assessment carried out? Was the plant in a satisfactory condition? What controls
and maintenance procedures were in place? Were they sufficiently rigorous and
respected? Was the data related to the plant’s design and technical operations
satisfactory? In the event that these investigations and the courts identify particular
weaknesses or shortcomings, the victims will receive financial and/or symbolic
compensation. These ‘gifts’ will contribute to resilience that will act as a reciprocal
gift, thereby creating new human requirements, such as gifts to the environment.
7 Conclusion
Our work looks the question of the losses resulting from the nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daiichi from multiple perspectives: natural and statutory law; compensation based on the market paradigm and that of gift-giving; and the designation
of victims, losses and compensation. On the latter point, it seems interesting to
think in terms of a kind of non-radical environmentalism.
15
The situation is already a reality. Tawada [16] points out that “there is no
Japanese word that is an exact translation for the German work ‘catastrophe’. In
German, the word is used in relation to nature and politics. In the event of a natural
catastrophe, politics comes readily to the mind of people.” While [12] considers that
“it has become impossible to clearly separate the movements of political change
from those that lead to an environmental threat. It is seen in the symbolic dimension
of the catastrophe, the overturning of the world of meanings leading to the revelation of a gap where legislation was supposed to take over.” From this flows the
importance of understanding how compensation can be used to fill the gap.
The catastrophe began on 11 March, 2011 and it does not yet appear to have
reached its end. Many observers believe that it is just beginning. Current discussions focus on two areas: an objective explanation of the disaster that initiated the
catastrophe; and the designation of victims and the assessment of losses. But who
will be invited to the discussions and for how long? It must not be forgotten that in
French the word ‘loss’ is equivalent to the concept of “harm or damage caused to
someone or something” (Dictionnaire Littré). This presupposes a dramatic event
that takes place over some time (with the idea that the timeframe widens—or not—
its scope). It also presupposes that it is possible to identify the persons or things that
15
Afeissa [14] [15] defines environmental ethics as an ethic “which produces a new object, the
non-human natural world, judged worthy of moral consideration on its own merits, in other words
regardless of any coefficient of utility for the existence of man and considered as a place of
intrinsic value or as a holder of rights whose existence as such, command a number of moral and
legal obligations.” It raises several questions that this article seeks to clarify: To whom should
natural rights (of Man or Nature) be given? Can it be done, and can we assign rights to
non-humans without strengthening an anthropocentric perspective leading to radical monism?
Who can claim these rights (humans, non-humans) and, in the case of non-humans, how does this
manifest? Who attributes such rights? In particular, who speaks on behalf of whom?
32
D. Pecaud
and maintenance procedures were in place? Were they sufficiently rigorous and
respected? Was the data related to the plant’s design and technical operations
satisfactory? In the event that these investigations and the courts identify particular
weaknesses or shortcomings, the victims will receive financial and/or symbolic
compensation. These ‘gifts’ will contribute to resilience that will act as a reciprocal
gift, thereby creating new human requirements, such as gifts to the environment.
7 Conclusion
Our work looks the question of the losses resulting from the nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daiichi from multiple perspectives: natural and statutory law; compensation based on the market paradigm and that of gift-giving; and the designation
of victims, losses and compensation. On the latter point, it seems interesting to
think in terms of a kind of non-radical environmentalism.
15
The situation is already a reality. Tawada [16] points out that “there is no
Japanese word that is an exact translation for the German work ‘catastrophe’. In
German, the word is used in relation to nature and politics. In the event of a natural
catastrophe, politics comes readily to the mind of people.” While [12] considers that
“it has become impossible to clearly separate the movements of political change
from those that lead to an environmental threat. It is seen in the symbolic dimension
of the catastrophe, the overturning of the world of meanings leading to the revelation of a gap where legislation was supposed to take over.” From this flows the
importance of understanding how compensation can be used to fill the gap.
The catastrophe began on 11 March, 2011 and it does not yet appear to have
reached its end. Many observers believe that it is just beginning. Current discussions focus on two areas: an objective explanation of the disaster that initiated the
catastrophe; and the designation of victims and the assessment of losses. But who
will be invited to the discussions and for how long? It must not be forgotten that in
French the word ‘loss’ is equivalent to the concept of “harm or damage caused to
someone or something” (Dictionnaire Littré). This presupposes a dramatic event
that takes place over some time (with the idea that the timeframe widens—or not—
its scope). It also presupposes that it is possible to identify the persons or things that
15
Afeissa [14] [15] defines environmental ethics as an ethic “which produces a new object, the
non-human natural world, judged worthy of moral consideration on its own merits, in other words
regardless of any coefficient of utility for the existence of man and considered as a place of
intrinsic value or as a holder of rights whose existence as such, command a number of moral and
legal obligations.” It raises several questions that this article seeks to clarify: To whom should
natural rights (of Man or Nature) be given? Can it be done, and can we assign rights to
non-humans without strengthening an anthropocentric perspective leading to radical monism?
Who can claim these rights (humans, non-humans) and, in the case of non-humans, how does this
manifest? Who attributes such rights? In particular, who speaks on behalf of whom?
32
D. Pecaud