysis of a decision
that was temporarily successful. de Terssac’s [1] safety paradox states that it is
possible to act safely and still not avoid disaster. This leads us to believe, given the
limited rationality of actors, that rules that are negotiated in periods of normal
operation or crisis may also lead to disaster (which was the case for the AZF
accident in particular).
6 Conclusions
The aftermath of accidents does not prevent social regulation processes, which
appear to be constrained by time and the emergency. Negotiations between actors
occur despite conflicting interests and value systems—in this case, protecting the
population, making decisions in line with international expectations, and protecting
equipment and the workforce.
All of these interests are the subject of negotiations that create cooperation (or in
some cases conflict) between actors in the system. We are therefore far from the
situation where safety in a crisis is governed by universal basic procedures, or the
intervention of a providential hero. The resilience capacity of a system is based on
its capacity to adapt, and therefore knowledge of the dynamics governing the
relationships between its actors.
References
1. G. de Terssac, J. Mignard. Les paradoxes de la sécurité, le cas d’AZF, Coll. Le Travail
Humain, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (2011)
2. J.D. Reynaud, Les régulations dans les organisations: régulation de contrôle et régulation
autonome. Revue française de sociologie (1988)
3. C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. Princeton University
Press (2011)
4. J. Reason, Human Error. Cambridge University Press (1990)
5. J. Reason, A systems approach to organizational error. Ergonomics 38(8), 1708–1721 (1995)
6. International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Culture, No. 75-INSAG-4 (1991)
7. K.H Roberts, Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization. Organ. Sci. 1
(2), 160–176 (1990)
8. E. Hollnagel, D. Woods, N. Leveson, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. (2007)
9. M. Bourrier, Le nucléaire à l’épreuve de l’organisation. Presses universitaires de France
(1999)
Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents …
53