are sometimes compatible with the plant economy through the improvement in
work efficiency.
When this table was created, a term of resilience was unknown among the
community of nuclear safety, but now it has become clear that enhancement of
resilience contributes to solving a problem how to prevent and mitigate Category 2
events. General principles as well as practical methods, however, to do so are not
yet enough established, and resilience engineering should challenge to solve this
issue.
6 Conclusions
The Fukushima Daiichi accident was caused mainly by the breach of
defense-in-depth against tsunamis, which is the very basis of nuclear safety, and it
is unnecessary to substitute it with a new concept. The accident rather showed that
defense-in-depth is effective even in unanticipated emergency conditions of beyond
design-basis, and the remedial actions now undertaken by the utility companies in
Japan are in line with the principle. It must be taken into consideration, however,
that the breach occurred due to insufficient preparedness for all-hazards and multiple disasters. The administration of emergency response rather than preventive
measures by hardware equipment should be more concerned about than before.
Enhancing the resilience and renovating the defense-in-depth of NPPs are crucial
and Category 2 unsafe events will be the targets of these efforts.
References
1. Final Investigation Report, Investigation committee on the accident at the Fukushima nuclear
power stations (2012) http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html. Accessed
23 July 2012
2. K. Furuta, K. Sasou, R. Kubota, H. Ujita, Y. Shuto, E. Yagi, Human factor analysis of JCO
criticality accident. Int. J. Cogn. Technol. Work 2(4), 182–203 (2000)
3. S. Kanaida, N. Itou, A. Ueno, Y. Takabayashi, Strategy of installation of permanent and mobile
equipment for countermeasures against severe accident at Tokai-2, in Proceedings of
ICMST-Kobe 2014, Kobe, Japan, Japan Society of Maintenology, 2–5 November 2014
4. H. Uehara, T. Kawamoto, S. Kaneda, K. Ishikawa, K. Numata, Safety measures at Tomari
nuclear plant, in Proceedings of ICMST-Kobe 2014, Kobe, Japan, Japan Society of
Maintenology, 2–5 November 2014
5. T. Kanno, Y. Morimoto, K. Furuta, A distributed multi-agent simulation system of emergency
response in disasters. Int. J. Risk Assess. Manag. 6(4/5/6), 528–554 (2006)
6. D.D. Woods, in Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, ed. by E. Hollnagel, D.D.
Woods, N. Leveson (Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 2006), p. 21–34
44
K. Furuta and T. Kanno
work efficiency.
When this table was created, a term of resilience was unknown among the
community of nuclear safety, but now it has become clear that enhancement of
resilience contributes to solving a problem how to prevent and mitigate Category 2
events. General principles as well as practical methods, however, to do so are not
yet enough established, and resilience engineering should challenge to solve this
issue.
6 Conclusions
The Fukushima Daiichi accident was caused mainly by the breach of
defense-in-depth against tsunamis, which is the very basis of nuclear safety, and it
is unnecessary to substitute it with a new concept. The accident rather showed that
defense-in-depth is effective even in unanticipated emergency conditions of beyond
design-basis, and the remedial actions now undertaken by the utility companies in
Japan are in line with the principle. It must be taken into consideration, however,
that the breach occurred due to insufficient preparedness for all-hazards and multiple disasters. The administration of emergency response rather than preventive
measures by hardware equipment should be more concerned about than before.
Enhancing the resilience and renovating the defense-in-depth of NPPs are crucial
and Category 2 unsafe events will be the targets of these efforts.
References
1. Final Investigation Report, Investigation committee on the accident at the Fukushima nuclear
power stations (2012) http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html. Accessed
23 July 2012
2. K. Furuta, K. Sasou, R. Kubota, H. Ujita, Y. Shuto, E. Yagi, Human factor analysis of JCO
criticality accident. Int. J. Cogn. Technol. Work 2(4), 182–203 (2000)
3. S. Kanaida, N. Itou, A. Ueno, Y. Takabayashi, Strategy of installation of permanent and mobile
equipment for countermeasures against severe accident at Tokai-2, in Proceedings of
ICMST-Kobe 2014, Kobe, Japan, Japan Society of Maintenology, 2–5 November 2014
4. H. Uehara, T. Kawamoto, S. Kaneda, K. Ishikawa, K. Numata, Safety measures at Tomari
nuclear plant, in Proceedings of ICMST-Kobe 2014, Kobe, Japan, Japan Society of
Maintenology, 2–5 November 2014
5. T. Kanno, Y. Morimoto, K. Furuta, A distributed multi-agent simulation system of emergency
response in disasters. Int. J. Risk Assess. Manag. 6(4/5/6), 528–554 (2006)
6. D.D. Woods, in Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, ed. by E. Hollnagel, D.D.
Woods, N. Leveson (Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 2006), p. 21–34
44
K. Furuta and T. Kanno